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VINTRODUCTION
Marxist ideas became a subject of discussion in the 
circles of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia in the 
eighties of the last century. Until that time the hopes 
of Russian revolutionaries had rested upon the peasantry 
as the class through which a socialist system would be 
established. Although polemics between populists and 
Marxists continued for some years, populism was a 
declining intellectual force and most of the younger 
members of the intelligentsia turned to Marxism, with the 
result that a fundamental re-evaluation of the perspectives 
and activity of the revolutionary movement took place. 
Attention was now directed to the small but rapidly 
growing urban working class. The early Russian Marxists 
whose social origins were far removed from those of the 
proletariat faced the same task as the populists of a 
generation earlier - of ’going to the people’, that is, of 
establishing links with the revolutionary class and 
formulating the programme on which it was to go into 
struggle. The political activity of the first Marxist 
groups was confined to propaganda classes for the most 
advanced workers and the composing and printing of 
agitational leaflets which the worker members of the groups 
distributed in the factories.
Russian workers at this time were entering upon the 
fierce economic struggles arising from a harsh and rapid 
industrialization, asserting their industrial demands, 
since trade union organisation was banned, by means of 
mass strikes. By the end of the century Marxists were
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divided as to the best way in which the organisation of 
the working class in the struggle for socialism should 
proceed. The immediate question was whether all efforts 
should be directed towards assisting vigorous industrial 
action in the factories and the political programme be 
left to the liberal bourgeoisie, or whether the first step 
should be to build up an illegal political party with a 
programme of revolutionary socialism. The significance of 
this division of opinion lay in the differing estimates 
made of the ability of the workers to proceed beyond the 
economic to the political struggle on their own initiative. 
Those who pointed to the necessity of the political party 
argued that revolutionary theory had to be brought to the 
workers by the educated classes and would never be 
generated by the economic struggle alone. The dispute was 
decided in favour of the political party when a group of 
intellectuals in exile, who included Plekhanov, Lenin and 
Martov, founded a newspaper Iskra which was to expound a 
political programme and act as an organiser to link the 
scattered groups in Russia into a single Social Democratic 
party. But at the congress of Social Democrats in 19^3 at 
which a programme was adopted and the Party established as 
a functioning organisation with central institutions, a 
split also occurred among the founders of Iskra. Was the 
Party to be a tightly organised underground body of 
professional revolutionaries or was it to be less 
exclusive, less disciplined and counting among its members 
those who sympathised broadly with the aims of Social 
Democracy? Although the dispute was waged over the Party 
rules, it was indicative of a deep disagreement between 
Russian Marxists as to the nature of the coming Russian
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revolution. The congress ended with the formation of 
rival Bolshevik and Menshevik factions, and after it the 
work of setting up and consolidating groups within Russia 
proceeded along separate lines with separate factional 
centres.
The events of 1905 took Social Democrats unawares. 
Unrolling in a series of actions from the massacre of 
January through the spreading disturbances of the 
summer to the general strike, the setting up of the 
St Petersburg Soviet of Workers1 Deputies and the armed 
uprising in Moscow, the revolution of 1905 flung together 
workers and Social Democratic intelligentsia and brought 
the Party into the open political arena. Workers joined 
it in large numbers, and constituted a majority of the 
members for the first time. The concessions won from the 
government in the October Manifesto provided political 
parties, although still illegal, with greatly enlarged 
opportunities for open agitation, propaganda and 
organisation. For the Social Democratic Party there was a 
partial abandonment of conspiratorial methods and the 
introduction of democratic election to office although the 
leading positions continued to be held by the 
intelligentsia. The events of 1905 in opening up wide 
fields of operation for the Party also brought to light a 
feature of the local organisation that was to remain 
characteristic of it, namely an impatience with factional 
splits and a disregard of the underlying reasons for the 
divisions between the left and right wings of Social 
Democracy. The strong pressure within Russia for the 
burying of factional differences brought about the uniting 
of the factions at the Stockholm Congress in 1906.
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Although, the defeat of the Moscow uprising ensured 
the steady recovery of the government 1s authority, the 
gains won in the revolution were substantial enough to 
enable the Social Democratic Party to lead an active semi­
legal existence with much open agitation and propaganda.
It was not until the Stolypin coup of June 1907 that the 
organisation was forced back into the underground and 
renewed faction splits occurred.
This thesis is concerned with the organisation, 
activity and tactics of the Bolshevik faction of the 
Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party in Russia from 
1907 to 1912. All Historians in writing of the R.S.D.W.P. 
have to deal with the fact that, except for the interlude 
of 1905-7» the leadership of the Party until 1917 was to 
be found in exile and the rank and file in Russia. The 
Party journals, except again in the years 1905-7» were 
published abroad. It was the leaders in exile who decided 
policy and it was between these that the decisive factional 
struggles were waged. Both because of the importance of 
the disputes between Lenin and other Party leaders in 
determining the political direction of Russian Social 
Democracy and because of the difficulty of obtaining 
information about the organisation within Russia, 
historians of the pre-revolutionary period have tended to 
devote most of their attention to the life of the Party in 
exile. Schapiro's work, The Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, concentrates largely on the evolution of policy and 
factional strife abroad. Keep's study, The Rise of Social 
Democracy in Russia, which deals with both aspects and 
throws much light on the local organisations does not go 
beyond 1906-7. The Social Democratic Party within Russia
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from 1907 to 1917 has been very little studied outside the 
U.S.S.R. The most obvious reason for this is the scarcity 
of source material. Even for the major Party 
organisations the sources are largely confined to the 
reports printed in the Party newspapers of the time, 
correspondence from local organisations, police records 
and memoirs. The reports from local organisations which 
form such an important part of Bolshevik journals, while 
necessarily incomplete and partisan give a great deal of 
valuable information about membership numbers, the type of 
activity undertaken and the difficulties faced. The 
largest gaps occur when the organisations break down 
through arrests and reports cease for a short or long 
period to appear. Correspondence from the localities and 
reports to the police give very clear descriptions of the 
state of local groups. Much use was made of these records 
in compiling regional Party histories after the 1917 
revolution, but only a small amount has appeared in the 
Soviet historical journals and archival publications. 
Finally, there are the memoirs, of which a great many 
appeared in the 1920s, in historical journals and as 
separate works. Most of these are of course the 
reminiscences of Bolshevik Party workers and give lively, 
partisan and often detailed accounts of the organisations 
of the pre-revolutionary years. The articles that appeared 
in the historical journal Proletarskaia revoliutsiia were 
obviously carefully studied and from time to time accounts 
were challenged in letters to the editors from other Party 
workers.
For an historian working in Australia in this field, 
there is an added difficulty in that much of the printed
Xmaterial which can be read in Europe and the United States 
is still not available here. In the last few years, 
however, the acquisition by libraries of photostated and 
micro-filmed journals and books has made it possible to 
begin work in this country. The primary sources for this 
thesis consist mainly of the newspapers' Proletarii and 
Sotsial* demokrat and memoirs and archival material printed 
in Proletarskaia revoliutsiia and other historical 
journals. It will be evident from the bibliography that 
there are major gaps, of which the most important are 
local Bolshevik illegal papers such as Rabochee znamia and 
the journal Krasnaia letopis1.
The amount of material available has been enough to 
give a fairly clear general picture of local organisations 
in this obscure period. It is possible to suggest answers 
to some of the questions that arise as to the changes in 
the organisation occurring during the revolutionary years. 
If 1905 had seen a change in the composition of the Party, 
from one consisting mainly of professional revolutionaries 
and intelligenty to one in which workers were in the 
majority, one might expect to learn something about 
relations in the local organisations between workers and 
intelligentsia, in the years that followed. Indeed this 
is so - from 1907 on there are frequent indications of 
tensions between the two groups, with the worker Party 
members relying on the intelligentsia for political 
leadership and propaganda, but resentful of their own 
dependence and contemptuous of the intelligentsia for their 
political cowardice. There is evidence also of the solid 
support among worker Bolsheviks for the left wing 
opposition to legal political activity. This support was
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so strong, that although it was possible for Lenin to have 
the emigre leaders of the left wing expelled, within 
Russia the rank and file of the left wing were never 
dislodged. There are plentiful signs of the comparative 
lack of interest within Russia in the factional disputes 
abroad. Finally the experience of the years of deep 
repression in Russia clearly indicates that in spite of all 
efforts of Social Democrats working legally, it was 
impossible to establish effective legal working class mass 
organisations - which largely accounted for the reviving 
workers’ movement from 1912 onwards finding its real 
leadership in the illegal Party.
Dates have been given according to the Julian 
calendar in use in Russia until 1917} which was thirteen 
days behind the Gregorian. The words faction and fraction 
have been used with different meanings - faction to 
indicate a group within the Party - the Bolshevik or 
Menshevik faction, and fraction to denote an organised 
group of Social Democrats within a non-Party organisation - 
thus, the Duma fraction (the group of Social Democratic 
deputies in the Duma) and fractions of Social Democrats in 
trade unions.
CHAPTER 1
ILLEGAL, HALF UNDERGROUND
A picture of the Party organisation as it appeared in 
the first half of 1 9 0 7  is full of contrast and variety. 
Videly varying levels of political sophistication and 
activity as well as of organisational complexity 
distinguished local groups one from the other. Factors 
such as the length of time a group had existed, the 
proportion of inteiligenty to workers in the membership, 
the number of professional revolutionaries available, the 
cistance from the largest city centres and the occupations 
of the local population strongly influenced the character 
of organisations. There were Party bodies in every stage 
(f development ranging from newly established groups which 
remarkably resembled the circles of the time of the League 
(f Struggle for the Emancipation of Labour, to the St 
letersburg organisation, which in March 1907 changed its 
rules to incorporate certain features of soviet 
(rganisation within its own structure.
An example of the most primitive type of Social 
I'emocratic group may be found in Vladivostock. In 
I'ecember 1906 the group had been in existence for three 
nonths. There were 500 workers in the area of operation 
(f the group, and thirty Party members, ten of them 
workers, with a leading collective of five (one a worker), 
lo leaflets had been put out by the group because it had 
1 0 technical facilities. Agitation was carried on orally. 
nhree mass meetings of 3 0 > 7 0 , and 20 workers and one of
1
217 (for shop assistants) had been held. To carry on 
propaganda there were four workers’ circles, with a total 
attendance of forty-five, one railway workers’ circle of 
twelve, one student circle of ten and two circles for 
gymnasium students. There were no trade unions, wide 
contacts existed with the countryside but no regular work 
was carried on, 40,000 troops were stationed in the area 
and it was proposed to form a propaganda circle for them. 
Links had been established with other Siberian centres, 
but in all this time not a word or a leaflet had come from 
the Central Committee or the Siberian Soiuz. The group 
was carryong on a campaign for the Duma elections entirely 
independently.
Here is an account of Social Democratic political 
activity which, except for the fact that there were now 
opportunities for open mass agitation, had changed little 
since the time of the early Marxist groups and which 
faithfully reflects the relationship between intelligentsia 
and workers outlined in What is to be done? The majority 
of the members were intelligenty, the weight of whose 
propaganda and agitational activity was directed towards 
the workers. The group was operating in isolation, 
relying (except for the matter of a purchase of seventy 
roubles’ worth of brochures) entirely on its own resources 
to carry on its missionary work.
But elsewhere, under the impact of the revolution, 
considerable organisational change and development had
1
Proletarii [hereafter cited 
1907, p.8.
as Prol. ] no. 15, 25 March
3taken place. The original basis of local organisation had 
been the town committees of professional revolutionaries. 
From here the building of factory nuclei had been 
undertaken and as the latter multiplied they became the 
primary units.
Party members in the factory constituted the factory1soiuz (union). This term however does not appear to have 
been much used and the factory organisation was usually 
referred to as the factory sobranie (meeting). A number 
of factory organisations were grouped into a raion 
(district) and the raions together formed the city 
organisation. Representatives from the raions comprised 
the city conference, the leading body, from which came 
members of the city committee which carried out the day to 
day tasks of political leadership.
The first bodies linking the local groups were also 
known as soiuzy. The Siberian Soiuz had been formed in 
1901, and the Transcaucasian in 1903. The term soiuz, as 
applied to regional bodies, began to go out of use and be 
replaced by oblast1. The Transcaucasian Soiuz was renamed 
in 1906, but the Crimean and Siberian regions retained the 
term soiuz.
In the early stages of the Party*s growth the linking 
bodies had simple functions, which were mainly to provide 
techanical assistance for the Party workers and to issue 
and distribute literature. The early groups were self 
acting organisations whose basic purpose was to carry on 
agitation and propaganda, and at this low level their
Prol. no. 15> 25 March 1907} p.8.
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4continued existence required merely the presence of 
intelligenty who were willing and able to instruct, and 
workers who were prepared to listen. The process of 
simple unification, proceeding within Russia before 1905 
was however given a powerful push and made more complex by 
the efforts of leading Party intelligenty abroad, in 
particular Lenin, who wished to see the scattered Social 
Democratic groups united through a central Party leading 
body and a central organ.
The growth of the Party was vastly speeded up during 
1905 and particularly after the October days. With the 
influx of thousands of new members two questions 
immediately arose, of organisational democracy and 
organisational ramification. The new situation was 
reflected in the decisions of the Tammerfors conference of 
Bolsheviks in December 1905> which stated that it was 
essential to put into effect a broad electoral principle 
and grant elected centres full powers in the matter of 
ideological and practical leadership, together with the 
removability, widest publicity and strict accountability 
of such centres for their actions. The conference also 
recommended the organisation of oblas t x conferences and 
soiuzy with oblas t * organs, in order to unify and 
stimulate work in the localities.
These oblast1 (regional) organisations, of which the 
Central Industrial, Urals, Volga, Crimean, North-west, 
Transcaucasian and Siberian were the ones mentioned in the 
Bolshevik press from 1906 on, were immediately called upon 
to furnish far more than technical assistance and regional 
publications for the Party groups in their areas. This 
was noted in the report of the second conference of the
5Central Industrial Region, which embraced the Moscow City 
and Moscow Okrug organisations, and those of a number of 
large industrial centres. The reporter from the Oblas tr 
Bureau pointed to the number and variety of tasks falling 
to the Bureau. Apart from technical functions in 
connection with passports, transport and allocation of 
forces (personnel), almost from the very first day of its 
existence the Bureau had had to resolve organisational 
questions, and if not formally, at least in practice, had 
become an organ of political co-ordination and leadership 
of the Oblast* , deciding disputes, assisting organisations 
financially and acting as an organ for the exchange of 
information.
The rules of the Oblast1 adopted at this conference, 
which was attended by seventeen delegates representing 
16,990 members, listed the nineteen local committees and 
groups currently comprising the Oblast * organisation, and 
stated that the regular Oblas tr conference was to be 
summoned every three months for the discussion and 
resolution of general Party and local questions and the 
co-ordination of work in the Oblast1. The right of 
representation with full vote belonged to all independent 
organisations with not less than 200 members.
Organisations with more than 200 members could send one 
delegate for every full 500 members. Organisations with 
not less than 100 members had a consultative vote. 
Delegates to the conference were to be elected either 
directly by all members of the organisation or by 
democratically organised conferences and congresses. The 
Oblast* Bureau was to carry out the decisions of the
conference, allocate Party forces in the region, conduct
6the regional institutions, organise the calling of the 
conference and prepare material for it, be in contact with 
the central Party institutions, inform the Party of the 
progress of Party affairs, draw up plans of campaigns and 
leaflets, and rebuild local organisations which had 
collapsed. Members of the Oblast* Bureau had the right to 
be present with consultative vote at the meetings of all 
organisations in the Oblast*. Oblast* organisations were
1to remit to the Bureau 5 per cent of all moneys received.
In August 1907 an Oblast * conference changed some of 
the rules, including those determining the basis of 
representation at the conference. The organisation had 
grown considerably in the past year although most centres 
reported a drop in numbers in the recent past. The new 
basis was to be one delegate per organisation of 300 
members and organisations with more than 1000 members were 
entitled to one delegate for each full thousand. Election 
of delegates was to take place in local conferences, okrug 
congresses and similar meetings. The number of 
representatives was to be determined by the number of 
members registered. The membership totals were to be kept 
by the Oblast * Bureau, and the Bureau was to give 
organisations two to three weeks notice of conferences.
As well as changing the rules, the conference gave a 
series of organisational directives to the newly elected 
Oblas t * Bureau, as follows:
The tasks of the Bureau were to arrange an Oblast * 
meeting place and assist in the allotment of forces;
Prol. no. 4, 19 September 1906, pp.3-5*
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7inform local organisations of what was happening in 
the Party and inform the Central Committee of local 
happenings and requests; set up an Oblast * printing 
apparatus and issue agitational leaflets and supply 
literature.
The conference also expressed the wish that the Bureau 
would send monthly circulars to the organisations and make
imore frequent tours of the region.
Another linking organisation which came into
existence as local centres expanded was the okrug. Such
bodies as the Moscow Okrug organisation and the Ivanovo-
Voznesensk Okrug organisation were simply bodies covering
the districts surrounding, but excluding, a city. They
were similar in constitution to the city organisations,
worked closely with them but were in no sense superior
Party bodies. Frunze who took an active part in the
organisation of the Party in Ivanovo-Voznesensk remarks
that the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Okrug body was formed at a
conference of representatives from various centres in the
area in 1905 and was set up simply because the city
organisation was unable to cope with the demands made on
it from places outside the city. One special feature of
this organisation was that in November 1906, on the
initiative of the City and Okrug committees a raion
conference was held and it was decided to unite all
organisations in the area into one special collective
2under the name of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Soiuz. This
_
Prol. no. 18, 29 October 1907 , pp.5-6.
2
M.V. Frunze, 1Vospominaniia o partiinoi rabote ivanovo- 
voznesenskoi organizatsii bol*shevikov*, in Partiia 
bol1shevikov v revoliutsii 1905-1907 godov. (M., 1961),
pp.4o6, 4o8-9.
8however, does not seem to have been a practice followed 
elsewhere.
A conference of Volga Okrug organisations in 1906 
noted three types of leading okrug bodies. Work among the 
peasants in the first stage was carried on by the town 
committees themselves in more or less regular contact with 
separate groups and individuals, by distributing 
literature and sending out agitators. In the next stage 
agrarian work was undertaken separately. Special okrug 
organisations were attached to local committees with the 
standing of raions. They embraced all the Social 
Democratic nuclei in the okrug, had their own organisers 
and acted autonomously. The third stage of development 
was reached when the okrug organisations became 
independent of the town committees with full powers and 
maintained direct contact with the Central Committee,
issuing their own literature and following their own
1tactical programme.
The Okrug Raion attached to the Petersburg Committee 
appears to have been an example of an organisation of the 
second type and the Moscow and Ivanovo-Voznesensk Okrug 
organisations were the best known fully independent okrugs.
In some areas, however, it seems that the okrug was a 
linking body intermediate between small town organisations 
and the oblast* centre. Instead of the okrug groups being 
attached as a raion to the town organisation, the latter 
became the nucleus of an okrug organisation which had 
representation on the oblast1 committee. The second
Prol. no. 8, 23 November 1906 , pp.5-6.
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9conference of the Central Industrial Region approved the
renaming of the Kostroma Committee as the Kostroma Okrug 
1Committee. The account of work to form the Vladimir
Okrug organisation in 1907 said that during the last few
months there had been no Okrug committee because the
members had left the area or been arrested. An organising
bureau succeeded in calling an Okrug conference, which met
in March, to elect delegates to the Party Congress. There
were fifteen delegates with full vote from a number of
local centres including the Vladimir town organisation.
Rules for the Vladimir Okrug organisation were adopted,
the Okrug committee budget fixed and the amount of
contributions from the local organisations determined.
The Okrug conference was to meet every three months,
elected on a basis of one to every hundred organised
workers. The conference elected an executive bureau which
together with the representatives (one each) from the
local organisations numbering not less than 150 organised
workers constituted the Okrug committee. Between the
monthly meetings of the committee work was carried on by
2the elected executive commission.
The city organisations, as has been said, were 
divided into raions and as the membership grew, the raions 
were divided into podraions (sub-districts). The latter 
would consist of the nuclei in one factory, if a large one, 
or in a number of small work places. A small city 
organisation would have a mixture of territorial and
1
Prol. no. 4, 19 September 1906, p .4.
Prol. no. 15, 25 March 1907, p.8.
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occupational raions. Kharkov for example had three - 
Railway, City and Locomotive Construction. In Moscow the 
division, except for the Railway raion, was territorial, 
the seven local raions being Central, Zamoskvorechie, 
Rogozhskii, Lefortovo, Sokol, Butyrsk and Presnia. At the 
beginning of 1907 Petersburg had twelve raions, seven of 
them, City, Vasilev Ostrov, Vyborg, Petersburg, Moscow, 
Narva and Neva, based on city districts, and the remainder 
being Okrug, Railway, Shop Assistants, Latvian and 
Estonian.
In March 1907 a draft plan of reorganisation of the 
Petersburg City organisation was published in Proletarii. 
The plan contained inter alia, the following points:
N o . 1 0 . The leading organ of the St Petersburg
organisation as a whole is the city conference. 
Conference is elected by direct vote on the basis of 
1 -50.
Note. Two stage elections are permissible only in 
case of insuperable police obstacles and then only 
with the agreement of the Petersburg Committee.
No. 11. Conference is a standing body, meeting at 
least twice a month.
N o . 12. Elections for conference are held every six
months.
Note. Conference elections may be held on request of 
half the members of the organisation or by decision 
of the conference itself.
N o . 13» All members of the Party are eligible for
election by conference to its executive organ, the 
Petersburg Committee.
11
The organisation was to be divided into territorial 
raions, except for railway workers who were to have 
separate raions.^
In the following issue of Proletarii appeared an 
account of the conference which had adopted the new rules. 
It was held in Finland on March 27 and attended by 133 
delegates of whom more than 100 were workers. Altogether 
7,327 members took part in the conference elections which 
continued for over a month and were supervised by the 
Central Committee. The reason for the presence of the C.C. 
was to avoid a repetition of the bitterly disputed votes 
of the January 1907 Petersburg conference. The main item 
of discussion was the proposed reorganisation. Conference 
adopted the Bolshevik plan by a large majority, declared 
itself a standing body for six months with permissible 
re-elections if the workers wished it, at two weeks 
notice.^
On April 8, the conference assembled, again in 
Finland in the second regular session under the new rules. 
The agenda, not all of which was dealt with because of 
lack of time contained the following nine items: May Day, 
the meetings campaign (protesting against police 
restrictions on meetings), the council of representatives 
(factory delegates who chose the electors from the 
workers* curia), elections to the 5th Congress, reports 
from Duma deputies Aleksinkii and Petrov, organisational
Prol. no. 15, 25 March 1907, p.8.
Prol. no. l6, 2 May 1907, p.8.
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questions, the co-operative movement, the struggle against
1the Black Hundreds and unemployment.
In the same issue there was an article by Lenin in 
which, commending the reorganisation, he referred to the 
defeated Menshevik proposal. The main difference, he said, 
was that the Mensheviks wanted to dispense with the 
Petersburg Committee altogether and instead, divide the 
conference into a number of commissions (propaganda, 
agitation, trade unions, etc.) to deal with various 
aspects of Party work. An elected presidium of five would 
attend to relations with the central Party institutions. 
Lenin described the proposal to do away with the executive 
body, the Petersburg Committee, as reducing the centralism 
in democratic centralism to a fiction.
Another conference of the Petersburg organisation was
held in October and was attended by fifty-seven delegates
with full vote and eleven with consultative vote.
Repression was already severe. The permanent session had
obviously been dropped. Although the six monthly term of
the conference was complete, it was decided not to proceed
with full elections until the end of the campaign in
connection with the trial of the Social Democratic
deputies of the Second Duma. Supplementary elections were
held to replace those who had been arrested or had gone 
2away.
1
Ibid.
Prol. no. 20, 19 November 1907» pp.5-6.
2
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Although there is no report in Proletarii of a
1similar reorganisation in Moscow, it seems that in the 
summer of 1907 the Moscow conference met fortnightly as in 
Petersburg. Khodorovskii in his reminiscences of work in 
Moscow says,
Conferences were held regularly every fortnight, 
all through Saturday night into Sunday. By 8 
o'clock in the evening representatives from all 
the raions would gather at the Izmailovskii Zoo. 
150-200 raion representatives attended the 
conferences...[which] began in the evening in 
the twilight and generally finished at daybreak.
In these deeply conspiratorial surroundings the 
mood of the delegates was notable for a special 
earnestness. Speeches were invariably business 
like, not a word too many was to be heard.
And before morning everyone set off on foot for 
their raions. I usually had to walk from the 
Izmailovskii Zoo to the Sparrow Hills (fifteen 
versts) where there was a meeting of the City 
Raion conference at my place at 9 or 10 on 
Sunday morning.^
It would also seem that the Sormovo town conference
3was a standing body meeting monthly.
What conclusions can be reached on the changes that 
had occurred in the Party structure since 1905? It can 
certainly be said that the ramification of the regional
1
The set of Prole tarii available to me lacks Nos. 10, 11,14.
2
I. Khodorovskii, 'Nekotorye momenty iz zhizni moskovskoi 
partiinoi organizatsii v 1907 godu*, in Proletarskaia 
revoliutsiia [hereafter cited as PRj (1925) , n o . 2~, p.198.
3
I. Flerovskii, 'Partiinaia rabota v Sormove v gody 
reaktsii (1905-1907 gg)1, in PR (1925), no. 6, p.l8l.
l4
organisations answered local needs. The entire tenor of 
reports in the Bolshevik press was that more assistance 
was required from the oblast* leadership and failure in 
work was often blamed on the inadequacy of oblas t * forces. 
The eighteen months of semi-legal operations were not long 
enough to indicate how relations between the Central 
Committee and powerful local centres would develop. With 
a Menshevik Central Committee in office for most of the 
time Bolshevik-led organisations took an independent stand 
whenever they disagreed strongly with its policy. Had the 
C.C. been Bolshevik, relations would have been more 
cordial, but the connecting links between the central body 
and the lower organisations would still have been somewhat 
tenuous. The line of transmission of policy from the top 
downward ran through the central press and the leading 
practical organisers. The shortage of these forces was so 
acute that considerable scope for initiative necessarily 
lay with local organisations.
Three general Party conferences were held in the 
comparative safety of Finland in 1906-7 on occasions when 
it was necessary to resolve major policy issues quickly, 
in particular those connected with elections to the Duma 
and its dissolution. As well as serving as a forum in 
which differences were made known, and policy was roughly 
decided by majority v o t e , the conferences acted as an 
organisational stimulant for local Party centres. So long 
as the delegates were able to make the journey to Finland 
and back without being arrested, attendance at the 
conferences provided a means for the rapid transmission 
and co-ordination of policy. Provision for the regular 
holding of such conferences was incorporated in the Party 
rules at the London Congress.
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The unwieldy standing conferences of 1907 could not, 
of course, survive the repression. They constituted an 
interesting unfinished experiment. While their very size, 
had they continued, would have prevented them from doing 
anything in Petersburg and Moscow but delegate large 
powers to the executive body, they did nevertheless 
establish close links between leading committees and 
members, and above a l l , they offered the opportunity for 
the training of workers in forms of political activity and 
leadership, thus reducing the gap between the 
intelligentsia and the workers.
It was primarily through propaganda and agitation 
that Party members maintained day to day political contact 
with the workers. In cities and okrugs the organisation 
of propaganda circles, elementary, intermediate and 
advanced, was undertaken by the raion committees, or in 
some instances in Petersburg and Moscow, by the podraion 
committees. The circles were discussion groups usually 
eight to fifteen in number, of workers who were members of 
the Party or close to it. They read basic political texts 
and studied the theory of Marxism, political economy, the 
Party history and programme and tasks of the day. The two 
difficulties in the way of organising stable propaganda 
circles, which were always present, arose from the lack of 
suitable quarters and competent tutors. The crowded 
workers1 dwellings could not accommodate even such small 
gatherings, so all sorts of premises were used, from clubs 
and union offices and student hostels to sympathisers* 
apartments - but there were never enough of them. The 
arrival of warm weather brought some relief, enabling 
outdoor classes to be held. Late in 1906 the leading
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Moscow raion, Central, reported that with a Party 
membership of 1,373> twenty-four circles with eight to 
twelve members each were operating, and nineteen more had 
just been set up. It was admitted that morale in the 
raion was low owing to a recent unsuccessful strike and 
workers were apathetic and irregular in their attendance
at factory meetings. The Butyrsk raion with 350 members
1appears to have had nine circles at this time.
The complaint of shortage of propagandists to take
circles was universal, but in addition in Petersburg in
1906-7 an increasingly critical attitude on the part of
advanced workers to the courses provided by Bolshevik
circles became apparent. The Gvozdilnyi podraion (Vasilev
Ostrov raion) reported that there were six factories in
the area with circles in each, but that circles which had
been almost the only means of influencing the masses no
longer satisfied the workers. The most conscious ones,
even Party members, were of the opinion that they had
heard it all before. They hadn*t arrived at a
consciousness of partiinost * but had gone far beyond the
stage of circles. The remedy, it was suggested, probably
lay in the serious organisation of advanced circles and
circles for training agitators and propagandists in which
2the creative independence of the workers could develop.
The state of affairs in the Semiannikov podraion (Neva 
raion) was discussed in January 1907. During the previous 
two months, of twenty-two agitational and propaganda
1
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meetings attended by 750 people only four lectures had
been devoted to programme and theory - the rest had all
been on the election campaign. Propaganda work was
unsatisfactory because the workers had outgrown the
circles in which propaganda leaders repeated for the
hundredth time, themes, words and phrases already familiar
to the workers. The need was for experienced, well read
comrades who could answer all questions and broad lectures
were required on the programme, tactics and history of
Social Democracy. It had been impossible to arrange this.
Insistent approaches to higher committees had been
unavailing. An attempt had been made to carry on a
systematic course of lectures on the history of Social
Democracy, but only three had been held. After that the
lecturer had been arrested and imprisoned. A list of the
subjects of the lectures and discussions held in the
podraion was given in the report. The lecturers appear to
have included both Lenin and Zinoviev. The subjects dealt
with were election agreements, agreements with the Cadets ,
differences of view points of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks on
the role of bourgeois democracy in the Russian revolution,
origin of the Russian revolutionary movement, beginnings
of the labour movement, parliamentarism, economism, and an
1agitational course.
By November 1907 the difficulties of organising
propaganda in Petersburg had become acute. Neva, City and
2Narva raions and the Central podraion all report in
1
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addition to the shortage of meeting places, demands from 
workers for serious education, which could not be 
satisfied. In the City raion conscious workers had 
expressed a strong wish for advanced circles to enable 
them to undertake systematic study, but on numerous 
occasions lecturers had failed to appear. In the Narva 
raion an advanced circle had been organised to train 
workers to speak on political questions at workers* 
meetings and for a study of the Party programme. Black 
Hundred activity and harassment by spies in the Putilov 
works had paralysed the energies of even the most active 
workers, who finding no satisfaction in Party work, were 
leaving the organisation *until times change* and in order 
to engage in self education and independent work to 
develop their general outlook.
Nor was the critical attitude confined to Petersburg. 
In Ekaterinoslav at the end of September 1907 it was 
reported that hardly any propaganda had been carried on 
since May. The local propagandists did not satisfy the 
demands made on them and workers refused to attend their 
lectures. These propagandists were less interested in
their Party work than in getting positions in trade unions
1as secretaries or office workers. In the Orekhovo- 
Pavlovsk raion (Moscow Okrug) , a purely proletarian centre, 
where there was enthusiastic support for the Party and the 
organisation numbered 500, with five professionals (two of 
them workers) and a regular monthly income of 150-200 
roubles, workers were able to carry out organisational,
18
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agitational and primary propaganda tasks, but for further 
propaganda needs local propagandists were inadequate.
Workers complained that they already knew what they had to
1say. There were six circles in the raion.
A rare example of a satisfactory solution of the 
problem both of premises and teachers was found in the 
Sormovo organisation, a centre of quarrelling Mensheviks 
and Bolsheviks. Here one of the liberal gains of the 
revolution had been the occupation of two Church run 
schools and the turning over of their administration to a 
pedagogical council of thirty-five teachers, thirty-two of 
whom were Social Democrats. Bolsheviks and Mensheviks 
settled their differences sufficiently to appoint their 
factional nominees to the staff in strict alternation. A 
flourishing Sunday school was established, which using 
school buildings and staff, provided not only the elements 
of grammar, arithmetic and geography for the masses but 
also some fifteen classes a week in political economy, 
historical materialism, the Party programme and history of 
the revolution and the labour movement. Less advanced
2workers were catered for in the usual propaganda circles.
The Lugansk organisation with over a thousand members 
divided into four raions, City, Railway and two factory 
raions, reported for the London Congress that in the 
second half of 1906 and the beginning of 1907 it was able
1
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to carry on extensive propaganda work in the spring and
summer but the classes in winter dropped to ten-fifteen
with attendances of ten-fifteen in each. Workers showed
particular interest in the agrarian question and relations
between Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries,
1Cadets and anarchists.
In the field of agitation reports from the localities 
indicated more success. Oral agitation in the form of 
quick factory gate and mass meetings was carried on 
wherever agitators could manage to get away with it. 
Conditions varied enormously from place to place even 
within the same city. Some podraions in Petersburg 
reported as early as 1906 that open meetings of workers in 
particular factories were not possible, but that leaflets 
were eagerly read. The number of mass meetings grew 
sharply in summer when people went to the nearby forests.
One form of open agitational-organisational activity 
which was very popular in some centres was the birzha 
(exchange). Descriptions of this in Samara, Dvinsk and 
Ekaterinoslav appear in Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia. 
Zalezhskii gives an account of what he says was the 
classic birzha in Ekaterinoslav. The Party organisation 
in 1906 numbered several thousand and was in his w ords, 
illegal and half underground. The city and raion 
committees, the conspiratorial meeting places, passport 
bureau and printing apparatus were all underground, while 
factory nuclei and well known local Social Democrats 
operated openly. The basic form of open Party life was
P r o l . no. 16, 2 May 1907, P-7-
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provided by the birzha which operated in the main city 
boulevards every evening between five and seven. Each 
party, Social Democrats, Bund, Socialist Revolutionaries, 
Jewish Socialists and anarchists had its own stand. Here 
the party members assembled, the news was discussed and 
people came in from the raions and factories to see 
agitators and organisers. Party literature was sold, 
meeting arrangements made and organisational matters 
attended to. At one time the police tried to clear the 
people from the boulevards but found the birzhi operating 
again next day, and thereafter contented themselves with 
seeing that the closing time of seven o*clock was 
punctually observed. Spies hung about the birzhi in large 
numbers. Zalezhskii observes that it was the collapse of 
the Ekaterinoslav Party organisation from within rather
than any particular police action that put an end, until
11912, to the Ekaterinoslav birzha.
The most effective agitational weapon of the Party in 
I905-I907 was the printed leaflet. One of the most 
important tasks of any Party centre was to acquire some 
sort of printing equipment, or at worst, duplicating 
machine, for the production of leaflets on local issues 
and current questions. The presses in Petersburg and 
Moscow also supplied surrounding areas. The agitational 
leaflet addressed to Party members, workers, peasants, 
soldiers, or society at large, served as a means of 
explaining Party policy and of organising support for it.
1
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Piatnitskii was in charge of the Moscow Committee
printing press in 1906-7• A shop was rented and stocked
as a greengrocery specialising in Caucasian products. The
printery was set up in the cellar. While the press was
working the sound could be heard in the shop above, so
that whenever a customer came in, a signal had to be given
to stop the press. All paper for printing was brought in
in the baskets of fruit and vegetables and all leaflets
1for distribution left the shope in the same way.
In the eight months of the operation of the printery
under Piatnitskii’s direction until its discovery in April
1 9 0 7 , a total of one and a half million leaflets was
turned out. Of the forty-five titles, seven were leaflets
addressed to workers on political and economic questions,
twenty-one to the general public mostly on the political
demands of the Party and the attitude of Social Democrats
to various questions, four were leaflets for peasants, two
for soldiers and one for railway workers. Also printed
were two numbers of the railway workers1 2 journal, the
Party’s agrarian programme, an appeal for assistance for
arrested persons, reports of the Moscow Committee for
November and December 1906, draft resolutions for the 5th
Congress and an address to the Social Democratic deputies 
2in the Duma.
The Petersburg Committee reported for the month of 
October 1906 that they had printed 264,688 copies of
1
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leaflets, 4000 issues of Proletarii and 6000 of Vpered. 
Nearly a year later they reported that »in the recent 
period» they had printed a total of 2 3 1 ,0 0 0 leaflets, 
mostly on the Duma election campaign. They had also
pdistributed 63,000 Central Committee leaflets.
But in spite of the formidable amount produced the 
demand for agitational literature was unending and the 
needs of the outlying areas were never satisfied. The 
difficulties of printing there were much greater than in 
the capitals and the output of local leaflets was 
invariably insufficient. Kursk from January to August 
1906 issued 31,300 leaflets (22 titles).^ Lugansk put out
3 0 . 0 0 0 leaflets in the second half of 1906 together with
20.000 reprints of Petersburg Committee and Central
4Committee leaflets. In the Orekhovo-Pavlovsk raion the
position was worse. The local equipment could produce no
more than 3 0 0 -6 0 0 copies three to four times a month.
They also received 10,000 leaflets a month from the Moscow
Committee and Moscow Okrug Committee, but they reported
5that they needed 1 0 ,0 0 0 copies of each leaflet.
The Urals, where the problems of distance and lack of 
intelligentsia were particularly acute, reported in 
October 1907 that literature was the nerve that united the
1
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far flung factory organisations with the Perm and Oblast1 
Committees. The need was for theoretically advanced Party 
workers but there was a chronic shortage both of these and 
of literature. The Urals had technical equipment but not 
the literary forces to make use of it.
The brief flowering in 1905 of legal newspapers 
published by the revolutionary opposition was cut short 
with the suppression of the Moscow uprising. 1906 began 
with the closure of more than eighty journals and the 
arrest of sixty editors. The Bolsheviks in Petersburg 
were able to do no more than publish in succession three 
legal dailies, Volna, Vpered and Ekho which survived from 
April to July. With the closure of the last they were 
without a legal press until early in 1 9 0 7 » when three 
weekly and four daily papers with even shorter lives 
appeared between January and April. In Moscow the legal 
Bolshevik papers Svetok, Svobodnoe slovo, Voprosy dnia and 
Istina appeared intermittently in 1906-7* The Caucasian, 
Kiev, Samara and Lugansk Social Democrats also published 
journals legally. But it was clear that there was very 
little future for a legal Social Democratic press in the 
aftermath of 1905* By summer 1906 Bolshevik leaders felt 
an urgent need both for a platform for their policy on 
important political issues and for a journal to counter 
the Menshevik controlled central organ Sotsial demokrat. 
And so the central illegal Bolshevik newspaper Proletarii 
began publication on August 21, 1906, appearing 
successively in Petersburg, Vyborg, Geneva and Paris.
Lenin was the editor and contributed over a hundred 
articles and pieces. Until its closure with no. 50 on 
November 28, 1909 this redoubtable factional organ served
Prol. no. 20, 19 November 1907» P*7*
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as a journal of political news and opinion, the bludgeon 
with which Lenin hammered his opponents on the Left and 
the Right, and very importantly, as a Party organiser. 
Regular reports of congress and conference resolutions and 
the activity of the Central Committee and accounts of 
happenings in the Duma, trade unions, factories, prisons 
and local organisations gave the Leninist political line 
and provided a picture of Party activity. Intended for 
circulation throughout the local organisations, it was 
essentially a journal for professionals, Party 
functionaries and advanced workers. Parallel with the 
first twenty numbers of Proletarii the editorial board 
published twenty numbers of an illegal popular paper for 
workers, Vpered. This ceased publication at the beginning 
of 1908 when the editorial board had to emigrate in order 
to continue publication of Prole tarii abroad. In the 
preparation of Vpered workers took a more active part and 
meetings of the editorial staff with worker correspondents 
were held.
The shortage and inadequacy of Bolshevik journals 
suitable for worker readers were generally recognised. An 
attempt was made in the Petersburg City raion early in 
1 9 0 7 to publish a paper that would appeal to the masses 
because it was felt that Prole tarii was rather too 
difficult for undeveloped workers to master. Since the 
Petersburg Committee press was fully occupied with 
leaflets, a separate printing apparatus had to be 
assembled. The students of the Okhta Technical School 
assisted in the work of the paper, Rabochii, but there was
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an informer among them and in June arrests put an end to 
the venture.^
Kazarma, an illegal paper for circulation among 
soldiers was published in Petersburg from February 1906 to 
March 1907• It was the organ of the Bureau of Military 
and Combat Organisations. At the end of 1906, 20,000 
copies of each issue were published. The illegal paper of 
the Moscow organisation was Bor1 2ba which appeared between 
March 1907 and February 1908.
Publishing underground newspapers in the provinces
was as a rule even more difficult than in the capitals.
Either the technical facilities would be lacking or the
people capable of acting as editors. Great efforts were
made in the Urals to publish illegal papers. Between
October 1906 and December 1907 five appeared, Ufimskii
rabochii, Rabochii (each issue 10,000 copies), Uralskij
rabochii, Krest1ianskaia gazeta (8000 copies) and
Soldatskaia gazeta (2000). According to Liadov,
sufficient type for three or four papers was provided by a
raid on a gubernia printery by the Party combat group at
the time when the Urals organisation was actively
campaigning in the elections for the 2nd Duma and the 5th 
2Party Congress.
Social Democratic work among the peasants was a 
subject of discussion in Bolshevik okrug organisations in
1
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1906 and 1907. With the general tactic that the peasantry 
would be the ally of the urban working class in carrying 
out a democratic revolution, the immediate problem was how 
to involve the peasants in wider issues than the shortage 
of land, and to find suitable organisational forms for the 
political struggle in the villages. Party organisers were 
fully aware, as a report from the Nizhni Novgorod district 
in September 1906 put it, that it was impossible to
organise the peasants without using the slogan of the
1seizure of the land. A conference of the Nizhni Novgorod 
Okrug organisation at this time saw its main tasks as 
being to encourage the peasants to refuse to pay taxes, 
withhold recruits, replace local authorities with peasant 
nominees and take possession of the land. The method of 
organisation was to set up revolutionary peasant
2committees and councils of peasants1Duma deputies.
Reports from various localities agree that the 
readiness of the peasants to listen to Social Democratic 
agitation depended on the closeness of their contacts with 
urban workers. One reporter from the Ukraine pointed out 
that in Central Russia peasants who worked in towns and 
returned regularly, sometimes as often as once a week to 
their villages, were the transmitters of revolutionary 
ideas, whereas in the Ukraine the poor had remained in the
countryside as a rural proletariat and the towns had not
3revolutionised the villages.
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A conference of Volga Okrug organisations with 
representatives from Samara, Saratov, Nizhni Novgorod,
Simbirsk and Kazan presented the most ambitious and
1detailed plan of work for a large peasant area. The 
general conclusions from the reports given were that the 
central point around which all peasant demands were to be 
united was the slogan of the seizure of the land and that 
the most revolutionary elements in the village were the 
semi-proletarians and proletarians created by the presence 
of industry. There had been a general decline of 
confidence in the Tsar and peasants were beginning to see 
the value of fraternising with soldiers and the need for 
unity with the workers. Forms of mass struggle were to be 
directed towards using the peasants' traditional rejection 
of authority from above and encouraging them to seize 
authority at the village level. They were to be urged to 
refuse tax payments, boycott auctions of the possessions 
of tax defaulters, boycott courts and police who were to 
be refused quarters and fodder for their horses and to 
resist arrest, free those arrested, refuse to supply 
recruits and destroy recruiting lists. The favoured type 
of organisation was the non-party revolutionary peasant 
committee which would link the villages, distribute 
revolutionary literature and organise mass meetings. They 
should be in contact with local organisations of railway 
men and workers in district factories. Another field of 
activity was to ascertain what stores of firearms were 
held by the landowners, police and government and to 
organise peasant combat groups. At the moment of decisive
Prol. no. 8, 23 November 1906 , pp.4-6.
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struggle the peasant committees would assume the 
leadership in the localities and carry out land seizure 
under the control of the village. The conference also 
discussed a plan of okrug organisation.
The deliberations of this conference clearly reveal 
the difficulties that stood in the way of Social Democratic 
organisation in the countryside. While the forms of 
struggle envisaged, disruption, non-co-operation and civil 
disobedience, were familiar enough to the peasants and 
widely practised in times of social disturbance, they 
could not, by their very nature, be brought easily within 
the framework of disciplined revolutionary action under 
the control of the Party. To cope with the peasants once 
they did start to move the conference considered that it 
was essential to train cadres of peasant agitators from 
amongst urban workers who had retained their links with 
the village.
A report from Kasimov, Riazan province, stated that
peasants in that area had already been influenced by the
purely proletarian sons of semi-proletarian peasants, who
came back each year from their factories in Petersburg,
Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Baku for the army call up,
bringing with them Social Democratic ideas and literature.
In Kasimov an organisation comprising twelve small
podraions with five or six villages in each had been in
1existence for three months.
The most marked example of a peasant population 
responding to the ideas from the cities may be found in
Prol. no. 8, 23 November 1906, p.8.
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the reports from the St Petersburg Okrug. Here there was 
strong criticism by organisers of the Party1s agitational 
material and a popular organ was called for. Proletarii 
was dismissed as unsuitable but it was felt that Vpered 
could be improved if the editorial board would meet the
group working among the peasants to discuss articles about
1the villages. In mid-1907 it was reported that the work
of Social Democratic groups in the Okrug had been much
assisted by workers returning to their native places
because of unemployment or administrative banishment.
Their role was more important than that of the village
teachers. The peasants regarded the Party very seriously.
The report also stated that in some areas the whole
community contributed to Party expenses and there were
districts where Social Democratic organisations were in
the forefront in all local activities and led the economic
struggle against the landlords for the lowering of rents
2on pasture and meadow land.
The election campaign preceding the convocation of 
the 2nd Duma in February 1907 was the occasion of fierce 
disputes between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in the recently 
re-united Party. The Stockholm Congress resolution on the 
Duma had stated that the antagonism between the new 
bourgeois society and the old regime would precipitate 
conflicts between the government and the parliamentary 
body, and it was the duty of Social Democrats to use these 
conflicts and those within the Duma itself to extend and
1
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deepen the revolutionary movement. But each faction 
emphasised different parts of the resolution. The 
Mensheviks, whose views were later summed up by Martov at 
the London Congress, recognised that with the defeat of 
the revolutionary challenge in December 1905» the militant 
mood of the masses was declining, but the Duma, owing its 
existence to the revolution and forced to struggle with 
the autocracy to survive, could constitute a rallying 
point for broad sections of the population, and this would 
assist the regrouping of social forces in the interests of 
further revolutionary development. The linking of the 
anti-government struggle of the Duma with the proletarian 
movement became the overriding aim of Menshevik tactics. 
They urged the conclusion of electoral agreements with the 
liberals wherever this was necessary to keep out 
candidates from the Right. They raised the slogans of the 
Duma as an organ of power to achieve a constituent 
assembly and of a ministry responsible to the Duma.
Bolshevik thinking expressed by Lenin rejected the 
idea of constitutional development and insisted that the 
political struggle between autocracy and people would have 
to be resolved by revolutionary means. The Duma could not 
be used to realise the demands of workers and peasants, 
and the primary task of Social Democratic deputies was to 
use the platform it provided, not for legislative purposes 
but for revolutionary agitation and propaganda. There 
could be no alliance between the working class and the 
essentially counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. In the 
matter of electoral agreements there could be no deal with 
the Cadets who would compromise with the government.
Since Lenin discounted the danger of candidates of the
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extreme Right winning support there was no general need 
for agreements, but if they were called for, they must be 
concluded only with the parties to the left of the 
Cadets - the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks.
The opposing programmes resulting from these tactical 
aims brought Bolsheviks and Mensheviks into collision in a 
number of localities and in Petersburg led to a split in 
the organisation. Under the electoral law there were four 
categories of voters, landowners, peasants, urban dwellers 
(determined by property and residential qualifications) 
and workers. The elections were not direct, all 
categories voted separately in their own curiae for 
electors (vyborshchiki), who met all together in city or 
provincial assemblies and chose from amongst themselves 
the number of deputies alloted to the district. For 
peasants there were two extra stages in the elections and 
for workers one. The workers first elected
representatives (upolnomochennie) on the basis of one for 
factories of 50 to 1000 workers, and for larger factories 
one for every 1000 workers. Work places with fewer than 
fifty employees and certain establishments such as 
bakeries and produce factories, which were not included in 
the categories of industrial, manufacturing, mining, 
metallurgical or railway undertakings were not entitled to 
elect representatives. Meetings of representatives chose 
electors from their number to go to the general electoral 
assembly. In the workers* curia where Social Democrats 
commanded overwhelming support the question of agreements 
did not arise, but in the peasants* and urban curiae and 
in the higher stage of the election, in the electoral 
assemblies, it did. At the beginning of the campaign in
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December 1906 a Party conference met at Tammerfors to 
discuss the elections. Menshevik tactics were adopted.
In the workers* curia no agreements with any parties which 
did not accept the idea of the class struggle of the 
proletariat were permitted. In other curiae agreements 
with any opposition parties were permitted to ensure the 
defeat of the Right. The Bolsheviks were opposed to the 
majority line but managed to get the conference to agree 
to allow local organisations to make their own agreements 
within the general directives of the Central Committee 
without being forced to include non Marxists in their 
lists.
The rift in the Petersburg organisation occurred in 
January 1907 when the Mensheviks tried to carry out a 
policy of agreement with the Cadets, and the Bolsheviks, 
in a majority on the city committee, used the loophole of 
the conference decision giving discretion to local 
organisations. The withdrawal of the Mensheviks from the 
city conference in January followed bitter disputes over 
credentials. As a result of the split Socialist 
Revolutionaries made considerable gains in the workers* 
curia in the Duma election. Organisational unity, but not 
harmony, was restored when a new city conference was 
elected under the supervision of the Central Committee.
It was this conference with a Bolshevik majority of 92 to 
4 l , which adopted the reorganisation proposals discussed 
above.
In general in the conduct of the Duma campaign the 
formation or not of blocs with other parties depended on 
which faction was in control of the local organisation. 
Odessa Bolsheviks complained that the local organisation
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having decided to support agreements with the Cadets had 
devoted the organisation^ apparatus and experienced 
agitators to the Cadet campaign. It turned out that of 
the 82 Odessa electors, 27 were Cadets, 33 Jewish Union of 
whom half were Cadets, 17 Social Democrats and 5 Socialist 
Revolutionaries. There never had been any danger of the 
Black Hundreds winning places, according to the Bolshevik 
account.^
As might be expected, the factional programmes were 
interpreted in some of the localities in a grossly 
simplified if not distorted way, colouring the whole 
approach both to the Duma elections and to Party work. 
Lenin1s formulation that the political crisis was a 
revolutionary one demanding direct struggle by workers and 
peasants became for many Bolsheviks a programme of 
preparation and accumulation of forces for the imminent 
uprising. Liadov who was an organiser in the Urals 
recalled that for the Bolsheviks the elections to the 2nd 
Duma were conducted in the main under the slogan of 
preparation for armed insurrection under the leadership of 
the Party. The address to the voter was couched somewhat 
as follows:
Representatives of various parties are addressing 
you, all of them promising you that they will 
achieve a great deal in the State Duma, if you 
elect them. W e , on the contrary, promise you 
nothing and emphatically declare that no matter 
whom you send to the Duma, they won*t be able to 
get you a thing. The Duma is powerless to give 
anything at all. If it meets as a revolutionary 
Duma, it will be dissolved by the Tsar just as 
the 1st Duma was. If it is a Black Hundred or
Prol. no. 13, 11 February 1907» p.6.
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Cadet Duma, it will help the Tsar to stifle the 
revolution and defend the landlords* land 
against the peasants, and the factory owners* 
profits from inroads by the workers. If you 
want to carry the revolution through to the end, 
if you want to drive the landlords from the 
land for good and all, and if you want to 
defend the eight hour working day for the 
workers, then elect members of our Party. They 
will not go to the Duma to give you anything or 
to get through legislation that will benefit 
you, but in order to organise, in conjunction 
with you and workers and peasants throughout 
Russia, the armed uprising, the decisive 
assault on the whole Tsarist-landlord order.
Elect only those people as electors and 
deputies, who can organise all you voters and 
prepare for action. It won*t be the Duma, but 
you yourselves with your elected deputies in 
the van, who will carry through the revolution 
to the end, beat back all the attacks of 
reaction and take the whole of the landlords* 
land. Let only those go to the Duma, who are 
prepared to end up in penal servitude or on 
the gallows instead of in the Duma.^
Khodorovskii in his article on Party life in Moscow at the
same time was scarcely more subtle. He said that at
workers* meetings discussions with the Mensheviks revolved
around two points - estimation of the present situation
and relations with non-proletarian parties. On the first
point the armed uprising was paramount - the crisis could
be resolved only by armed revolt, and on the second, there
could be agreement only with those parties that wished to
2overthrow the autocracy and expropriate the land. 
Bobrovskaia, who was working in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, where
1
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it was generally recognised that the workers* militancy 
had declined and there were sharp divisions among Party 
members as to whether a planned regional strike of textile 
workers had any chance of success, said that for both 
supporters and opponents of the strike the prime need was 
to build up strength for the final struggle, the armed
insurrection, which seemed closer to them then than it was
1in fact. Disagreements were purely on a tactical level.
Equally the Menshevik idea of the broad popular
opposition was oddly interpreted at times, as in
Ekaterinoslav, where it was argued among Party members
that the weakness of the Party was due to it reaching only
a fraction of the working class, but that councils of
workers representatives (upolnomochennie) brought into
being by the electoral laws could be used entirely legally
to create a democratic nucleus for wide sections of the
proletariat. In the discussion which this evoked the
preoccupation with forms of mass organisation became
evident. It was suggested that the councils of
representatives might replace factory committees or that
they could serve, after being democratically broadened by
elections from all undertakings, as links between the
Party and the broad masses, or that they could act as
centres organising around themselves the population at
2large and not just the working class. The element of 
crackpottery in these suggestions and the impractical
1
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hopes entertained for a non-party workers* congress, a 
project much favoured in 1906 and still discussed in 1 9 0 7 , 
are evidence of the immaturity and fluidity of 
organisational forms at this time, due to the absence of a 
tradition and history of stable working class or any other 
voluntary organisations in Russia. In this context the 
Mensheviks* search for ways of approach to the workers on 
a broad class basis was a difficult one, but on the other 
hand, they could point to signs indicating that the 
workers would respond to class organisation. Another 
report from Ekaterinoslav said that the interest of 
workers in the Social Democratic programme was very great. 
Leaflets handed out at factories brought immediate demands 
for propagandists and organisers. But the local 
proletariat was neither revolutionary nor politically 
interested, it refrained from voting in the elections from 
apathy and indifference rather than as an active boycott. 
What it was interested in, was a class programme and 
tactics.^
The performance of Bolsheviks in the Duma election 
campaign showed that while Lenin was engaged in working 
out and expounding the tactics which would maintain intact 
a revolutionary opposition within the framework of a 
parliamentary regime, many of his followers were only half 
converted from a conviction that the bourgeois 
parliamentary institution should be boycotted. They used 
the elections to provide themselves with an agitational 
platform but their minds were filled with the coming 
insurrection. With such attitudes it was natural enough
Prol. no. 18, 29 October 1907> pp.7-8.
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that the greatly reduced area of tolerated political 
activity after June 1907 would give rise to 
disillusionment with all legal political work and renewed 
attachment to the boycott during the 3Fd Duma elections.
From shortly after the Stockholm Congress the 
Bolsheviks had been urging that an extraordinary congress 
be called on the grounds that the Mensheviks were grossly 
over-represented on the Central Committee, and that the 
slogan of the Duma as an organ of power to convene a
constituent assembly was not supported by the Party
1membership. At the Tammerfors conference it was decided 
that a regular congress would be called in 1907 and the 
Bolsheviks began to organise energetically for the numbers 
to overturn the Menshevik Central Committee and reverse 
Menshevik policy. Liadov describes how he was sent by 
Lenin with four organisers to the Urals to collect as 
large a contingent as possible for the congress from that 
solidly Bolshevik region. This he did with great vigour 
and according to his own account, finding on arrival a 
membership of over 5000 saw it doubled in a matter of 
months, entitling the Urals to 24 delegates, all 
Bolsheviks. In fact there seem to have been 19 from the 
Urals at the congress (one of them a Menshevik). To make 
this organisational tour de force possible it was 
necessary for the boevaia druzhina (fighting squad) to
1
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carry out two expropriations - a robbery of a mail train 
and a raid on a gubernia printery to give them the money 
and type to publish newspapers, indispensable organising 
agents in so large a region.
Bolshevik organising methods in other areas were less
crude. Bobrovskaia writing of the same campaign in
Ivanovo-Voznesensk spoke of the two factional platforms
being put to the Party members, even where it meant in the
2absence of Mensheviks that a Bolshevik had to do it. 
Khodorovski also said that in Moscow both programmes were3presented to the workers.
With a weak central organisation and clearly defined 
differences of policy the two factions tended to 
concentrate their strength and find support in separate 
areas. Where one faction was stronger than the other and 
entrenched in a higher committee the smaller faction would 
try to consolidate itself in the leadership of a lower 
Party body, exercising the utmost autonomy and ignoring as 
far as possible the existence of the higher committee.
This was the case in the Petersburg organisation. In the 
Bolshevik controlled City and Neva raions the Mensheviks 
were in a majority in the Franco-Russian and Obukhov 
podraions and were reported to be operating independently, 
ignoring the raion committees and in the case of the
4Obukhov podraion, refusing to transmit dues.
-
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In Sormovo with, a total membership of 500, the
Mensheviks with 300 had a majority on the town committee
and in two raions. In the third the Bolsheviks had a
strong organisation. Formal unity was maintained in the
form of the general meetings of the town conference of
delegates from factory nuclei once a month. The
Bolsheviks had one member on the town committee to keep
themselves informed. They had their own printing press,
issued their own leaflets, organised circles, had separate
meetings and a direct unofficial link with the Central
Industrial Oblas t * Bureau. Apart from this irregular
contact with the regional organisation, all their other
activities were formally in accordance with Party rules.
Their raion committee was elected at the raion conference.
Its members included outstanding Party workers who did not
necessarily belong to the raion, and workshop
representatives from outside the raion. Where expedient
the committee resorted to co-option confirming this by
1later election.
In the Vyborg raion on the other hand where the 
Mensheviks were overwhelmingly strong and the Bolsheviks 
supporters scattered, the latter were reduced to 
complaints that the Mensheviks were preventing the 
distribution of Bolshevik political literature, failing to 
inform them of Party meetings and ignoring or ridiculing 
Petersburg Committee decisions. In view of this, it was 
reported, a meeting of thirty-seven representatives of 
factories in the raion, representatives from the shop 
assistants and several Bolshevik organisers and
I. Flerovskii, op. cit., pp.181-2.
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propagandists had resolved to set up a commission of one 
representative from each undertaking and to establish 
contact with the city committee independently of the 
raion.
The congress that finally assembled in London from 
April 30 to May 19, 1907 was a trial of strength for both 
factions. Their numbers were almost equal, 8 9 -8 8 ,^ but 
both sides drew allies from the recently admitted national 
groups. The Bundists tended towards the Mensheviks and 
the Poles and Letts to the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik 
censure of the policy of the Central Committee and the 
conduct of the Duma Social Democratic fraction aimed to 
discredit the Mensheviks but failed to win the support of 
the congress. The weight of the attacks was directed 
against the Central Committee*s concessions to the liberal 
opposition and the abandonment of a revolutionary position 
in the Duma. The vote on the Central Committee however, 
was that having heard its report, the congress pass on to 
the next business. The only implied criticism was in the 
directive that the Central Committee in future should 
circulate, not less than six weeks before a regular 
congress a report on its activities, work in the 
localities, electoral agitation where this had been 
carried out, and a financial statement. On the report of 
the Duma fraction, the Bolshevik resolution criticising the 
group*s wavering attitudes and indicating the strictly
1
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Independent revolutionary path it was to follow, was 
defeated. A short general resolution of Bundist origin 
was carried approving its activities and expressing 
confidence that it would work under the leadership of the 
Central Committee.
The Bolsheviks however, did register some important
victories. The resolution on relations with bourgeois
parties characterising them by their class position and
calling for united action only with the Popular Socialists,
Trudoviks and Socialist Revolutionaries against reaction
and the liberal bourgeoisie was written by Lenin. The
resolution on the workers1 congress and non-party workers*
organisations in which the Mensheviks were isolated,
1deserted even by numbers of the Bund, tersely asserted 
the significance of the trade unions as the most important 
form of mass organisation for the defence of the economic 
interests of the masses other than the Social Democratic 
Party, and while the importance of participating in mass 
organisations was recognised, it was added that the idea 
of a workers* congress led to replacement of Social 
Democracy by non-party workers* organisations and to 
disorganisation of the Party. The brief resolution on 
trade unions supported the idea of partiinos t * (partyness) 
recently adopted by the Bolsheviks.
The Party rules adopted by the congress provided for 
the obligatory holding of Party conferences every three or
1
The voting figures were 165 for the resolution, 94 
against, 21 abstaining. Unfortunately the names of those 
voting have not been recorded in the Minutes. Prot. V, 
p.561.
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four months, elected on a basis of one delegate to every 
5000 members. Their decisions were to become binding only 
if they were subsequently confirmed by the Central 
Committee. The institution of conferences as a means of 
strengthening the links binding the local organisations
with the centre was regarded with satisfaction by the
1Bolsheviks. The new Central Committee elected at the
congress comprising Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Poles,
Bundists and Letts gave the Bolsheviks a majority with the
support of the Poles and Letts. The abolition of the
favoured position of the editorial board of the central
organ, whose members had had a full vote in the Central
Committee on political questions, but was now relegated to
the position of a Party institution under the control of
the Central Committee was also welcomed by the Bolsheviks
2as a strengthening of the authority of the central body.
The only vote at the congress which indicated a deep 
division of opinion among Bolsheviks was that on partisan 
acts. The resolution condemning partisan attacks and 
expropriations (armed robberies) was carried 170-35 with 
52 abstaining. There was very little discussion since the 
item came up almost at the end of the congress. A 
considerable number of Bolsheviks neither voted nor 
abstained, were simply absent. In the report from the 
Central Committee Martov had said that terrorist acts of 
protest against government repression occurred when mass
1
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political militancy and activity were declining. Partisan 
terror and the armed robberies which accompanied it 
demoralised the revolutionary elements of the proletariat. 
He drew attention to the change in the role of the boevye 
druzhiny (fighting squads) which at the height of the 
revolutionary uprising had functioned as a necessary Party 
organ carrying out certain technical tasks. But with the 
subsiding of mass revolutionary activity certain elements 
in the fighting squads attempted to set up independent 
para-military organisations occupied with the preparation 
of the armed insurrection. In order to secure supplies 
these groups had to resort to expropriations from the 
government and private individuals. Enjoying the sympathy 
of anarchist minded workers the boeviki helped in the 
process of demoralisation. The Central Committee wished 
to dissolve the fighting squads but had met with
resistance from people engaged in creating a centralised
1fighting organisation linked with the troops.
Lenin*s position on the question of partisan warfare
had been stated in September 1906 in his article Guerrilla 
2warfare. Starting from an historical analysis similar to 
Martov*s he came to different conclusions. Guerrilla 
actions arising as part of the mass struggle in the course 
of the class war were a feature of that stage of the 
Russian revolution that followed the defeat of the armed 
uprising. It was not guerrilla actions in themselves that 
demoralised the mass movement. Disorganisation and 
demoralisation arose when the Party was incapable of 
exercising control over them.
Prot. V, pp.79-81.
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Lenin had argued that guerrilla warfare springs
spontaneously from a certain stage of the class war. 1906
could be regarded as a case in point, when a combination
of declining mass struggle, acute economic conditions and
repressive retaliatory acts by the government produced
partisan actions and expropriations. But by 1907
Stolypints draconian measures had re-established the
government's authority. Armed struggle had declined to
the point of individual acts of violence and robbery.
Demoralisation of the workers was affecting the Party
ranks. It was at least time to draw attention to the
dangers of the situation, as had been done in a letter
1from Moscow on expropriations. But Lenin was notoriously
silent on the matter at the congress. He voted against
the resolution. It is clear why he could have nothing to 
2say. He was too deeply involved with the large scale 
robberies being carried out by the Bolshevik technical 
commission. The last major one took place in Tiflis in 
June 1907 shortly after the congress. It was not until 
1909 in the course of his struggle against the left wing 
of the Bolshevik faction that Lenin characterised the 
tendency to withdraw into independent secret groups for 
the preparation of terrorist acts and armed insurrection 
against the government as anarchism, having nothing in 
common with Social Democracy.
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The voting figures on the partisan resolution give 
some interesting information. Of the 34 who voted with 
Lenin against the resolution, no fewer than 17 were Letts, 
the greatest expropriators of them all. Of the remaining 
17> all Bolsheviks, 5 were from Moscow, 4 from Petersburg, 
3 from the Urals, 3 from the Central Industrial Region, 1 
from Siberia and 1 from Odessa. Of these, Liadov (Urals) 
and Yaroslavskii (Petersburg) had been leading figures in 
the organisation of fighting squads. The most noticeable 
feature of this voting is the fact that areas where 
expropriations flourished, the Urals, the Volga and the 
Central Industrial Region, provided so few supporters of 
the practice among Bolshevik Party workers and 
professionals. Turning to those who abstained from voting 
we find even more eloquent figures. Of the Bolsheviks, 
there were 9 from the Urals, 13 from the Central 
Industrial Region, 3 from the Volga region, 3 from the 
Caucasus, 5 from other provinces, 6 from Petersburg, 3 
from Moscow, 1 from Siberia and 1 from the Finland army 
group. There were also 5 Poles, 2 Letts and 1 Bundist. 
Three Bolsheviks, two from the Central Industrial region 
and one from Voronezh voted for the resolution.1
What seems to be indicated here is that in the 
regions where Bolshevik professionals and Party workers 
had experience of the effects of partisan actions and 
expropriations, whether carried out by Socialist 
Revolutionaries or Social Democrats, they found themselves 
in general unable to dispute the correctness of the 
resolution. Liadov in his memoir spoke complacently of
Prot. V, pp.582-3» 621-9.
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the Urals druzhinniki who carried out expropriations and 
having observed that they operated strictly under Party 
control, appeared to think that no problems of morale or 
discipline existed. But clearly other delegates from the 
Urals did not share this opinion and in the following year 
there were reports of the shattering effects on the Party 
organisation of the partisan acts of Socialist 
Revolutionaries and Social Democrats in that region. 
Bobrovskaia spoke with heartfelt disapproval of the
expropriations in Ivanovo-Voznesensk and the offers of the
1expropriators to share the loot with the Party.
The Sormovo Bolsheviks, whose income came entirely
from membership subscriptions found themselves at the end
of 1 9 0 7 in extreme need of money for an illegal paper,
literature and the support of professionals. When
attempts to organise fund raising concerts and lectures
failed, their thoughts turned to the possibility of a well
managed expropriation of a local factory pay roll. This
had just been decided upon when V.P. Nogin arrived in the
town on tour from the Central Committee and flatly forbade
the venture on the grounds that expropriations had
degenerated into hooliganism and robbery and were
corrupting the Party. No amount of pleading about the
2good of the cause could make him change his mind.
In Odessa on the other hand it appears to have been 
the experience of local organisations themselves that led 
them to take active steps to dissociate the Party from
1
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expropriations. Here these had begun with raids on stores 
to secure clothing for people arrested as well as arms and 
rapidly turned into robberies in which professional 
criminals took part. Active agitation in the factories by 
means of proclamations and talks with workers persuaded 
the latter to leave expropriations to robbers and 
1 lumpens 1.^
The intensity and nature of partisan exploits and 
expropriations varied according to the regions in which 
they occurred. In the Baltic provinces and the Caucasus 
they were bound up with the national struggle and in the 
remote and backward Urals expropriations at times took on 
a mass character with Robin Hood bands operating with the 
sympathy and support of the local population. Partisan 
actions in the Central Industrial Region declined rapidly 
into small scale robberies and minor terrorism. Even 
after acts of lawlessness lessened, the attitudes of mind 
that went with them persisted, symptomatic of a raw, 
militant and undisciplined working class movement at a low 
level of political consciousness. The task of Bolshevik 
professionals and Party workers struggling with the 
demoralising results of criminal actions and indiscipline 
amongst their supporters was of course made a good deal 
more difficult by the Bolsheviks* own preoccupation with 
hastening the development of the revolutionary movement 
into armed insurrection.
The workers themselves seemed to have had a confused 
recognition of the dangerous effect of widespread robbery
1
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and violence upon the standing of the Party, while at the
same time they held fast to the principle of expropriation
This may be seen in the recommendations from Moscow
factory committees in 1906 that the Party itself should
embark upon a major programme of controlled expropriations
The resolution of one meeting read,
In view of the fact that the [Stockholm] Congress 
did not forsee the lamentable consequences of the 
banning of expropriations of public property, 
thus allowing expropriationist tendencies to 
assume distorted forms; in view of the fact that 
there are no forces to restrain these tendencies, 
it is proposed, in order that the Party should 
not be entirely discredited:-
1. that we take upon ourselves the organisation 
of expropriations of public property, at the same 
time pointing out the complete impermissibility 
of public property expropriations and stating 
this publicly;
2. in view of the spontaneous growth of militant 
actions in the forms of all sorts of 
confiscations and attacks, and the impossibility, 
owing to the decisions of the Unification 
Congress, of organising and regulating this 
tendency within the Party, the meeting declares 
itself in favour of the creation of non-party 
revolutionary combat squads in order to carry out 
partisan actions and assist the proletariat in 
the organisation of the armed uprising^.
The congress resolution on trade unions, a brief 
statement passed almost without discussion at the end of 
the congress by a majority of 155 to 5> with 19 
abstentions and 3 refusals to vote, declared support for 
the Stockholm Congress resolution^ which had urged the 
setting up of non-party trade unions and active
Prol. no. 4, 19 September 1906, pp.5-6.
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participation of Social Democrats in union work, but added 
to this the following:-
Congress reminds Party organisations and Social 
Democrats working in trade unions of one of the 
fundamental tasks of Social Democratic work in 
them: to assist in the recognition by the trade
unions of the ideological leadership of the 
Social Democratic Party, and in the 
establishment of organisational links with it, 
and of the necessity where local conditions 
permit, to put this aim into effect.^
This last part of the resolution, a concise summary of
partiinos t * expressed the newly adopted position of
Bolsheviks on the trade union question, and represented a
significant change from the views they had held for some
years. In What is to be done? Lenin had sharply asserted
the prime importance of the political struggle and the
prime need to build the political party. Bolsheviks paid
little attention to trade unions, but in 1905 the problem
of defining the organisational relationship between the
industrial and political wings of the working class
movement suddenly became a pressing one, when the great
political strikes were followed by massive moves by the
workers to form trade unions. Discussion in the Bolshevik
press, and approval by the Bolshevik Central Committee of
certain articles give a clear idea of the reactions of the
leadership to the emerging mass trade unions. While there
can be no doubt that they meant it, when they said again
and again that the economic (trade union) struggle was an
indispensable part of the struggle of the working class
and every encouragement should be given to develop it,
there were present nevertheless shades of the old
Prot. V, pp. 583-4.
1
51
controversy with the economists, a patent fear of 1 vulgar 
economism' in the careful defining they made of the 
boundary between the economic and political struggles.
Trade unions were regarded as important mainly because 
they drew into action the backward elements of the working 
class, enabling them to proceed further to the struggle 
for socialism. Being legal institutions they could 
relieve revolutionaries of some functions in the field of 
culture and economic agitation. An attempt was made by 
M. Borisov to set down precisely the relationship between 
Party and unions. When his article On the Trade Union 
Movement and the Tasks of Social Democracy appeared in 
Proletarii it received the explicit approval of the 
editorial board and was later reprinted in the Bolshevik 
legal journal Novaia Zhizn. It may be said to represent 
the views of the Bolshevik leaders in 1905* The author, 
having recognised the growth of trade unions as an 
inevitable phenomenon saw them in competition with the 
Party not for the support of the masses but for the limited 
number of available functionaries. The needs of trade 
unions however, could be met by workers who were not of a 
revolutionary turn of mind. A second problem of keeping 
the trade unions free of politically opportunist elements 
could be solved by preventing any political colouration at 
all. If it was impossible to indoctrinate the unions with 
the full socialist and political programme of the Party, 
it was better not to indoctrinate them at all. Pointing 
to the danger presented to German Social Democracy by the 
rankly opportunist, money grubbing German unions which 
constituted an integral part of the Party, he urged that 
the economic organisation of the proletariat should be
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strictly separated from the political. In Russia the
Party must assist in the formation of trade unions but
confine their activities to strictly economic limits, not
permitting them to discuss Party affairs. Trade unions
were merely a sphere of influence not a component part of
the Party. The article gave a five point statement of
relations between Party and trade unions. (l) The trade
unions were completely autonomous in their own sphere.
(2) Trade unions were not to impinge on general Party
affairs. (3) Party members in unions and union
functionaries should take steps to ensure Social
Democratic agitation in unions. (4) Trade unionists with
influence and belonging to the Party were to form a
special agitational bureau and to be members of the raion
committee. (5) These people were on the raion committee
not as trade union representatives but as Party members
with special functions. Borisov*s concluding words
eloquently summed up the suspicions of the Party in regard
to the mass economic organisations and its determination
to preserve its own political purity.
In this way the Party has its own private agency 
within the union, but not official 
representation. Mutual relations of this kind, 
in my view, are highly advantageous to our Party.
They free it from the necessity of expending 
energy on the purely economic struggle and 
enable the application of forces which otherwise 
would remain dead capital. On the other hand, 
they guarantee the Party from the intrusion of 
opportunist elements and assist its further 
growth without forcing it to change the ^
revolutionary tactics already adopted by it.
Novaia Zhizn, no. 7 , 21 November 1905» pp.12-^ 9»
1
53
One other point may be noted at this stage. In 1905 the 
actual Bolshevik experience of trade union work in 
Petersburg was negligible. The shop assistants were the
1only trade union organisation under Bolshevik influence.
This view of the role of trade unions remained 
official Bolshevik policy throughout 1906. The resolution 
on trade unions at the Stockholm Congress in April which 
was unanimously recommended by the trade union commission 
of the congress, was passed with no dissentents and two 
abstentions. The Menshevik draft with an additional 
clause and minor alterations, became the final resolution. 
The Bolshevik draft gave much more grudging recognition of 
the value of trade unions and exhorted the Party to train 
those workers belonging to unions in the spirit of 
understanding of the class struggle and socialist tasks of 
the proletariat in order that they might achieve a leading 
role in the unions and these unions might under certain 
conditions directly adhere to the Party without excluding 
non-party members. Both drafts however, were agreed that 
the prime tasks of Social Democrats was to facilate the 
formation of non-party unions. The resolution in its 
final form added that the class solidarity and 
consciousness of unionists must be strengthened in order 
organically to link unions with Party in struggle and 
agitation.
As late as December 1906 Lenin once again 
emphatically stated that Bolsheviks adhered to the policy
1
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of neutrality of trade unions (that is, that they should 
be non-party) when in a footnote to his article Crisis of
Menshevism he attacked a proposal by the Menshevik Larin
1to admit trade unions into the Party. But by the time of 
the London Congress in May 1907 the official Bolshevik 
attitude to trade unions had changed and they were 
declaring for the ideological leadership of the unions by 
Social Democracy and the establishment of organisational 
links. How may one account for this?
It would appear that the rigid theoretical stance of 
the Petersburg oriented leadership had been successfully 
challenged by practical Party workers in the Moscow 
organisation, who had actually had experience in trade 
union work. According to V.P. Nogin, the Bolshevik-led 
Moscow Committee in October 1906 which had hitherto been 
preoccupied with the armed revolt and looked on trade 
union work as opportunist changed its attitude to the 
unions and appointed one of its organisers, Nogin himself, 
to work in the unions. The change in policy closely 
followed Nogin1s own arrival in Moscow from Baku where he 
had taken part in the strikes of oil workers. Nogin soon 
became chairman of the Moscow Central Trade Union Bureau. 
In February 1907 the new approach was apparent in the 
calling of a Textile Workers* Conference sponsored jointly 
by the union and the Moscow Committee, at which Nogin 
officially represented the Party. On the way to the 5th 
Congress Nogin and other members of the Central Industrial 
Region delegation had discussions with Lenin in Finland 
and put the viewpoint of partiinos t * of the trade unions,
Lenin, XIV, p.l66 n.
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which was based on a recognition of the vast power of the 
economic movement and the necessity not to separate the 
economic and political struggles, but to give the economic
struggle itself a political character through Social
1Democratic leadership.
The idea of a close link between the economic and 
political wings of the working class movement was not a 
new one. The problem of the neutrality of the trade 
unions had become an increasingly uncomfortable one in the 
German Social Democratic movement. Kautsky in 1905 had 
written an article for the Polish Social Democratic paper 
condemning neutrality and supporting partiinost* in 
general terms. Rosa Luxemburg in her pamphlet The Mass 
Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions written 
in 1906 had come out strongly against the theory of equal 
authority of the unions in the German movement and had 
called for unity of the Party and unions, without making 
any specific organisational recommendations.
The distinctive Bolshevik contribution to partiinost *
was in the organisational framework they devised to put it
into effect. But this cannot be fathered upon Lenin.
Nogin in discreet but unmistakeable terms claims credit.
Recognising the need to make use of all legal 
avenues, taking part in all institutions from 
the State Duma to the trade union and 
co-operative organisations of the working 
class, Bolsheviks everywhere laid primary 
importance on the need to unite the Party 
members in these organisations. At one of 
the conferences of the Moscow organisation I 
was the first to introduce a resolution,
1V.P. Nogin in PR (1925), no. 2, pp.206-12; N. Nelidov in 
PR (1924), no. 7» pp.154-7.
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later supported by the rest of the Party 
organisations, on the creation of Party nuclei 
(iadra) as we called them then, which later 
became widely known under the name of Party 
cells (iacheiki).^
Again according to Nogin, the idea of Party nuclei in 
legal organisations was worked out at the Party conference 
at Kotka in Finland in July 1907, where although no 
resolution was passed, trade unions were discussed at 
length.
The basic ideas I put forward in my report to 
the Kotka conference were accepted by the 
Bolshevik centre and then by the Central 
Committee, and were developed in my articles 
in the Bolshevik collections of the time. It 
may be said, therefore that the basic position 
of Bolsheviks in their attitude to trade 
unions originated in the Moscow organisation 
and was confirmed by Moscow practice. Our 
Petersburg comrades very soon took the same 
line and in this way we practical workers in 
this field found allies in the Petersburg 
comrades. Comrade Zinoviev was one of the 
first of these.^
1
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57
CHAPTER 2 
REPRESSION
Shortly after the London Congress ended the Stolypin 
coup of June 3 took place. The Duma was dissolved, the 
Social Democratic deputies arrested for high treason and a 
new electoral law proclaimed which reduced the 
representation of workers and peasants and ensured a 
reactionary majority in the next Duma. With the 
parliamentary opposition greatly weakened and the liberals 
thoroughly frightened, the government felt free to launch 
oppressive measures against the Social Democrats. Arrests 
of active members and seizure of Party literature and 
printing presses had been going on since 1906, and had 
become more frequent in 1907- But after June conditions 
became much more difficult. The long tolerated open 
agitational meetings could no longer be held, pressure on 
the trade unions deprived the Party of meeting places and 
an intensified search for printing presses began.
Articles 102, 125 and 126 of the Criminal Code 
provided ample grounds on which to secure convictions in 
the courts for membership of a revolutionary party.
Article 102 covered the most serious crime of belonging to 
an association set up to carry out attempts on the life, 
health and liberty of members of the imperial family or 
attempts to dethrone the monarch, for which the penalty 
was forced labour for life; or attempts to change by 
violence the form of government or the order of succession 
to the throne, for which the penalty was forced labour for
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a fixed period. Article 125 provided that those guilty of 
belonging to an association which deliberately aimed at 
inciting disobedience or opposition to laws, decrees or 
lawful orders, or of arousing enmity between classes or 
estates, or employers and workers, or of inciting workers 
to begin or continue certain strikes could be punished by 
imprisonment in a house of correction or fortress.
Article 126 provided for those guilty of belonging to an 
association deliberately set up to overthrow the existing 
social order or of causing the commission of grievous 
crimes with explosives or firearms, forced labour for not 
more than eight years or exile. If the association itself 
was in possession of explosives or a store of weapons the 
term was forced labour for a fixed period.
Where evidence incriminating suspects could not be 
found, the practice of administrative banishment was 
frequently resorted to. The police chief of a city was 
empowered without resort to a court, to expel anyone for 
periods up to five years. Simple banishment from a 
particular place was not a punishment which deterred 
professional revolutionaries, but it was an effective 
weapon against trade union leaders or rank and file 
members.
Even in the most open period of the Party*s existence
JUsome of its activities remained conspiratoral and secret, 
particularly those connected with the printing of Party 
literature. Professional revolutionaries also habitually 
observed elementary rules of conspiracy in the use of 
false names and secret meeting places. In order to track 
down leading activists and to discover them with 
incriminating evidence the police relied heavily on secret
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agents. There were two kinds of informers, agents of 
external observation, or simply spies, whose work was to 
watch and follow suspects gathering as much information as 
possible about them, and agents of internal observation 
who entered the illegal organisations, carried out Party 
tasks without exciting suspicion and passed on information 
to the police. Informers within the organisation (or 
provocateurs as they were universally known in the 
revolutionary movement) were responsible for tremendous 
losses in arrests and seizure of literature. They were 
recruited from the intelligentsia and working class, 
joining the service for many reasons, sometimes bribed or 
blackmailed by the police, or quite often offering their 
services voluntarily. Golubkov relates that on one 
occasion when he was detained at the Moscow Okhrana 
building he saw hanging behind the door of the cell a 
schedule of rates of payment for information, beginning 
with five roubles for an address where meetings were held
and rising to the top rate for the location of stores of
-]explosives. As repression increased and the Bolshevik 
wing of the Party went ever deeper underground, 
necessarily becoming isolated from the workers, it became 
more and more the prisoner of the provocateurs in its 
mids t .
The main political question facing the Party after 
June was once again connected with the Duma. The 
elections to the 3rd Duma were to be held in the autumn. 
The electoral law had been amended to ensure one elector
1
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for 350 people in the landowners* curia, one for 1,000 and 
1 5 j000 in the two categories of the urban curia and one 
for 60,000 and 125,000 respectively in the peasants* and 
workers* curiae. Since this meant that an unshakeable 
majority of the deputies would come from the right Centre 
and extreme reactionary groups, most Bolsheviks, 
professionals and rank and file alike, now advocated a 
complete boycott of the elections. Lenin rejected the 
boycott, arguing that it was a weapon to be used only in a 
period of revolutionary upswing developing into 
insurrection. In the absence of such conditions it was 
correct to take part in the elections. His article 
Against Boycott was published jointly with Kamenev*s 
defence of the boycott.
At the general Party conference at Kotka, Finland in 
July, which discussed the Duma elections Lenin was the 
only member of the Bolshevik delegation to vote against 
the boycott. However, his resolution advocating both 
participation and a resolute struggle against reaction and 
against the hegemony of the Cadets in the liberation 
movement was carried. The boycotters, although entirely 
unconvinced by his arguments, voted with Lenin and the
Poles in order to prevent the broad Menshevik interpretation
1of support for the Duma gaining ground.
Work in the election campaign which for many local 
Party organisations was the last occasion for some years 
upon which the Party appeared openly before the public, was
1
K.P.S.S. v resoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh (M., 1953) Part 1, 
pp.173-8.
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carried on under the difficulties arising from government 
repression and a lack of conviction that the campaign was 
worth waging. The Petersburg organisation reported that 
it was bound hand and foot, unable to carry on open 
agitation and able only to distribute illegal leaflets.
Workers in many factories were in favour of boycotting the
1elections and this feeling was shared by Party members.
The Central Industrial Oblast1 Bureau sounded a resigned
note when it said that the Oblas t * organisation was
boycottist but had bowed to the Kotka Conference decision.
The masses were apathetic and passive towards the elections
and Social Democratic workers were consciously boycottist
but it was hoped that their trust in the Party was
2sufficiently great to take them to the polls.
Reporting after the elections the Petersburg
Committee said the campaign had been a bad one. The
strongly boycottist mood of the workers had meant that
very few of those entitled to had enrolled on the voting
lists and workers had taken an insignificant part in the
actual campaigning. Agitation at pre-electoral level had
been unsatisfactory and the Party had had no legal
3election literature.
In the second part of 1907 trade unions for the first 
time occupied an important place in Bolshevik discussions. 
The relationship between Party and unions had been
1
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discussed at length at the Kotka Conference because of the 
forthcoming all-Russian trade union congress. Four draft 
resolutions had been presented but none adopted. At the 
Stuttgart Congress of the 2nd International in August 
there had been a major debate on the role of the trade 
unions and of the political parties in the emancipation of 
the proletariat. A resolution had been carried which, 
asserting the independence of the unions and urging the 
creation of close links between the political and economic 
struggles, gave comfort both to neutralists and supporters 
of 1 partyness*. The Bolshevik interpretation of 
* partyness* of trade unions was published in October in 
the form of a report from a group of Bolsheviks working in 
trade union and Party organisations in various parts of 
Russia. The proposals in this document were adopted 
without change by the Central Committee at the beginning 
of 1908.
The draft resolution on trade unions presented by 
Lenin to the Kotka Conference had urged that Party 
organisations and the Party press should study and discuss 
the question of trade union life in general and the 
forthcoming trade union congress in particular.
The response of Bolshevik organisations in the 
localities to this lead from above may be seen in the 
appearance of trade unions as items on the agendas of 
Party conferences in the Urals, Petersburg and the Central 
Industrial Region. The Urals Oblast * conference urged all 
organisations to pay increased attention to the formation 
of trade unions. Party members were to join unions and to 
strive to broaden their aims and tasks to match those of 
the Social Democratic Party. The Oblast * Bureau was
6 3
instructed to assist in the unification of trade unions in 
the Urals through the organisation of an Oblas tr trade 
union bureau and to arrange for the supply of trade union 
literature from the centre.
The St„ Petersburg conference reported that its work
in the trade union field had been very weak. Bolshevik
workers and functionaries alike had stood aside from the
unions, but now they must take an active part in the day
to day work of unions, strengthening Social Democratic
influence in the lowest bodies by practical work and
consistent agitation. The Party organisation as such
should approach the union only with concrete proposals of
the sort recently put up to the unions, the question of
the trial of the Social Democratic deputies, unemployment
and so on. Only where it would cause no internal
upheavals should the Party propose to the unions that it
have official representation with consultative vote. This
sort of work had already had some results and workers had
responded in a friendly fashion. But trade union
functionaries, Social Democratic intelligentsia and
Mensheviks with few exceptions had been carrying on anti-
Party agitation in the unions, frightening workers with
stories that the Petersburg Committee wanted to turn all
legal unions into illegal ones and to attach a party label
2to them forthwith.
The Central Industrial Region conference reported 
that trade unions had been closed down and were showing
1
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little sign of life. The question that arose was in what 
form should the unions be liquidated - should they go 
underground or become legal as mutual benefit societies?
The conference resolved that one of its central tasks was 
to strengthen partiinost» in the unions. Party nuclei
which had survived when unions collapsed must carry out
1the functions of unions.
A report from the Donets basin described the great
difficulties trade unions had to face in areas outside the
large cities. The conditions of savage exploitation in
this centre of mines and metallurgy were described - low
wages, extremely long working day, child labour, health
hazards and lack of amenities. Then there were the miners
who responded with their hearts more than their minds to
speakers* ideas, rejecting subtleties of political economy
and the like. The reason for this was the extremely low
level of intellectual development of the miners
who spend two-thirds of their life underground; 
the rest of the time in most cases is devoted 
to Bacchus and it has only been with the coming 
of organisations that their former drunkenness 
has decreased to any extent.
But in these circumstances so favourable for industrial
organisation of the workers we read that the unions were
not growing because of the prohibitory measures of the
Governor of the province. The union in one particular
mine was unable to get its rules registered. A normal set
of rules adopted by it was mutilated beyond recognition by
the Governor, who altered point one, which read *The union
defends and improves the economic position of its members*,
Prol. no. 18, 29 October 1907» pp.5-6.
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to *The union expounds the economic position of its 
members1. Amongst the established unions the only one to 
flourish was one which was exclusively occupied in
1managing shops and putting on theatrical performances.
The Governor, in demolishing the first point of the 
unions* aims, was in fact merely interpreting literally 
the regulations applying to rules of societies. The trade 
union movement in no way escaped the repression which 
enveloped the Party. Legalised under the Provisional 
Regulations of March 1906, the unions were never formally 
declared illegal but they could be closed down if they 
constituted any threat to public order and security and 
the objectives they were permitted to work for excluded 
any active defence or improvement of wage standards or 
hours of labour. They could seek means to remove 
misunderstandings between employees and employers, explain 
rates of pay and other conditions of work to their members, 
organise funeral benefit and mutual benefit funds and 
undertake cultural and educational activities. A circular 
sent out in May 1907 from the Police Department directed 
local authorities to pay particular attention to union 
rules and activities and permit their registration only 
where there was undoubted evidence of absence of links 
with Social Democratic groups, and the slightest attempt 
of unions to retreat from their stated limits of activity 
was to bring about their closure. In addition where there 
was sufficient foundation for charging of active members 
of the unions, criminal prosecutions were to be launched 
against them.
Prol. no. 19, 5 November 1907> p.8.
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Throughout the autumn conditions in all localities 
grew worse. The Central Industrial Region reported that 
the organisation was on the defensive. In nearly all 
centres there had been a fall in membership, professionals, 
finance and printing presses were lacking and there was a 
shortage of literature and local intelligentsia. 
Organisations in Tver, Tula, Kostroma, Yaroslavl and 
Nizhni Novgorod had collapsed. An unsuccessful strike of 
textile workers had furthered the decline in the Kostroma 
and Ivanovo-Voznesensk areas. The main tasks were to 
strengthen the organisational nuclei, improve propaganda
and reduce the dependence on the intelligentsia by putting
1workers into responsible positions.
Petersburg which was endeavouring to organise a one
day mass strike to take place on the first day of the
trial of the Social Democratic deputies of the 2nd Duma
also reported lagging work, a decline in morale and the
2need to rebuild factories committees.
The decline in the organisations in the Donets basin
was accompanied by expropriations. Here the workers had
expected that the dissolution of the 2nd Duma would be
followed by a general strike and perhaps armed insurrection.
The authority of the Central Committee had suffered
because this had not occurred. Then mines and railway
stations had been occupied by troops, arrests and searches
had followed and some members had to leave the area and
3others had abandoned Party work.
1
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The Central Committee was having its own difficulties
It was reported as suffering from an unstable majority.
Only Bolsheviks supported its practical work and assisted
it financially. The other factions, it said, were at best
neutral, or at worst like the Mensheviks, actively hostile
In the last few months the Committee had been unable to
reach decisions on such questions as the central organ, a
leaflet dealing with terror and expropriations, the trade
unions, what the Duma fraction should do first and
contributions to the bourgeois press. The objective
conditions under which the Committee worked were
appallingly difficult but it was its composition and the
conduct of some factions on it, that would place both
Party and Committee in an impossible position if things
1continued in this way.
In November the entire Petersburg committee was 
betrayed and arrested. Finland, which with a liberal 
constitution and a certain measure of independence had 
provided meeting places for Party conferences and the 
Petersburg organisation, premises for the printing of 
Proletarii and asylum for Party leaders long after they 
had had to leave Russia, was now, under the pressure of 
Russian reaction, no longer a possible base for the 
leadership. By the end of the year the leaders of both 
factions were once again in emigration.
When Proletarii resumed publication with No. 21 in 
Geneva at the end of February 1908 after a break of three 
months, reports from local centres showed a drastic
Prol. no. 20, 19 November 1907» P*5*
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worsening of the situation. The police actions in the 
autumn of 1907 had been followed by a severe and 
widespread wave of arrests in January 1908. Arrests of 
members of leading committees, removal of professional 
revolutionaries through flight or imprisonment, seizure of 
printing presses, breaking of the links connecting groups 
with each other and with oblas t * centres and the Central 
Committee, and the disappearance of members, above all of 
the Party intelligentsia, had, in the space of six months, 
reduced the loud voice of revolutionary protest to a 
whisper.
It is very difficult to estimate by how much the 
numbers in the organisation fell in the first months of 
repression. Some figures have been suggested for various 
areas and various periods. In the Ukraine, the Kiev 
organisation numbered 1,235 in spring 1907; 80 remained at 
the end of 1908; Kharkov from April 1907 to March 1908
1declined from 762 to 150. In May 1907 Social Democratic
organisations in Transcaucasia had 15>670 members; at the
beginning of I9O8 14,100, and this number fell to 12,530
2in the next nine months. In Ivanovo-Vosnesensk in the
middle of 1907 there were 2,000 members; not more than 6003remained by May 1908. The well entrenched and ramified 
organisations of Petersburg and Moscow also suffered. In 
1907 the Petersburg membership had been 8,000 and Moscow
1
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7 j500. In February 1908 it was 3>000 in Petersburg.^
2Moscow claimed 3>500 in August 1908. What fraction of 
the 1907 membership remained by mid-1909, how much lower 
than one-tenth, it is impossible to say. By that time 
there appear to have been less than 1,000 in Petersburg 
and 1,500 in Moscow.
The reasons for the outflow of members that began 
before the question of decimation through factional fights 
had arisen can be sought first in the repression itself. 
For intelligenty, membership of the Party meant 
imprisonment and the end of chances of advancement in 
their careers. Some left politics altogether, others went 
into legal activity. This happened to worker members as 
well, but the main reasons why workers were lost were to 
be found in the industrial depression occurring in a 
number of centres and a general counter-offensive by 
employers against the working class. The considerable 
advances in hours and wages won piecemeal by workers were 
now subjected to a massive attack. Wholesale dismissals 
accompanied the worsening conditions, employers1 black 
lists were drawn up and workers who were unable to get 
certificates of reliability from the police could not find 
employment. Since many factory workers did not have 
permanent lodgings but were housed in barracks or 
subrented rooms, loss of a job often meant that they had 
to leave a district. Unemployment was high in parts of 
the Central Industrial Region, some Petersburg industries,
1
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the South, and above all in the Urals where many
enterprises were closed down in the disorders of the
summer of 1907 and did not return to normal operation for
some years. According to a report from the Urals in
February 1909 the industrial crisis affecting half the
population there had had a worse effect on the
1organisation than police repression. And a Party
Menshevik in 1910 surveying the experience of the worst
years said that the loss of three-quarters of the Party
membership had been due less to direct repression than to
unemployment and dismissals. In the Motovilikha factory
at Perm, the most revolutionary centre in the Urals, only
those workers who were members of the Union of the Russian
People had escaped dismissal and some Party members had
2actually joined that highly reactionary organisation.
It can be said of the drop in membership beginning in
the second half of 1907 that all centres suffered, the
provinces much more severely than the capitals. In some
places organisations disappeared almost entirely and the
areas which suffered most were those in which unemployment
was severe or where expropriations had been carried out on
a large scale either by Social Democrats or Socialist
Revolutionaries or both, as in the Urals and in the Volga
region. There the losses sustained were due not only to
the severity of police reprisals but also to the
resentment of the inhabitants who were often victims of
3the more irresponsible acts of violence.
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That aspect of the repression which was emphasized 
repeatedly in Proletarii in 1908 as having the most 
disastrous immediate effect on the Party was the flight of 
the intelligentsia. What silenced the local organisations 
of the Party at the beginning of 1908 was not so much the 
absolute loss of members, which became much more severe 
later, as the disappearance of the key Party workers, 
without whom written agitation and propaganda work could 
not at that time be carried on at all. These were the 
Party intelligenty, the majority of whom were not 
professional revolutionaries. The breakdown clearly 
showed the extent to which the Party still depended on the 
intelligentsia for political leadership and instruction. 
Although the old relationship of teacher and taught 
between professional revolutionaries and a few advanced 
workers had been much modified in the revolutionary years 
when workers had flocked into the Party and shown great 
aptitude for mass organisation and action, for the 
political word they still relied on the agitation and 
elementary propaganda classes supplied by the intelligentsia. 
In conditions of increasing repression when it became 
impossible to hold mass meetings of workers the printed 
leaflets and illegal newspapers became indispensible 
agitational, propaganda and organisational weapons but the 
workers simply did not have the necessary political 
knowledge, literacy or technical competence to produce 
these unaided.
The effect of the loss of the intelligentsia was 
discussed in the Party press at length. From Petersburg 
it was reported in February that the numbers of Party 
intelligenty were decreasing, those elements having gone,
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that had come from a bourgeois milieu and only worked in
1the organisation when it was safe to do so. In the
following issue of Proletarii it was estimated that nine-
2tenths of the Petersburg intelligentsia had left.
A long report appeared in August discussing what was 
described as the internal revolution in which workers had 
replaced the intelligentsia in all fields of activity in 
the city organisation. It was recalled that in September- 
October 1907 there had been four or five workers and the 
rest intelligenty on the city committee, whereas now there 
were four inteiligenty (two with full vote) and the rest 
workers. By the middle of June in the whole Petersburg 
organisation there were 12 inteiligenty; as many as had 
been in one podraion nine months before. There had been a 
mass desertion of the students. Only four were still 
working in the organisation. Student fractions in the 
higher educational organisations no longer supplied Party 
workers but were turning into groups occupied with 
academic questions. Most of the Party workers of six 
months before had literally fled from their work. They 
had been students. The reasons for their disappearance 
suggested in the report were fear of punishment, careerism, 
the humdrum nature of organisational work, political and 
moral instability and finally that general spiritual decay 
which now possessed the whole of the bourgeois intelligentsia. 
Between January and June only twelve inteiligenty had come 
into the Party and all of these were from other cities or
1
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prison or had escaped from exile. The most damaging 
aspect of the flight of the intelligentsia was the loss in 
the numbers of professional revolutionaries that it caused, 
since the intelligentsia supplied nine-tenths of the 
professionals. Many of these had now been arrested or 
were in hiding or had left work altogether and it was 
difficult to replace them, since workers had always been 
reluctant to become professionals. In Petersburg in 
November 1907 there had been 15-17 inteiligenty who were 
professionals; by June 1908 there were 5. The other side 
of the picture was that workers were obliged to take over 
the jobs of the intelligentsia. By the beginning of 1908 
the organisational and technical work of the raion 
committees was being done by workers. But propaganda and 
political leadership in the raions were still in the hands 
of the intelligentsia. Resolutions were constantly being 
passed in raions asking for help from the Petersburg 
Committee, but, said the reporter, unless the question was
strongly raised of workers carrying out all functions, the
1organisation would collapse.
From other places the story was the same. In the 
strongly working class centres of the Central Industrial 
Region where there had always been a shortage of them, 
Party intelligenty had disappeared almost entirely. A 
conference of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Soiuz Council 
reported in May that in the whole region with its tens of 
thousands of workers there was not one intelligent left 
working in the organisation. This information had a mixed
Prol. no. 33) 23 July 1908, pp.4-5.
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reception at the conference. Some said it was a good 
thing that the intelligentsia had left. At least it was 
now possible for the workers to stand on their own feet 
and it was to be hoped that the intelligentsia would not 
come back. They couldn* t be trusted. The workers would 
do everything themselves. Others pointed out that all 
intelligenty could not be lumped together and although the 
workers were capable of doing all the usual organisational 
tasks and even elementary propaganda and agitation, 
political leadership was also necessary and they were not 
able to provide that for the time being. The Soiuz 
Council decided to ask the Oblas t * Bureau and Central
1Committee to send a comrade to give political leadership.
In organisations which had been heavily dependent on
the intelligentsia, their going was attended with
bitterness. In Tver the organisation had almost collapsed
through lack of professionals, although workers were
receptive to Social Democracy, and Social Democratic
intelligenty were plentiful. It had not been possible to
develop responsible functionaries from amongst the workers,
and the Tver intelligenty were now either preoccupied with
their professional interests and gradually turning into
obyvateli with paunches and nice little homes (s briushkom
i domkom) , or were engaged in * self-perfection* , paying no
2attention whatever to the workers.
It was reported from the Crimea that Party committees 
were now working class in composition. Some of the
1
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intelligentsia had left altogether, others were 
demoralising those around them with complaints about the 
futility of underground work. Such whining was often a 
cover for political cowardice. In order to justify 
themselves these people were assuring everyone that the
Party had ceased to exist and the Central Committee was
1not functioning or had collapsed.
From Nizhni-Novgorod the report was that after the
organisation had been shattered in the previous summer and
practically no meetings were being held, it was decided to
concentrate all forces on work in the trade unions, which
however were soon suppressed. Only two, the metalworkers*
and bakers* unions were still left. When the results of
the decision became apparent a provisional organising
commission was formed, which called a conference in
February and a committee was elected. The conference with
an attendance of 112 was a stormy one. Some comrades put
forward a proposal that the Party organisation should be
disbanded, there being no need for it, and Party work
replaced with cultural and educational activities. The
2proposal was rejected.
The position in Moscow received attention in 
Proletarii in July and August. In a report of activity in 
Moscow from August 1907 to April 1908 it was stated that 
work had been carried on within narrower limits since the 
dispersal of the 2nd Duma due to the reaction and the 
massive withdrawal of Party functionaries, which had had a
1
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serious effect on the worker Party members, some of whom
had followed the intelligentsia while others accepted the
necessity of doing the work themselves. The departing
workers echoed to some degree the sentiments of the
intelligentsia with such remarks as,
We have done our job, we are tired and need a 
rest to do a little of our own work and study.
Younger people must be drawn in, we certainly 
haven1t changed our beliefs, we are old time 
Marxists in outlook, we*11 return to work 
when necessary and we*11 come back with new 
knowledge and new strength. But frankly just 
now revolutionary work amounts to bashing 
one *s head against a wall.
On the other hand some workers said of those that had gone 
out, that we were well rid of them. The intelligentsia 
had played out their role and it was time for the workers 
to get started. Certainly study was necessary, but study 
within the Party.
The question of the shortage of functionaries and the 
lowering of standards of work, continued the report, was 
being discussed throughout the organisation. At a recent 
meeting in the Lefortovo raion, Bolsheviks said it was 
necessary for workers to be trained as functionaries to 
take the place of the intelligentsia by forming special 
circles for training them from among the most advanced.
The Mensheviks were against this narrow posing of the
question and supported the wide use of legal
1opportunities.
In August in a discussion of the flight of the 
intelligentsia in Moscow it was suggested for the first
Prol. no. 32, 2 July 1908, pp.6-7*
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time that the desertion was due to something more than the 
cowardice and instability which had been suggested as the 
reason in an earlier article in March. This had said that 
the great mass of the intelligentsia now racing each other 
away from the proletariat had embraced Party work in 1905 
inspired only by the idea of political freedom and when 
reaction triumphed temporarily and the working class and
1Party were driven underground such intelligenty deserted.
By August a new factor was observed. The writer 
described what he considered to be the most harmful of the 
many forms of flight, which was not a quiet peaceful one. 
Some people wanted an official sanction, that is, to 
receive permission to flee, *to have their hands untied*, 
as they put it. This urge to have their hands untied had 
appeared at the beginning of March among some Petersburg 
Mensheviks who wanted to call a conference of 
representatives of separate organisations in order to 
state that
only remnants of the Party remain; it doesn* t 
exist in fact, and therefore all those who 
have hitherto had in one way or another to 
take account of the views of these remnants 
are now freeing themselves from this burden 
and can go freely into legal organisations 
where they will be carrying out work it is 
possible to do, that of creating a new 
workers* party.
A delegate from this group was sent to Moscow in March to 
have a talk with the Mensheviks but in spite of his 
argument that Petersburg workers did not want to hear of 
any sort of illegal work and would not even read illegal 
newspapers the proposal was rejected. But, added the
Prol. no. 26, 19 March 1908, p.3*
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reporter, there were nevertheless people in Moscow who 
thought that the Party no longer existed and were urging 
that since the organisations that did exist were led by
the intelligentsia, a new workers* party should be created
1free from the yoke of the intelligentsia.
Although according to the writer of the Moscow 
article the main arguments in support of what was later 
known as liquidationism were being advanced in Petersburg 
and Moscow as early as March, in the form of suggesting 
that the most effective work could be done by Social 
Democrats freeing themselves from the burden of the 
disintegrating illegal organisation, working legally and 
trying to lay the basis of a legal workers* party, it does 
not appear that it was until August that the flight of the 
intelligentsia was connected with the liquidation as well 
as the desertion of the Party.
Prol. no. 34,
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CHAPTER 3 
DISINTEGRATION
In 1908 in a series of articles in Proletarii Lenin 
continued the examination begun in 1907 of the lessons of 
the revolution. He found confirmation in the political 
events of the period of reaction of the argument advanced 
by him in 1905 in Two Tactics of Social Democracy that the 
Russian bourgeoisie was unable to complete its own 
revolution and would become counter-revolutionary and that 
the overthrow of the autocracy and the establishment of a 
bourgeois democratic republic would have to be undertaken 
by the working class in alliance with the revolutionary 
peasantry. He drew the conclusion that the main tactical 
need was to strengthen and consolidate the illegal Party 
organisation in the period of reaction.
In the article On to the Straight Road written in 
March after studying a number of reports coming from the 
localities he observed that the flight of the 
intelligentsia had made necessary a reconstruction of the 
class basis of the Party in the sense of drawing leaders 
from the advanced workers. In the mass organisations 
where a movement from non-party to Party ideology was 
taking place, the aim should be to establish Party groups 
and give leadership in the spirit of revolutionary class 
struggle. He pointed to the path the Party was taking - 
that of
a strong illegal organisation of Party centres, 
systematic illegal publications and, most 
important of all, local and especially factory
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Party nuclei, led by advanced members Prom among 
the workers themselves, living in direct contact 
with the masses: such is the foundation on which
we were building, and have built, a hard and 
solid core of a revolutionary and Social 
Democratic working class movement.1
It was this form of adaptation to conditions of severe
repression which, Lenin stated again and again in the next
few years, was essential if the Party was to survive.
Mensheviks were also examining the experience of the 
revolution and the blows suffered by the Party and were 
coming to the conclusion that it was not possible for the 
working class to return to the old conspiratorial methods. 
They believed that the bourgeoisie in spite of its 
manifest weakness in 1 9 0 5, would be forced by its own 
class interests into decisive struggle against the old 
order and a majority of the class would be fellow 
travellers of the proletariat. They also recognised that 
the bourgeois revolution was not completed and there would 
be a new revolutionary upsurge in the future, but for the 
present period of reaction it was necessary to work in the 
most appropriate way within the limits of the legal 
framework; to direct the Duma activity not towards 
stepping over the barriers in a revolutionary way, but 
towards exploiting the laws for the preparation of 
conditions that would make it possible to step over them. 
It was this tactic of Social Democratic work as intensive 
as possible within the legal framework as a means of 
accumulating organisational forces for the coming new
Lenin XVII, p.7.
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revolution that guided Mensheviks in the next few years, 
most of all in the field of parliamentary work.
Mensheviks emphasised the importance of the 
development of the class consciousness of the workers and 
they claimed that the institutions and organisations 
permitted as a result of the partial gains of the 
revolution, the trade unions, clubs, trade union press, 
non-party factory committees, co-operatives and the Duma 
fraction had become centres of concentration of the masses.
Having had much more experience in the mass 
organisations than the Bolsheviks they saw in them the 
best hope of maintaining contact with the masses in the 
period of repression.
At the beginning of 1908 the reports in Golos sotsial1 
demokrata, the monthly paper edited by Martov and Dan drew 
attention to the same state of affairs as the Bolsheviks 
were noting in Proletarii. The flight of the
intelligentsia and the failure of the students’ fraction to 
act as a Party body were referred to in April. They spoke 
of the need to recreate the political organisations of the 
proletariat as an essential task of the proletarian 
movement, not as a mechanical act to unite scattered 
groups but as the organisation of conscious elements 
actively working in the name of revolutionary socialism in 
all fields of the working class movement. The importance 
of the Duma was emphasised and the Bolshevik slogan for 
recall of the Duma fraction was critised. The reports 
from Kiev, Kharkov, Baku and the South were similar to 
those appearing in Proletarii, speaking of the growing 
difficulty of maintaining support for the trade unions as 
they became less effective and the difficulty of
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organisation owing to the lack of Party workers. In Kiev 
and Kharkov there were joint Menshevik-Bolshevik 
organisations, in Baku in 1908 parallel factional 
organisations existed.
During 1908 a critical change in emphasis took place 
in Menshevik work in Petersburg and Moscow. Whereas in 
the early months, the reports from the capitals in Golos 
sotsial* demokrata dealt with Party matters as in 
Proletarii, by the end of the year the emphasis, in No^. 
10-11, was entirely upon the mass organisations of the 
working class and the legal public congresses, of which 
three, the congresses of popular universities, 
co-operatives and women were held in I9Ö8. In the 
capitals where the legal organisations existed, the 
Mensheviks in devoting their attention to this form of 
work appear to have made a sober estimate of its limited 
value in providing schools of political education for the 
workers but accepted the limitations as temporarily 
necessary. In Petersburg most of all, links with the 
underground Party were abandoned by Mensheviks not only as 
a necessary condition of effective legal work but also 
because they found themselves increasingly opposed to the 
policy of the Central Committee and the Petersburg 
Committee, both Bolshevik controlled. With the otzovist 
Petersburg Committee it was impossible for them to work 
and their opposition to the Central Committee stemmed 
both from factional disagreements abroad and from the 
attempts of the Central Committee to exercise control over 
the Duma fraction. During 1908 they proposed that the 
Central Committee be no longer recognised as a leading 
body but be transformed into an information bureau. The
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tendency in centres where legal work was possible to
regard it as incompatible with membership of the
underground organisation, the talk of forming a purely
legal workers’ party and the challenge to the authority of
the Central Committee were developments to which Lenin
responded late in 1908 by speaking of a trend towards the
liquidation of the Party. In his article Assessment of
the Present Situation he stated that the task was to
strengthen the illegal Party organisation in spite of the
reactionary outcry of the Mensheviks who were trying to 
1bury it, and again in the following issue of Proletarii
in Two Letters in which he discussed otzovism, he spoke of
the tendency of Menshevism which was directly and openly,
or secretly and shamefacedly, burying the Party and was
scarcely represented at all within the local 
2organisations. But it was not until 1909 that the 
Leninist campaign against the trend of liquidationism 
became vehement.
The main ideological issue occupying Lenin’s attention 
in 1908 was the dispute with the Bolshevik left wing - the 
otzovists. The resolution of this conflict was important 
in determining the political direction of Bolshevism. The 
defeat of the left wing with its anarchist leanings 
brought the theory and practice of Bolshevism close to the 
position occupied by the left wing of Menshevism (Party 
Menshevism) by 1910. The dispute is often seen as little 
more than an intra-factional brawl between Lenin and the
Lenin XVII, p.284.
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emigre leaders of the trend, led by A.A. Bogdanov, which 
ended in the expulsion of the otzovists-ultimatumists in 
1909 and the formation of a new faction known as the 
Vperedists from the name of the journal they published.
But this view entirely neglects the support the Bolshevik 
left wing received in the localities and its persisting 
influence on the outlook of working class members of the 
Party.
During the years when the revolutionary Party was 
able to operate semi-legally and carry on the agitational, 
propaganda and organisational activities of an open 
political party, the Mensheviks had been concerned above 
all with the legal mass organisations, particularly trade 
unions and with the creation of a parliamentary Social 
Democratic group - all this activity being directed 
towards using to the utmost the gains of the revolution. 
The Bolsheviks who wanted to use the gains of the 
revolution to make new demands on the autocracy never lost 
sight, as we have seen, of the importance of the armed 
struggle as the culmination of the revolution to overthrow 
the autocracy. Even after the defeat of the December 
uprising they still expected that a new revolutionary 
upsurge would offer a more successful challenge to the 
regime. Although in many parts of the country Bolsheviks 
and Mensheviks using the available political opportunities 
competed side by side for the support of the members and 
local workers and undertook similar activities, the legal 
organisations were in the main left to the Mensheviks 
while the subversive para-military operations of the Party 
were in the hands of the Bolsheviks. What Dan called the 
military-technical side of the revolution including the 
recruiting and training of combat groups, the carrying out
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of acts of violence and the smuggling of arms was the 
concern of men who had little interest in legal political 
activity. The combat groups in the localities were 
supposed to function as separate bodies under the 
leadership of the Party committee, but they frequently 
acknowledged no control at all from the Party. Some of 
those most closely involved in organising the supply of 
weapons and in the expropriations, such as Krasin and
tBogdanov, later became the emigre spokesmen of the left 
wing. But more important than the combat groups, as the 
solid core of the left wing within Russia, were the 
working class members of the Bolshevik faction. Workers 
who had joined the Party or came close to it during the 
revolution knew from their own experience that the main 
gains of 1905 in the matter of hours, wages and conditions 
had been won by the massive confrontation of capital by 
labour in the form of strikes waged without benefit of 
trade unions and certainly without benefit of leadership 
from Social Democratic professional revolutionaries.
During the twelve to eighteen months when trade unions 
enjoyed comparative freedom and some strikes were legal, 
workers joined up in great numbers. But the support given 
to the institutions won from the autocratic government 
remained, in the view of many revolutionaries, conditional 
as long as the autocracy survived. This was particularly 
the case with the parliamentary institution. Once the 
Duma was established in 1906 the response of most 
Bolsheviks and many Mensheviks was to reject it as the 
creation of tsarism and to support the slogan to set up a 
constitutional assembly by revolutionary means. When it 
became apparent both that the workers had ignored the 
slogan to boycott the Duma elections and that the peasants
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had unexpectedly elected the most militant candidates 
offering, Mensheviks threw their entire efforts into 
making the Duma an instrument of legal opposition to the 
autocracy. Two Party conferences were given over to 
disputes on the attitude to be taken by Social Democrats 
to the Duma. In the elections to the second Duma in 1907, 
Lenin supported a change in the tactics of boycott on the 
ground that the revolutionary wave was receding and the 
Duma offered a platform for Social Democrats. He managed 
to get the support of a majority of his faction for 
participation in the elections on a platform different 
from that of the Mensheviks, that is to say, rejecting 
agreements with the Cadets or the formation of a united 
opposition. As we have seen in the case of the 2nd Duma 
the application of Lenin*s election programme was heavy 
handed and at times disruptive. And with the 3rd Duma, 
participation in the elections went deeply against the 
convictions of the Bolshevik rank and file and of large 
numbers of urban workers. The tendency to reject any 
dealings with the reactionary institutions of the 
autocracy persisted and when the boycott was no longer 
appropriate after the elections, it reappeared in the form 
of a campaign to recall the Social Democratic deputies 
from the Duma (otzovism).
The otzovist programme was a simple one. Since the 
tasks of the revolution were not completed and a new 
social uprising would take place in the future, it was the 
duty of Social Democrats basing themselves on the coming 
rise in militancy and not the present stagnation to 
prepare for the new upsurge by preserving the illegal 
party. In the Duma the Social Democratic group had failed 
to fulfil its task of agitation and propaganda, all hope
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of expanding its work must be abandoned, its continued 
presence in the Duma was a mistake and it should be 
recalled.
The boycott had been supported by the great majority 
of Bolsheviks in the period of working class militancy.
Its successor, otzovism (recallism) had to win acceptance 
when the revolutionary tide was retreating and workers 
were in no mood for political gestures of defiance, and it 
found support only among the left wing of the 
revolutionary opposition. Whereas the right wing of 
Social Democracy, Menshevism, accepting all the 
restrictions imposed by police repression, worked within 
legal limits so constricted that its activity appeared to 
lose all political complexion, the left wing in the face 
of the apathy of the masses and the emasculation of their 
organisations proposed to retreat entirely into 
conspiratorial conditions in order to preserve the kernel 
of the Party, and to form small underground groups to keep 
the militant spirit alive - and with this went rejection 
of work in legal organisations, especially the Duma. As 
developed by Bogdanov the ideas of the left leaned more 
and more to the training of combat groups in preparation 
for the next mass upsurge and their anarchist character 
became more pronounced after the split from the main body 
of Bolsheviks.
The problems of political tactics brought forward by 
the otzovists were much discussed by Bolsheviks within 
Russia from the spring of 1908. Articles by the emigre 
spokesmen were matched by resolutions in local committees. 
An otzovist resolution demanding the recall of the Social 
Democratic deputies was debated in the Moscow Committee in
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iMay 1908 and defeated 18-14. In the Petersburg
2organisation the otzovist and ultimatumist supporters 
were strongly represented and indeed held a majority of 
the Petersburg Committee for much of 1908 and I9O9 . In 
November 1908 Lenin opened up a full scale campaign 
against otzovism which continued throughout 1909.
If we try to estimate the strength and nature of the
otzovist-ultimatumist tendency within Russia it has to be
said that it appears to have been widespread among the
Bolshevik rank and file. In areas where Bolsheviks had
either organised combat groups and engaged in
expropriations or sympathised and co-operated with those
that did, the support for boycott had been very strong.
Where the Party organisations in such places survived into
the period of deep repression otzovism also found
supporters, Saratov and the Urals, the only two centres
outside Moscow and Petersburg which sent delegates to the
Conference of Combat Groups and Military organisations in
1906 were strongly boycottist. In June 1907 five-sixths
of the Saratov organisation voted for boycott of the 33rd3Duma, Expropriations in that area continued till 1908. 
There was no record of otzovism in Saratov but it must be 
remembered here that the expropriations (mainly the work
1
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revolutionary policy in the Duma. If they failed to 
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of the Socialist Revolutionaries) brought down such
severe police reprisals that there was practically no
organisation left for some years. The forests surrounding
the Motovilikha works near Perm had been the scene of the
exploits of the legendary Socialist Revolutionary
expropriator, Lbov, There were supposed to have been more
than a thousand Party members in the works at the time of
the London Congress.^ Both the Perm and the Motovilikha
organisations had a record of strong support for boycott
and recall. By 1909 the membership had declined to two
groups of 25-30 each in the town and at the factory and
2the workers were said to be no longer otzovist. This was 
hardly surprising, since police repression and 
unemployment had combined to reduce the Social Democratic 
organisations in the Urals to a dim half life after the 
turbulance of 1906-7, from which they feebly emerged in 
1911-12 to participate in the Russian Organising 
Commission and the Prague conference.
But the boycottist-otzovist tendency was also strong 
in Petersburg and Moscow where boevism had not greatly 
influenced the minds of Party members. Here the tendency 
expressed itself in an insistence on the importance of the 
underground Party, contempt for the futility of legal 
organisations, utter dislike of the feeble part the Social 
Democratic fraction was playing in the ,Black Hundred 
Duma*, and at times resentment against the intelligentsia. 
The last was most noticeable in Moscow. An early report
1
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on the flight of the intelligentsia mentioned a tendency
1 2towards makhaevshchina among Moscow workers. By 1909 
when the disputes between Bolshevik leaders had become 
prolonged, public and bitter, the disposition of the rank 
and file to blame the squabbling intelligentsia for the 
Party’s troubles increased. Meetings of otzovist 
supporters were reported as saying that although the 
intelligentsia could not be dispensed with entirely, they 
should be carefully vetted and the role of the small 
number of elected representatives reduced to that of 
1ideological technicians f. The reporter commented that
this sort of thing could only end in the old dated
3makhaevshchina.
Throughout 1908 the decline in the strength of the 
Party continued. Unremitting police persecution, arrests 
of those who had replaced the committee members, 
disappearance of the professionals and the extreme 
difficulty of circulating Party publications had meant the 
breakup of the organisation outside a few centres, into 
isolated groups. Only in the Central Industrial Region 
and the Caucasus did the oblast* organisation continue to
1
This refers to the ideas of V.K. Makhaiskii (1866-1926), 
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manual workers. They led anti-capitalist movements in 
order to win political democracy and jobs under capitalism, 
or in order to occupy leading political and managerial 
positions, in a socialised economy. Makhaiskii rejected 
the political struggle in favour of a purely economic 
struggle of the workers.
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function. In the provinces arrests, the departure of 
members and the loss of links were much more important 
than faction fights in bringing activity to a standstill. 
The needs of the small centres so frequently expressed in 
Proletarii were for the help of professionals, guidance 
from the Central Committee, a supply of Party literature 
and restoration of links with other groups. The question 
of open liquidationism was not relevant where there were 
no legal organisations. But in the capitals and the few 
other areas where legal work was possible recriminations 
between the factions was an important factor in further 
reducing, dividing and demoralising the members. There 
were particularly acute difficulties in Petersburg where 
the decline and demoralisation were much more marked than 
in Moscow. Here a strong legal Menshevik centre led by 
Potresov and Akselrod and firmly based on the Duma 
fraction and the legal trade union centre with its journal 
Professional’nyi Vestnik attracted many members away from 
the underground organisation. The rival claimant for 
Social Democratic leadership, the Petersburg Committee, 
dominated by the otzovists and characterised by bitter 
left hostility to the Duma fraction, harassed by spies and 
provocateurs and disrupted by frequent arrests had little 
authority.
Those Mensheviks who regarded the existence of the 
illegal Party as something to be defended were quite 
unable to accept the Petersburg Committee and worked 
independently.
The position in Moscow was rather different. Here 
the legal Mensheviks lacked the strong rallying point of 
the Duma fraction. They were entrenched in the trade
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unions although less strongly than in Petersburg. There 
was a separate centre of legal Mensheviks but there were 
also Party Mensheviks, as was shown by the letter from 
’Alexei Moskovskii’ (G.I. Khundadze) published in Rabochee 
Znamia, the paper of the Central Industrial Region, at the 
end of 1908 and reprinted in Sotsial’demokrat in 1909.
This was a brief statement dissociating the Mensheviks 
working in the Moscow organisation from the inteiligenty 
in legal organisations calling themselves the Group of 
Social Democratic Mensheviks who were, according to the
writer of the letter, carrying on a struggle against the
1R.S.D.W.P. Reacting indignantly to the accusation the
legal Mensheviks demanded its retraction at a meeting of
2Moscow Mensheviks, but without success. Proletarii
branded the Group of Social Democratic Mensheviks as hidden 
liquidators. It would seem however, that since the basis 
of pure legalism in Moscow was narrower than in 
Petersburg its attraction for Mensheviks was 
correspondingly less.
Although there was a solid core of otzovists in the 
Moscow organisation, the Leninist policy of combination of 
legal and illegal work was supported in the Moscow 
Committee and only one raion, Lefortovo, was regarded as a 
stronghold of otzovism. Bolshevik; and Mensheviks did not 
polarise into such bitterly opposed groups as in 
Petersburg, with the result that the organisation was less 
fragmented. In spite of severe losses through arrests,
1
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the Moscow City and Okrug committees were recognised as 
leading bodies even when they were temporarily out of 
action. It was a considerable achievement that in 1908 
they managed to publish seven issues of their paper and to 
hold Party conferences.
The Fifth Conference of the Party which met in Paris 
at the end of I9O8 (o.s.) marked a very low point in the 
organisation. It was summoned with great difficulty, 
opposed by the Mensheviks as being unrepresentative, and 
only sixteen delegates representing organisations within 
the empire could be mustered - 5 Poles, 3 Bundists, 3 
Mensheviks representing the Caucasus (emigres) and 5 
Bolsheviks (3 of them otzovists). Of the Bolsheviks there 
were one each from Moscow, the Central Industrial Region 
and the Urals, and two from Petersburg. The otzovists 
came from the C.I.R., the Urals and Petersburg. One more 
Menshevik from Kiev arrived as the conference was ending 
and a Bolshevik from the North-west region after it was
1over. Four Bolsheviks from other parts failed to arrive.
The main resolutions of the conference which were all,
as Krupskaia said, in the Bolshevik spirit, dealt with the
current situation and tasks of the Party, the Duma
fraction and organisational questions, and all made
2significant statements of Bolshevik policy. The brief 
resolution arising from the reports merely stated that in 
a number of places there had been attempts by a certain
1
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section of the Party intelligentsia to liquidate the 
existing organisation and replace it with an amorphous 
union within legal limits, although this would be 
purchased at the expense of the programme, tactics and 
traditions of the Party. Conference found necessary the 
most resolute ideological and organisational struggle 
against liquidationist attempts and called on Party 
workers regardless of faction and tendency to an energetic 
rejection of these attempts. It was further stated in 
this resolution that the Central Committee would not 
function properly unless the minority submitted to Party 
discipline and worked loyally within the one institution 
and its executive organs.
The resolution on the current situation and tasks of 
the Party was the work of Lenin at his most terse and 
lucid. It noted the evolution of the autocracy into a 
bourgeois monarchy, the present role of the various 
classes, the unresolved problem of the bourgeois 
revolution, the deepening conflict between ruling and 
working classes and the certain development of a new 
revolutionary crisis. The tasks were to strengthen the 
Party in the form in which it had been built up during the 
revolutionary period and to resist attempts to whittle 
down the slogans and liquidate the illegal organisation. 
The functions of the intelligentsia were to be transferred 
to the workers themselves. The economic struggle of the 
workers was to be assisted along the lines laid down by 
the London Congress of the Party and the Stuttgart 
Congress of the International. The Duma was to be used as 
a rostrum for revolutionary Social Democratic propaganda 
and agitation.
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The resolution on the Duma fraction directly opposed 
the Menshevik view of its role, in stating that it was to 
serve as one of the organs of the Party in propaganda, 
agitation and organisation, and to refrain from so-called 
positive legislation and chasing after trifling reforms.
It should bring forward measures on the 8-hour day, 
freedom of unions and strikes and workers insurance. In 
listing the fraction's mistakes, laying down a militant 
agitational policy and insisting on its subordination to 
the Central Committee the resolution was clearly designed 
to meet some of the criticism of the performance of the 
Social Democratic deputies, upon which a great deal of 
otzovist dissatisfaction was based. The otzovist 
Bolsheviks here found themselves in a difficult position. 
They voted for the resolution on the current situation 
although with the rider that they did not agree with point 
5, on the use of the Duma. On the Duma resolution they 
voted with the Leninists to maintain a united front against 
the Mensheviks. On the organisational resolution they had 
no position other than the official Bolshevik one.
The resolution on organisational questions having 
repeated the Leninist estimate that present political 
conditions made it less feasible to maintain Social 
Democratic work within the limits of legal and semi-legal 
workers’ organisations and made impossible the full 
application of the principle of the democratic structure 
of the organisation, recommended that the greatest 
possible use be made of both legal and illegal 
organisations. However work could be undertaken fruitfully 
only where Party committees, even small ones, existed in 
every industrial enterprise and if all work in legal
9 6
organisations were carried on under the leadership of 
illegal Party organisations. In order to co-ordinate 
Party work in the localities, oblas t * centres were to be 
organised in each oblast 1 to give technical assistance and 
ideological leadership, to rebuild organisations which had 
collapsed and to establish close links between local and 
oblast 1 organisations and the Central Committee. The 
principle of co-option should be permitted in local 
organisations with the co-opted members being replaced as 
soon as possible by properly elected comrades.
On the Central Committee the conference supported the 
Central Committee plenum decision to set up a bureau in 
Russia with plenary powers although questions of principle 
should be decided by a plenum. Links with the centre were 
to be strengthened by more frequent tours by Central 
Committee members and improvement of communications. The 
conference insisted that the printing of the central organ, 
Sotsial1demokrat should be resumed as soon as possible.
Lenin, unlike Zinoviev who dismissed the 5th 
Conference in his history of the Party as of little 
importance, had a high regard for its decisions. He 
considered that it had made a correct estimate of the 
political situation in the years of counter revolution and 
had laid down a policy (his own) which remained 
substantially correct for the next few years. He not only 
referred in later works with approval to its decisions, 
but at his suggestion the Prague Conference of 1912 
mentioned the 5th Conference resolution on the current 
situation
whose propositions on the historical 
significance and class content of the whole 
June 3 regime on the one hand and the growth
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of the revolutionary crisis on the other 
have been fully borne out by the events of 
the last three yearsJ
From the resolution on organisational questions it is 
clear how weak the Central Committee had become. The 
recommendation to set up a small committee (fixed at five 
by the plenum following the conference), to lead the work 
inside Russia was not a new one, but the record of the 
Russian bureau in 1908 had not been impressive. The 
Central Committee had begun the year with brisk 
resolutions on trade unions and co-operatives and letters 
to Party members on how to work in trade unions. Zinoviev 
in his report on the 5th Conference described these 
resolutions outlining the method of fraction work in mass 
organisations as amongst the most important the Central 
Committee had taken between the 4th and 5th conferences. 
The record of activity was not long. The Central 
Committee had published one number of a trade union paper 
and had endeavoured without success to call a conference 
of Social Democrats working in trade unions. It had 
carried on agitation in connection with the trial of 
Social Democratic deputies of the 2nd Duma, it took part 
in the preparation and work of Social Democrats in the 
congresses of co-operatives, popular universities, women 
and students (the last one was illegal). Members of the 
Central Committee had made a number of tours to organise 
and consolidate oblastT centres in Central Russia, the 
South, Urals, Volga, Crimea, North West, Caucasus and 
Northern Caucasus. They participated regularly in local
1
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work in Petersburg. A Bureau to assist the military 
organisation with agitation and propaganda had been set up 
and Central Committee members sent to settle 
organisational disputes in Baku and Taganrog. It 
published one number of the central organ, SotsialT demokrat, 
in Petersburg and several leaflets, and had made a number 
of attempts to get the central organ published regularly 
in Russia. Finally it had devoted a good deal of 
attention to the task of leading the Duma fraction, but 
absolved itself from responsibility for a number of its 
mistakes, since the fraction at times acted contrary to 
the advice or instructions of the Central Committee. It 
had done its best to establish close contact between the 
fraction and local organisations by issuing appeals to the 
Party and on their tours Central Committee members had 
drawn the attention of local comrades to the matter.
One reason for the ineffectiveness of the activity of
the central body, Zinoviev observed, was the unstable
majority which meant that obstructive actions by the
Mensheviks at times prevented the Central Committee from 
1acting at all.
A plenum of the Central Committee had met in Geneva 
in August 1908. This meeting was marked by bitter 
quarrels between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The former 
managed to divert an enquiry into expropriations pressed 
for by the Mensheviks into a Bolshevik controlled 
commission, while the Menshevik proposal to turn the 
Central Committee into an information centre was brought 
to light. These two points of dissension showed the gulf
Prol. no. 42, 12 February 1909, pp.2-4.
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existing at that time between the two wings - the 
Mensheviks condemning the resort to anarchist lawlessness 
and the Bolsheviks denouncing the attempts to liquidate 
the Party. 1908 had begun with the two factions on the 
Central Committee disagreeing but able to reach decisions 
at least by majority vote and occasionally unanimously. 
During the year the Menshevik members virtually boycotted 
the Central Committee. The question after the 5th 
conference was whether the organisational proposals would 
make the Committee a functioning body. In the event they 
did not.
The record of Bolshevik activity in the trade unions 
in I9O8 vividly illustrates the gap between intentions and 
performance. In February 1908 a resolution was published 
on Social Democratic work in trade unions which it was 
stated, had been drawn up by a commission of the Central 
Committee and adopted by the Committee in January. As 
mentioned earlier, this resolution contained the same 
proposals as those put forward by a conference of 
Bolshevik activists late in 1907.
It began with the statement that Social Democratic 
work in trade unions must be carried out in the spirit of 
the London and Stuttgart resolutions, that is, not in the 
spirit of neutrality or non-partyness of trade unions but 
on the contrary, in the spirit of unremitting striving for 
the closest possible rapprochement of unions with Party.
Trade unions in their period of legal existence had 
not in general succeeded in creating solid, organised 
nuclei in industrial enterprises. Therefore government 
repression had led not only to the closing of many unions
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but to complete destruction of some. Thus the central 
task was the creation of such solidly organised nuclei. 
Without such nuclei it was impossible either to build 
stable unions or to lead the economic struggle of the 
proletariat.
In existing legal trade unions these nuclei had to be 
organised in all factories, that is, primary trade union 
organisations had to be created. Members of the Party 
should form solid groups in all such organisations in order 
to influence them systematically in a Social Democratic 
spirit.
Where police repression had entirely broken up the 
legal trade unions, illegal trade unions were to be 
organised. As with the legal ones the basis of these 
illegal unions must be the organisation of as many workers 
as possible in the trade union nucleus of an undertaking, 
and within this nucleus it was necessary to organise a 
trade union group of Social Democrats in the undertaking.
In order to co-ordinate all Social Democratic work in
trade unions, union groups of Social Democrats were to be
set up in every occupation, which would unite the union
groups of the various enterprises. All these groups were
to carry on work in close organisational contact with the
1local Party centre.
This resolution was followed by a long explanatory 
letter from the Central Committee on work in trade unions 
in which the reason for the collapse of unions in the face
Prol. no. 21, 13 February 1908, p.4.
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of repression, namely the instability of their 
organisation, was examined and the tasks of Social 
Democrats in restoring them outlined.
The organised groups of Social Democrats were to work 
(1) through meetings of Party members of union management 
boards and delegate meetings for preliminary discussion of 
important questions; (2 ) by discussion in raion and other 
Party meetings of trade union questions; (3) by 
organisation where possible of meetings at city, raion and 
podraion level of Social Democrats in a particular 
industry for such discussion; (4) because of the 
organisation of Russian trade unions on industry and not 
occupational basis, the discussion of trade union
1questions could take place in workplace Party meetings.
In the discussion that these proposals brought forth 
there were objections on the ground that they presented a 
danger both to the unions and to the Party. The Party 
would be in danger of degenerating into a trade union 
party, or on the other hand, the existence of Social 
Democratic groups within the unions could lead to schisms, 
even to the formation of special Party unions. The 
defenders were ready for this, they pointed out that the 
groups were not Party nuclei and political questions would 
be decided not by meetings of Party members of this or 
that union but at Party meetings. There would be nothing 
to fear from the second danger, that of splits caused by 
the operations of Social Democrats within unions, since 
the groups would meet only to discuss important questions
101
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on which it was essential to have a final decision. In
the end a compromise was reached - organised groups were
to be formed only in union boards of management and
1delegate meetings.
It seems clear that the proposers of the new system 
of organised groups within the mass organisations were 
aware of the possible danger of an independent body 
parallel to and challenging the authority of the Party 
being set up and they were careful not to construct a 
fraction in which the chain of authority ran directly from 
the leading Social Democrats in the mass organisation to 
the rank and file Party members, but instead at every 
level, Social Democrats in the unions were in 
consultation with and subordinated to the appropriate 
Party body. The system was devised as much to protect the 
Party from encroachment by the mass organisations as to 
bring the latter speedily and efficiently under the 
ideological influence of the Party.
In the same issue of Proletarii a letter from the 
Central Committee appeared proposing that an all-Russian 
conference of leading Party workers in the trade unions be 
held in April 1908. It pointed out that Social Democrats 
had taken a leading part in the development of trade 
unions in the last 2^ - years but their trade union work had 
no organised character, it was carried on in isolation and 
mistakes occurred again and again. There was a need to 
sum up the experiences of these years. The Central 
Committee had recently decided to set up organised groups
Prol. no. 28, 2 April 1908, p.3»
1
103
in trade unions and the completion of the uniting of these 
groups must be an all-Russian co-ordination of Social 
Democratic activity by means of a special conference.
The suggested method of election of delegates to the
conference was that it should be as democratic as possible,
embracing all Social Democrats working in trade unions, or
if that were not possible, embracing Party members on
union boards of management and in union delegate meetings,
or in extreme cases, only those on the central trade union
bureau. The final order of election was left to oblastT
1and local organisations to arrange.
Police persecution was too intense for the conference 
to be held.
A Moscow Committee resolution on trade unions in 1908
is of some interest. It stated that under existing police
conditions legal leadership of the economic struggle was
impossible, and illegal boevye prof, tsentry (militant
trade union centres) would have to be organised to
undertake this leadership. To form these centres, city
conferences by trade of the most active members of unions
and representatives of factory Party nuclei should be held.
It was essential to reactivate and re-establish the legal
trade unions. Boevye prof, tsentry were to elect
representatives to a central all-trade union group
attached to the Moscow Committee which would have
representatives from the Moscow Committee and every Party
raion and would lead the trade union struggle under the
2control of the Moscow Committee.
_
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The Moscow resolution on work in trade unions was 
adopted by a Party city conference.
The elaborate plans of work in trade unions drawn up 
by Bolshevik committees in 1908 proved quite impossible to 
put into effect. Shattered by internal dissension and 
loss of members the Bolshevik faction was too preoccupied 
with its own difficulties to restore unions which had 
collapsed or to challenge Menshevik domination of the 
legal unions. Articles by faction leaders continued to 
appear in the Party press defending neutrality or 
partiinost*. Martov attacked the bureaucracy of the 
Bolshevik proposals pointing out that the main activity 
should be energetic agitation against repression of the 
unions and the barbarous policies of the government. His 
view of the role of the trade unions which cast them as 
organs of struggle while respecting their organisational 
independence was more constructive than Lenin*s. But 
there was one catch. Under Russian conditions there was 
no possibility for the time being of the trade union 
movement developing in that direction. The emasculated 
legal trade unions on which the Mensheviks lavished so 
much care failed precisely to protest against the 
repression of the unions or to attack the barbarous 
policies of the government. A perusal of Professional * nyi 
Yestnik, the journal of the Petersburg legal trade union 
centre, for 1908-9 shows that it conducted no agitation on 
wages and conditions and made no overt protests against 
government policy. In I9O8 it did indeed print an article 
on the eight hour movement - in western Europe. It 
recorded without comment the enormities perpetrated by the 
authorities against the trade union organisations. For a
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small politically literate section of the workers there 
was an eloquent message in this Aesopian language. But to 
the mass of the Russian workers it had nothing to say.
In a report from Kiev in Golos sotsial*demokrata on
the position of the trade unions there, the story was that
of unions rapidly losing both members and funds, fearing
for their continued existence and reduced to a state where
they were carrying on no economic struggle at all. There
was one exception, the woodworkers, who had gone on strike
and after a week were successful in having the working day
reduced from 10^ to 9 and 8 hours and in raising wages in
six workshops. There was also a sequel. The union was
1closed by the Kiev administration.
The conditions of exploitation of labour in Russia, a 
rapidly industrializing backward country were severe, as 
they were in many parts of Europe at that time. But 
whereas elsewhere organised labour had a voice and could 
state its grievances, in Russia complete silence was 
imposed on the legal labour movement on the issues which 
concerned it most. It was not allowed to state such a 
simple fact of industrial life as that the boss was an 
exploiter or to prepare a programme of claims to be made 
against him. In the end it was the illegal revolutionary 
political party which had to do these things, which was 
not at all what Lenin had envisaged in What is to be done?
1909 was a year of continuing disintegration. Even 
as the Bolshevik organising centre, the Russian Bureau of 
the Central Committee failed and by the end of the year
Golos sotsial*demokrata, no. 6-7» May-June 1908, p.27*
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had almost ceased to function. The Bureau had five 
members with one representative each from the Bolsheviks, 
Mensheviks, Bund, Poles and Latvians, but never functioned 
with full numbers. The day to day work was done by 
I.F. Dubrovinskii (innokenty) as the Polish delegate, with 
the Bolshevik chairman Meshkovskii responsible for work 
with the Duma fraction. Soon after the 5th Conference the 
Central Committee published a questionnaire addressed to 
Party organisations. They were asked to state their 
numbers, how they defined membership and to propose a date
for the next Party congress, basis of representation at it
1and an agenda. It was in the answers to this 
questionnaire that rough figures for the membership of 
various organisations were given. The few replies 
published to the question of definition of membership 
conformed fairly closely to the Leninist formula put 
forward at the 2nd Congress. From the brief reports of 
the activity of the Committee appearing in So tsial* demokrat 
in 1 9 0 9 it would appear that it concerned itself with the 
policy to be adopted at the legal congress of factory 
medical officers, announced that a May Day leaflet calling 
for a one day strike would be published, drew up a protest 
for Social Democratic supporters against the death penalty, 
different from the liberal one which was being widely 
circulated, discussed the Duma fraction, made a number of 
proposals on the policy it should adopt and asserted its 
right of veto over fraction decisions, pronounced on the 
desirability of a separate organisation for women workers, 
regarding it as temporarily admissible, and sent agents to
SD no. 2, 28 January 1909» p.7*
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restore organisations. No further reports for 1909 appear 
after the issue of Sotsialt demokrat No. 5 in May.
A report on the work of the Central Committee Bureau 
was given by Me^shkovskii at the enlarged editorial board 
meeting of Proletarii in Paris in June 1909» which 
unfortunately was not preserved in the minutes, but from 
the discussion it would appear that there had been 
disagreements with the Petersburg Committee and some of 
the practical workers at the meeting were very critical of 
the Bureau for its lack of activity. The reason for the 
complete inability of the Bureau in the first half of 1909 
to fulfil its function as the leading Party body seems to 
have been with a remarkable performance of provocation by 
a trusted functionary in the Bureau secretariat. A memoir 
of work with the Bureau in 1908 and 1909 by Golubkov gives 
a vivid account of the undermining process which both 
halted the work of the centre and made it so dangerous 
that local organisations boycotted it. From the first 
message received early in 1909 from Burtsev in Berlin, 
through Krupskaia, that there was a provocateur, identity 
unknown, close to the centre, Golubkov recounts the 
growing uncertainty and tension as the signs pointed to a 
most valued secretarial worker Lucia (Julia Serova), wife 
of one of the exiled Social Democratic deputies of the 2nd 
Duma. The centre had suffered a series of setbacks, the 
two leading professionals Dubrovinskii and Nogin had been 
arrested unexpectedly, the printed resolutions of the 5th 
Conference had been seized when the police raided the 
apartment where they were awaiting distribution, and the 
May Day leaflets printed in Poland had been lost when the 
courier bringing them in was arrested. It seemed clear
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that the Bureau was able to carry on some work of a 
conspiratorial nature, find premises, have appointments, 
provide accommodation and supply passports and money. But 
as soon as it moved beyond these narrow limits and tried 
to do any real work such as printing resolutions, 
distributing leaflets or getting people out of the country 
it met with some obstacle.
By June suspicion of Lucia was almost a certainty. 
Golubkov attending the enlarged editorial board meeting 
asked Lenin what should be done and received the 
characteristic reply that they should build the 
organisation so that provocateurs could not get in. Then 
he relented and advised Golubkov to remove anyone on whom 
there lay the smallest suspicion. It was decided in Paris 
to wind up the Bureau office.
Rumours that provocation was centred in the leading 
bodies of the Party had been circulating in the Petersburg 
organisation for months. In March 1909 the fourteen 
members of the Petersburg Committee present at a meeting 
were surprised and arrested. The Provisional Executive 
Commission which endeavoured to rebuild the Committee 
found the Petersburg raion organisations extremely 
suspicious and reluctant to have anything to do with it. 
Four raions proposed the setting up of an inter-raion, but 
not city, investigating committee to examine the arrests 
and rumours. The Provisional Executive itself set up an 
investigating committee and proposed more conspiratorial 
methods of reconstituting the Petersburg city committee,
A. Golubkov, op. cit., pp.121-51*
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that is, by reducing the number of raion representatives 
from two to one each, to be nominated by the raion 
executives instead of being elected by the raion 
conferences. It was hoped that nomination would ensure 
greater safety for delegates, as would the smaller city 
committee of 8-10 which would replace the former 
cumbersome body numbering 16-17.
The Petersburg organisation had given up the practice
early in 1908 of electing representatives to its leading
committee at the city conference because it had become
impossible to hold large meetings, and had adopted the
system of having the raion conferences elect two
2representatives each.
As finally adopted, the new rules provided that 
delegates to the Petersburg Committee were to be elected 
by the raion executive commissions wherever it was not 
expedient for them to be elected by the raion committees. 
An executive commission of three, with power to co-opt two 
more members was to be elected by the city committee. The
term of office of the committee continued to be six
3months. But even these extreme conspiratorial 
precautions were not successful in protecting the 
committee and in the new batch of members that took office
1
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in the summer, there was the inevitable provocateur-Jpresent, this time Poliakov (‘Katsap*).
For the Petersburg organisation as powerful a 
disruptive factor as arrests and provocation was the 
bitter intrafactional struggle between Leninists and 
otzovists which flared up after the conference of the 
enlarged editorial board of Proletarii expelled Bogdanov 
from the Bolshevik faction and condemned otzovism and 
ultimatumism as a deviation from the path of revolutionary 
Marxism. This conference was attended by the editors of 
Prole tarii, five Bolshevik Central Committee members and 
three representatives from localities. The resolutions 
dealing with the tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Party, and 
the tasks of Social Democrats in relation to the Duma 
restated Leninist policy. The resolution on otzovism and 
ultimatumism described the origin of the tendency and 
stated that it had nothing in common with Bolshevism. The 
resolutions on God building tendencies, the Party school 
abroad and agitation for separate Bolshevik congresses and 
conferences condemned the various splitting activities and 
un-Marxist tendencies amongst otzovists and their 
associates.^
In a report on the conference which accompanied the 
publication of the resolutions in a supplement to 
Prole tarii, Lenin clearly stated that the conference had 
not declared a split in the Bolshevik faction and the 
resolutions were not to be understood as an instruction to
1
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1expel otzovist-minded workers. Nevertheless the last
paragraph of the resolution on otzovism and ultimatumism
disclaiming any common ground between Bolshevism and the
otzovist tendency and Lenin*s article Liquidation of
Liquidationism, where he stated that the Party could make
no headway until it liquidated otzovist as well as
2Menshevik liquidationism were bound to produce the 
impression that a split was about to occur.
The minutes of the enlarged editorial board
conference reveal that some of the practical workers
present, in particular Tomskii and Rykov, were greatly
concerned that members should not be driven out. Tomskii
after twice saying that he feared that the pages of
Proletarii would be filled with the struggle against
otzovism made a statement supported by Rykov and Shantser
(Marat) asking the editorial board not to be carried away
by the discussions on otzovism to the detriment of more
3important questions. He also made a statement on the
main resolution on otzovism supporting it as a whole, but
opposing the last paragraph. Other practical workers
4present shared his views. Tomskii1s gloomy predictions 
about the content of Prole tarii were fully borne out. The 
next two issues had supplements devoted to otzovism, and
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there were polemics against Bogdanov who had issued a 
statement defending his viewpoint.
There was an immediate reaction in Petersburg.
Emphatic letters from Party functionaries, F.I. Goloshchekin 
and V.O. Volosevich expressed similar views to those of 
Tomskii and Rykov - support of the political line of 
Proletarii combined with outright rejection of any move to 
expel otzovists. Everyone was agreed that otzovism 
represented a mood or an attitude and not a policy. The 
way to change this attitude, according to the men on the 
spot, was through persistent re-education and not the
isetting off of a factional brawl.
On August 9 the Petersburg Committee, at that time
divided 4-4 between otzovists and Leninists, at a meeting
at which there happened to be a majority of otzovists
resolved, apropos of the pending Duma by-elections,
On the question of the elections the Executive 
Committee, without attaching special importance 
to the State Duma and our fraction there, but 
being guided by the general Party decision, 
resolves to take part in the elections, not 
investing all the available forces, but merely 
putting forward its own candidates to collect 
the Social Democratic votes and organising an 
election commission answerable to the executive 
of the St Petersburg Committee through its 
representative.2
This crass but not untypical example of otzovist political 
thinking caused great embarrassment in the organisation and 
an unofficial inter-raion meeting of activists was hastily
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called which repudiated the resolution and expressed 
support of the political line of Proletarii, together with 
strong disagreement with the methods of struggle against 
ultimatumism pursued by the editorial board. A later 
meeting of the Petersburg Committee rescinded the otzovist 
resolution. On the occasion of the inter-raion meeting, 
Goloshchekin wrote to the Bolshevik centre saying how wrong
they had been to adopt disruptive methods of struggle,
1drowning a grain of truth in a sea of muck. Volosevich,
organiser in the Vasilev Ostrov raion and a member of the
Petersburg Committee also wrote in strong terms. He said
that a split was looming in the organisation with the
inevitable accompaniments of intrigue, raging quarrels,
demagogy and other morally dubious methods of factional
struggle. The wish to discredit the theoretical position
of onels opponents often led to entirely impermissible
means of discrediting Party organisations and even the
Party itself. All this put on the alert comrades who
valued the organisation, weak as it was and forced them to
concentrate all their forces to prevent a split. This had
been the reason for the calling of the unofficial inter-
raion meeting. Volosevich believed he was correctly
expressing the feeling of the meeting in saying that they
2would not allow a split to occur.
The uncompromising rejection of a heresy hunt by the 
men in Petersburg and their critical attitude to the
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editors of Proletarii produced a conciliatory article from 
Lenin, A Word to the Bolsheviks of St Petersburg.
The Petersburg Committee however, remained deadlocked
and incapable of action, because the November six monthly
elections returned a 5-3 majority for the otzovists.
Reports of meetings told of arid arguments and lack of 
1action. The ultimatumist variety of otzovism which 
flourished in Petersburg lacked any positive policy. In 
November their main concern seems to have been to prevent 
workers from participating in the coming congress on 
alcoholism. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
had the Central Committee had a functioning centre or had 
there been any of the leading professionals able to work in 
the city at this time, the confusion in the Petersburg 
Committee could have been cleared up. But the centre had 
disintegrated and there is no evidence of the continued 
presence of experienced professionals. Goloshchekin had 
gone on to Moscow and local functionaries retreated to the 
raions. While the committee was foundering, such work as 
did go on was in the raions, where a cautious rapprochement 
between some Party Mensheviks and non-otzovist Bolsheviks 
had begun.
The situation in the eight raions was discussed in
Sotsial* demokrat and Prole tarii in 1909* A report to a
meeting of the city committee at the end of January 1909
gave numbers of organised members. This report covering
2six raions gave a rough total of 520. Mention was made of
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united work with Party Mensheviks in the Petersburg and 
Vasilev Ostrov raions and there was a member of the 
Petersburg Committee on the Central Trade Union Bureau. 
Leadership was entirely in the hands of workers in three 
raions, Narva, Neva and Moscow, where there were no 
intelligenty. In those raions arrests and unemployment 
were severe. Vasilev Ostrov was the raion where the 
otzovists were strongest. It claimed 200 members and seven 
intelligenty. City raion No. 1 with 250 members had four 
intelligenty. Vyborg belonged to the Mensheviks and there 
was very little Bolshevik organisation there.
In June an article described the parlous condition of 
the Petersburg organisation as a whole. Rumours of 
provocation had undermined confidence and otzovism had done 
great harm because it caused the neglect of organisational 
work. Activity was being started again but because of the 
shortage of professionals most organisers had to work both 
in the city committee and in the raions. Police 
persecution was particularly intense because the Okhrana 
which had hitherto devoted attention to the Socialist 
Revolutionaries, maximalists, makhaevtsy and anarchists was 
now concentrating solely on the Social Democrats. There 
had been almost no activity for May Day. A radical change 
in methods of work was necessary. Having grown used to 
legal conditions and having expanded enormously in the *days 
of freedom* the Party found it difficult to adapt itself to 
repression. The organisation of nuclei wherever there were 
links, even in very small enterprises required forces which 
the Party did not have. The task therefore was to build up 
strength in the large undertakings. There was an extreme 
shortage of functionaries and propagandists, and the Party
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press from abroad came in such small quantities that it 
could not give guidance, nor were its articles understood 
by the workers. There were at the present time less than 
1000 members in Petersburg although the prestige of Social 
Democracy stood as high as it had done before.1 2
The attitude of workers in the organisation at this 
time as it occasionally appears in correspondence with the 
Bolshevik centre abroad reflected a mixture of dependence 
and resentment. A letter full of emotion from a worker 
said,
And know what we people working in the raions 
and factories have decided. We have decided 
to exclude the otzovists from the executive 
and take their places. You are going to make a 
fuss about this? What is going on? Dumping 
the professionals? Yes, comrades, the Party is 
dear to us, as dear as Social Democracy. If we 
can manage to get our people on to the 
executive things won*t be any worse than before 
because they couldn*t be...we have decided that 
although we are not educated in the sense of 
having lofty thoughts we will be able to 
organise around us an ideological leadership 
and leaders from among those not wishing to 
work with the present executive...a serious 
question faces us. Is there to be a Petersburg 
organisation or not? There has got to be help 
from u s .^
The tendency of a good many politically conscious 
workers at this time however was to withdraw from the 
organisation and wait. Worker activists, Mitrevich and 
Pireiko, both speak of this in their memoirs.
1
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Our revolutionary activity consisted merely of 
meeting together frequently and chatting about 
the past over a bottle of beer and belonging 
to cultural and educational circles and 
technical schools in the factories.^
Pireiko wrote,
Of workers who had formerly been in the Party, 
some took to exes [expropriations], others to 
drink and a few went off to study in evening 
courses or at a club. This latter workers' 
group represented the Party at that time.2
Accounts of Party life in Moscow and the Central 
Industrial Region testified to the livelier state of the 
organisation there. Although otzovists had considerable 
support they were not as obsessed by the shortcomings of 
the Duma fraction as were the Petersburg otzovists.
Otzovist workers boycotted the legal trade unions but 
provided great support for the Party school abroad. Free 
of the exacerbating presence of the Duma deputies and an 
overwhelmingly strong legal Menshevik centre the Bolshevik 
left wing was less disruptive in Moscow than in Petersburg. 
Another reason for the greater solidity of the Moscow 
organisation may be found in its being somewhat less 
plagued, until 1909 , with spying and provocation than the 
Petersburg organisation. It was not until after the 5th 
Conference that Moscow adopted the more conspiratorial 
system of raions electing two representatives each at their 
own conferences, to the city committee.
1
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One of the many proposals to cope with the internal 
difficulties caused by the disappearance of the 
intelligentsia and the inability of worker Party members to 
undertake political leadership was for an advanced 
propaganda and organisational school to be organised 
outside Russia to give workers a basic theoretical and 
practical training lasting some months. First suggested in 
circles abroad by the otzovist Aleksinskii, the idea was 
taken up by Bogdanov, Gorky and a Moscow Party worker 
N. Vilonov (*Mikhail Zavodskoi*), who, suffering from 
tuberculosis, was at that time living in Capri. Early in 
1909 Vilonov submitted a prospectus for publication in 
Proletarii. Unfortunately for the future of the school, 
its most active supporters abroad were to be found among 
the otzovists and the God builders Lunarcharskii and Gorky, 
and Capri, Gorky*s headquarters, was the place where it was 
to be held. At a time when the struggle between Lenin and 
the otzovists was approaching a critical stage and both 
sides were manoeuvering for tactical advantage, this was 
enough to damn the project with the Bolshevik centre, which 
understandably considered that the purpose of the school 
would be to lay the basis of a new factional tendency. It 
refused to countenance the school unless it was run in 
Paris under its control. Vilonov, a Bolshevik committed 
neither to the Leninists nor to the otzovists, but single- 
mindedly involved in getting the school launched wished to 
see it kept under the control of local organisations and 
standing outside factional disputes. He approached the 
Moscow Committee directly for approval of the plan. Under 
pressure from the editorial board of Proletarii this was
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refused. Vilonov returned to Russia to organise support
for the school himself and members throughout the Central
Industrial Region responded enthusiastically. In otzovist
organisations such as the Lefortovo raion, approval was
combined with charges that the Bolshevik centre was trying
to freeze the plan. Other Party bodies, in Shuia, Sormovo
and Yaroslavl, gave their support on condition that the
school should be held under the aegis of the Bolshevik
2centre or the Central Committee. Finally the otzovist-led 
Central Industrial Oblas t * Bureau gave its approval and 
candidates were elected in the organisation.
The school which opened in Capri with thirteen 
students, all from the Central Industrial Region, in August 
1909 was in the hands of the otzovists and God builders.
Its stormy history, the revolt and withdrawal of Vilonov 
and some of the students and the organisation of later 
schools are not the concern of this work. What may be 
noted here is that the first Russian Party school was 
brought to fruition by the dedicated efforts of a worker 
Party functionary and received its greatest support from 
worker Party members. The project was caught in the 
crossfire of factional battles and the particular interests 
of those who stood to benefit by it were lost to sight. It 
was not until Lenin met Vilonov for the first time, not 
long before the latter died, that he understood the motives 
of the man who had fought to get the school started and saw
1
S. Livshits, 'Kapriiskaia partiinaia shkola (1909 g*)*> in 
PR (1924), no. 6, p.39*
2
Ibid., p.47.
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that for worker Party members it had an importance which
had nothing to do with factional disputes.
I regarded the school merely as the centre of a 
new faction. It has turned out that this is 
wrong - not in the sense that it was not the 
centre of a new faction (the school was that 
centre and is so now), but in the sense that 
this was not complete, not the full truth. 
Subjectively, certain people made such a centre 
out of the school, objectively, it was such, 
but in addition the school attracted genuine, 
leading workers from real working class life.
(Lenin to Gorky, November 16, I909).1
The Central Industrial Region had managed to hold an 
Oblast1 conference in November 1908 to elect delegates to 
the 5^h Party Conference. Sixteen representatives with 
full vote attended from Moscow, Moscow Okrug, Ivanovo- 
Voznesensk, Nizhni-Novgorod, Sormovo, Orel, Kineshma, 
Morshank, Briansk and Vladimir Okrug. The six with 
consultative vote were made up of members of the Oblast* 
Bureau, reporters to the conference and secretaries. It 
had proved very difficult to summon the conference since 
the Oblas t* Bureau was not functioning and links with local 
centres had been broken. The Moscow Committee had done 
most of the organising work and in the absence of 
ideological direction from the centres had drawn up the 
political platform and practical recommendations.
The reports from the localities all pointed to the 
decline in activity and the disappearance of the local 
intelligentsia. The workers were giving both ideological 
and practical leadership. The difficulties created by this
Lenin XLVII, p.219.
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change were increased by the scarcity of Party literature.
Proletarii arrived in small quantities and did not give the
answers to questions raised by the workers. The local
illegal paper Rabochee Znamia was also in short supply and
was too small to deal in detail with theoretical and
tactical problems. The consensus of the reports was that
the worst ill was not the indifference of the masses but
the lack of a functioning Party apparatus. The need was
for agitational material and the training of worker
organisers and propagandists. A resolution was carried
calling for a Party congress to help the organisation to
adapt to conspiratorial conditions and create effective
1central institutions.
In April 1909 the Moscow membership was reported as
being 1500. All seven raions were supporting one
professional each and five or six were maintained by the
city committee. A recent meeting of the committee had been
informed that the raions had considered the new form of
election, adopted it and were to hold elections for
2representatives to the committee. During the year however, 
a major breakdown occurred. The city committee was put out 
of action by arrests in May and a provisional executive was 
set up, but the full committee was not yet functioning in 
October, when only three of the raions were reported as 
still having organisers, although the raion committees were 
meeting. The main difficulties were the usual ones of lack 
of organisers, propagandists and meeting places. It was
1
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pointed out that in Petersburg between seven and ten per
cent of workers rented their own dwellings but in Moscow
it was between one and two per cent. The reasons for this,
it was said, were the very low wages and high rents.
Considerable numbers of workers still lived in barracks
1attached to factories.
In September the Moscow Okrug organisation of eight
raions reported a membership of about 300* There had
probably been between two and three thousand at the time
of the London Congress. The Okrug conference at which
these figures were produced, was attended by sixteen
delegates, eleven of whom were workers and five
inteiligenty, Nine, eight of them workers, had full vote.
The organisation was reported to be firmly on its feet
after two years of unsuccessful effort. Local groups had
survived even where they had had no contacts with higher
bodies for over a year. The conference listened with
great attention to a report by the executive on the
present situation but refused to carry the anti—otzovist
resolution presented with it. Instead it deferred its
2decision, asking for more time to consider. The 
conference was by no means fully otzovist in sympathy, 
since it passed a resolution on the Duma fraction 
recognising the value of work in the Duma. The refusal to 
accept the executive1s lead seems to have been an instance 
of local worker Party members resisting the attempts of 
intelligenty on leading committees to carry the anti —
1
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otzovist campaign to the point of hounding the otzovists 
in the local organisations.
From the various centres of the Central Industrial 
Region reports continued to come in of collapse of 
organisations through arrests# The most complete seems 
to have been that of the formerly vigorous Ivanovo- 
Voznesensk organisation. Two groups which did survive 
were in Yaroslavl and Kineshma, Both of these reported 
that the closing down of, or the failure to launch such 
much needed mass organisations as co-operatives, clubs
and trade unions left no alternative but to build the
1illegal Party.
The Kineshma area was one of backward workers of 
whom only 20 to 23 per cent were literate. The reason 
why the organisation survived the first years of the 
repression appears to have been that a core of 
intelligenty remained in the town, several of whom were 
women working at the zemstvo hospital. According to 
R. Kovnator's account of work in the organisation, an 
active worker Party member was recruited as a provocateur 
in 1909 and from then on all the affairs of the 
organisation were known to the police. Indeed, police 
reports give a very detailed picture of the fortunes of 
the organisation. In an endeavour to combat provocation 
a new plan of organisation was drawn up. It was decided 
to give up electing a committee, and calling factory 
meetings and instead, to organise one stable independent 
circle of eight to ten of the most conscious workers on 
whose shoulders would rest all Party activity. The 
organisation was able to carry on local work but when it
SD, no, 3, 23 April 1909? p,10.
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endeavoured in 1910 to call a conference to reunite the 
unlinked Party organisations in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Shuia, 
and other places, the police descended and arrested the 
participants. By 1911 the last active Party workers in 
Kineshma were arrested and the revolutionary movement 
there died down until 1917»^
As has been said before the decline in the Urals was
especially drastic. The Oblast* organisation collapsed
in 1908 and could not be revived. Perm and Ekaterinburg
suffered very severely from repression. At the beginning
of 1909 not one trade union remained in Ekaterinburg and
the city Party committee was overtaken by arrest every 
2three months. There were cases of partial revival in
isolated centres such as Tiumen, After arrests as a
result of a strike in 1907 the organisation there was
rebuilt by Party members coming to the town in 1908. The
numbers grew from 18 to 180 and more than 35»000 copies
of leaflets, brochures and newspapers were issued. The
Party printing press was one of the very few that
survived in the Urals. But collapse occurred again in
31909 as a result of provocation.
The position in the Urals was one of extreme 
repression and frequent arrests of Party committees. The 
Oblast * bureau being beyond revival, particular 
difficulty was experienced in maintaining any contact at 
all with the centre because of the area* s remoteness.
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A report from the Donets basin showed that the 
miners were still militant although the Party 
organisations were weak and disrupted by provocation.
The Petrovsk organisation, with a membership of fifty- 
five, had recently had its printing press seized, which 
it had had for eighteen months and on which it had printed 
eight leaflets of 24,000 copies each for the Iuzovka— 
Petrovsk district and two local leaflets of 2,000 copies 
each. In spite of the lack of meetings, leaflets or 
organisation a number of mines had struck on May Day,
The report ended with an appeal for Party literature that 
the workers could read and help from the Central Committee
and the declaration that matters were bad only because of
1lack of organisers.
During 1909 there were frequent complaints from the
members in the localities that Proletarii was not the
sort of newspaper that the workers wanted. Its style was
critised as well as the content. Since locally produced
illegal newspapers could not survive long, the
desirability of a popularly written central paper was
stressed, Trotsky1s Pravda was often mentioned as being
more popular with the workers than Proletarii because it
could be understood. At the enlarged editorial board
meeting the needs of the Party press were discussed. All
agreed on the desirability of having a popular organ
printed, if possible, in Russia and for Proletarii to be
replaced or radically changed. It was decided to explore
the possibilities of having Pravda made an organ of the
2Central Committee,
_
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Finances were also discussed at the editorial board
meeting. Much was made of the needs of the localities by
the practicals present. A reduced budget of three to
four thousand roubles a month for the Bolshevik centre
was decided upon. It was also resolved that subsidies to
local organisations would have to be reduced in the
autumn, Tomskii dissented. He wanted the subsidies to
the national organisations and legal press reduced 
1instead, The reductions that took place in the autumn
were keenly felt in the local organisations and loud
protests were heard. There was extreme distress in
Petersburg because the Bolshevik centre entirely cut off
supplies pro tern to prevent them going to the otzovist
Petersburg Committee, Goloshchekin was ungracious enough
to point out to the editors of Proletarii that raions
struggling to put out little papers and leaflets were
stopped for lack of five or ten roubles when Proletarii
was arriving in minute quantities, not answering local
2demands and had vast sums to spend. In November
Bagdatiev wrote asking for money to be sent since it was
two months since they had had any, but it was not to be
3sent to the Petersburg Committee,
The story from Moscow was the same. In October 
Goloshchekin and Golubev writing from Moscow said that 
either the existence of the Party organisation must be 
ensured with a minimum subsidy to the Moscow Committee of
1
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200 roubles a month (even if the publication of Proletarii 
had to be cut down) or nothing remained but to liquidate a 
fully functioning Party apparatus. The Moscow Committee 
had no money and professionals were going hungry. An
urgent plea was also sent from Moscow for 120 roubles a
1month to enable Rabochee Znamia to be published.
While Party organisations were still functioning 
regularly they occasionally issued brief monthly financial 
statements which would appear on the back pages of 
Proletarii and Sotsialf demokrat. Most of these came from 
the Moscow Committee and all related to 1908. The budgets 
were usually small. Receipts of the Moscow Committee were 
692 roubles 45 kopeks in April, 423.65 in. July, 405*83 in 
August and 1014.31 in December, The main items of 
expenditure were in respect of printing and the 
maintenance of professionals.
Policy and tactics for the Bolshevik faction 
appropriate to the period of repression were worked out by 
Lenin in 1908 and remained the basis for Bolshevik policy 
for some years. He argued that because the revolution of 
1905 had not been carried to completion and the 
bourgeoisie itself had become counter-revolutionary, the 
minimum programme of social and political reforms had 
still to be fought for by the working class. Since the 
struggle had to be carried on against a reactionary regime 
unwilling to yield anything, it had to go on by 
revolutionary means.
Ibid., pp,187-9*
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The autocracy feared to permit the growth of a legal 
trade union movement which could have separated the 
industrial from the political struggle, and indeed 
constantly frustrated the development of working class 
leaders by its repression of the unions, hence workers 
were driven along the path of semi-legal and illegal 
economic struggle into close association with the entirely 
illegal political movement. The Russian working class in 
the course of striving for the most elementary economic 
demands were made politically conscious. The relentless 
persecution of the trade union movement in the years of 
repression had the effect of combining the political and 
economic leadership of the working class in the 
revolutionary political party. The opposition to the 
government took on a character that was to prove deadly to 
the autocracy when even the struggle for a minimum 
programme of moderate reforms had to be carried on by 
revolutionary means.
The revolutionary years had brought large numbers of 
workers into the Social Democratic Party. In the 
decimation of the succeeding years when the leaders were 
forced into emigration and the intelligentsia deserted, 
the workers constituted the solid core of what was left in 
Russia. The Party never again reverted to being circles 
of intelligenty instructing a few workers. Leadership had 
been exercised from the emigration before 1905 but a 
different relationship developed between the membership in 
Russia and the leaders in the second emigration. The 
Russian members had a greater sense of their own identity 
and capacity to judge local affairs. The bitter factional 
brawls of the emigres could not be carried on entirely
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independently of the Russian scene. In the end the policy 
reached the members and was judged by them. The protest 
that arose in 1909 against the anti-otzovist campaign of 
the Bolshevik centre was couched in terms of rejecting a 
split imposed on them from outside. On the other hand 
many of the issues violently debated by the emigres were 
of little or no interest to the membership within. The 
Bolshevik record with Party finances which aroused 
scandals abroad and discredited them in the international 
socialist movement did not worry Party workers in the 
localities. What was unpardonable was to fail to send 
supplies to keep the work of revolution going or to waste 
money in the printing of polemics.
Within the Russian membership the workers began to be 
aware of their own weight. They had always been conscious 
of the gulf that separated them from the intelligentsia. 
But the desertion of the intelligenty in 1908 left worker 
Party members with no alternative but to try with a 
mixture of resentment and determination to take their 
place. The idea of a Party school at which workers would 
receive a thorough political training was warmly supported 
by workers in spite of Lenin*s anathema. Although they 
never ceased begging for help and guidance from abroad, 
the members within Russia felt upon occasions that their 
interests were not identical with those of the emigre 
leaders. They were quick to criticise the Party press as 
unsuitable for workers. Although their needs varied 
somewhat, they all required an effective Russian centre, 
functioning regional centres, Party literature and the 
services of professionals. In the provinces there was 
little criticism of policy but in the capitals the workers
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brought an increasingly appraising judgment to bear on the 
policy resolutions presented to them.
The structure of the organisation which had been 
based on democratic election to office in the years of 
revolution adapted slowly to the conspirational 
requirements imposed by the repression and democratic 
elections were abandoned piecemeal.
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CHAPTER 4 
PHOENIX DISTORTED
By the end of 1909 there was a strong feeling among 
many Social Democrats both in exile and within Russia who 
were members of the illegal Party that unity of all 
factions prepared to recognise the necessity of an 
underground organisation was possible. These factions, 
from the left, were the otzovists-ultimatumists who 
regarded themselves as Bolsheviks who correctly estimated 
the importance of the revolutionary underground and 
considered legal work as the sowing of illusions among the 
masses; the main body of Bolsheviks who since the Fifth 
Conference at the end of 1908, had, while recognising the 
primacy of the underground organisation, stressed the 
necessity of using all legal possibilities of work; the 
Plekhanov Mensheviks who supported Plekhanov's defence of 
the illegal apparatus in face of its abandonment by many 
Mensheviks and finally, the Martov Mensheviks who 
represented the main body of Menshevik thinking, seeing 
the illegal organisation as a necessary evil but defending 
the value of the activity of those Social Democrats who in 
the interests of work in legal organisations, had severed 
all connections with the underground Party. All these 
tendencies had their ideological leadership in exile and 
their rank and file in Russia, and in all cases the latter 
found that the reality of Russian political conditions 
modified, tempered and sometimes even contradicted the 
theoretical positions adopted by the leaders abroad and
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transmitted through the four factional journals. There 
was a fifth journal Pravda edited by Trotsky, written in a 
popular style which had a fairly wide sale in Russia and 
stood for the unity of all factions.
Nineteen hundred and nine had been a year of severe 
inner-Party struggle. Lenin had concluded his ferocious 
campaign against the otzovist-ultimatumist leaders in the 
Bolshevik faction and had had them expelled. His other 
campaign, against the so-called liquidators of the right 
had assumed a particular form. He no longer identified 
the whole of Menshevism as a non-revolutionary trend in 
Russian Social Democracy, but indicated that a minority 
opinion within it expressed by Plekhanov had remained 
true to revolutionary tradition, and the future 
development of Social Democracy lay in the rapprochement 
of the Bolsheviks and Party Mensheviks on a programme of 
struggle against 1iquidationism of the left and right.
The public ideological defeat of the Blanquist policies of 
the otzovist-ultimatumists and the firm assertion of the 
need for partyness by Plekhanov emphasised that for the 
time being many old points of disagreement between 
Bolshevism and Menshevism such as the armed uprising, the 
Duma boycott and expropriations had ceased to be relevant. 
For Social Democrats in the period of counter-revolution, 
the policy was to carry on the struggle for the overthrow 
of the autocracy with tactics adapted to the conditions of 
repression, strengthening and uniting the illegal 
organisation and making the utmost use of legal 
opportunities. For this, the overriding need was the 
combination of available forces and ideological and 
organisational guidance from a reconstituted Russian 
centre.
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The Leninist programme of unity was laid down at a 
meeting of members of the Proletarii editorial board with 
Social Democrats working directly with the masses, which 
discussed the problem of revolutionary Social Democratic 
work in legal workers1 organisations. It stated once 
again that what was necessary was a strong network of 
illegal Party nuclei surrounded by legal workers* 
organisations and the transformation of these 
organisations into strong points of systematic Party 
Social Democratic work among the masses.
In order to achieve this it was essential to discuss 
the practical experience of Party Social Democrats working 
in legal organisations and congresses.
The meeting recommended that at the next Party 
conference there should not only be delegates with full 
vote elected by oblast1 conferences but also delegates with 
consultative vote coming in the first place from raion 
Party nuclei and other Party bodies in direct contact with 
the masses, and in the second place, from Social 
Democratic Party groups working in legal and semi-legal 
workers* organisations.
Measures should be worked out to strengthen the links 
between illegal nuclei and Party groups in legal 
organisations. Bolsheviks were reminded that all Party 
Social Democrats should be drawn in without regard to 
fac tions.
Bolshevik Central Committee members were asked to 
introduce the proposal of the Party conference at the next 
meeting of the committee. The meeting regarded the 
bolding of a conference of Party activists in legal and
semi-legal organisations, which was not linked with a 
general Party conference as an undesirable step.
The questions which should be considered by the Party 
conference were those of the publication of a popular 
workers* paper by the Central Committee, the issue of 
brochures, development of the trade union movement, Party 
schools and an effective Party centre.
The meeting described its deliberations as being 
directed towards the consolidation of all Party Social 
Democrats under the Party banner around its institutions,
with the aim of restoring and stabilising the influence of
1the Party in all fields of work.
The recommendations of this meeting clearly indicated 
the Bolshevik concern to assert the leading role of the 
Party in the working class movement and to exclude from 
unity moves those people who might regard themselves as 
Social Democrats but were not prepared to accept the 
ideological and organisational leadership of the Party.
In the meantime in Petersburg the renewal of 
relations between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was taking 
place less formally. The first move came from the 
Mensheviks of the Vyborg raion who addressed a letter to 
Social Democrats working in trade unions, educational 
associations, schools, co-operatives and other legal 
workers* institutions. They emphasised the value of work 
in the mass movement but drew attention to a new danger 
threatening work in legal organisations. As a result of
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the loss of organisational unity and ideological clarity 
which had been provided by membership of the Party, parish 
pump politics and unprincipled opportunism were frequently 
a feature of mass work. They pointed to the shrinking of 
the aims of workers' educational associations, which 
bypassed lectures on subjects of social and political 
significance in favour of narrowly technical instruction 
and social activities. Trade unions were tending to become 
dues collecting organisations, to avoid discussion of 
controversial issues and to stand aside when issues of 
importance to the working class arose. The authors 
concluded with a call for the uniting of Social Democrats 
in the ranks of the illegal Party without any sacrifice of 
legal work.
Proletarii reprinted the letter under the title 
Legalists' Hangover, happily greeting it as a sign of a
change of heart and a return to partiinost' among some
1members of the right wing of Social Democracy.
The Petersburg Committee followed with a resolution 
to the effect that disagreements in the Party were the 
result of the disruptive activities of the legalists and 
it called on all comrades who valued the Party to join a 
single Party organisation and break with the Menshevik 
centre.^
The steps which effectively brought about a 
rapprochement of the factions in St Petersburg were taken
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by the Mensheviks, who summoned two meetings of Social
Democrats working in legal organisations, which were
attended by trade union activists and Party workers of
both factions. Between thirty-five and forty people,
including representatives of the Petersburg Committee and
some raions were present at the second meeting in November.
A leading trade unionist gave the main report and pointed
to the damage done by the isolation and fragmentation of
Social Democrats in the mass organisations. The only
possible way to end this was by uniting Party members and
Party activists in the open movement in a single illegal
organisation. There was general agreement on the basic
points of the report, except for the otzovist
representative of the Petersburg Committee who charged all
present with opportunism and legalism. The meeting played
an important part in establishing links between the Party
and those who had left the ranks. It was followed by
amalgamation of factional groups in the raions, most
importantly in Vyborg. By the end of December two
Mensheviks were on the city committee and united work in
preparation for the congress on alcoholism was under way.
The Petersburg Committee however, still otzovist inclined,
1continued to act obstructively.
The general feeling that unity in the Party was both 
desirable and possible led to the calling in January 1910 
of a plenum of the Central Committee in Paris. It was on 
this point of unity that Lenin found himself in opposition 
to all other members of the plenum, including the leading
SD nos. 15-l6, 30 September 1910, p.l4.
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Bolshevik practical workers, particularly Dubrovinskii and 
Nogin. As we have seen, Lenin*s view was that the only 
basis of unity within the Party was in a rapprochement of 
the Leninist Bolsheviks and Plekhanov Mensheviks. He held 
that the policy of Martov and Dan as expressed in Golos 
sotsial* demokrata, was in fact liquidationist although 
they remained within the Party. Liquidationism of the 
left was represented by the otzovist-ultimatumists with 
the journal Vpered. Both these trends were dangerous to 
the Party and should be named and condemned. He tried in 
the discussion in committee to get a formal condemnation 
included in the main resolution but this ran counter to 
the whole feeling of the meeting and all that emerged was 
a careful passage which named neither the liquidators nor 
the Vperedists, but stated that the influence of the 
bourgeoisie on the proletariat was to be seen both in the 
denial and underestimation of the role of the illegal
Party, and in the denial of Social Democratic work in the
1Duma and of the use of legal opportunities.
The resolution on the summoning of the Party 
conference was a compromise between Lenin*s position that 
the admission of Social Democrats working in the legal 
movement to the conference should rest upon their 
recognising themselves as linked with the Party and the 
Menshevik view that the establishment of formal links 
should not be a pre-condition. It was decided to allow 
* supplementary* representation of Social Democratic groups 
in legal organisations which were prepared to establish
KPSS v resoliutsiiakh, 1, p.236.
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links with local Party centres. It was to be left to the 
conference to decide whether such delegates should be 
given full or consultative vote. The Letter to Party 
Organisations in which these approaches to Social pDemocrats in legal organisations were explained in detail 
was drawn up and agreed upon unanimously by a commission 
consisting of Zinoviev, Dubrovinskii and Martov.
The extent to which Lenin was overruled in the plenum
may be seen by comparing two articles he wrote, one before
and one after the plenum, on Party unity. The first,
Methods of the Liquidators and the Party Tasks of
Bolsheviks, was along the familiar lines of the basis for
co-operation between Bolsheviks and Party Mensheviks, the
need to combat liquidationism and the need to strengthen
the illegal organisation for persistent work through the
strong points of legal opportunities. In the second
article, Towards Unity, published in February 1910, he
gave a nonfactional analysis of the decisions, pointing
out that conditions of work in the localities, the
difficult position of the Social Democratic organisation
and the urgent tasks of the economic and political
struggle of the proletariat had impelled all factions to
unite Social Democratic forces, and further, *a year of
acute factional struggle has led to the decisive step being
taken in favour of abolishing all factions and every kind3of factionalism in favour of unity of the Party*.
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But within six weeks of that article being published, 
his attacks on liquidationism had been resumed at full 
strength. In the next issue of So tsial* demokrat he 
attacked Martov for interpreting the decisions of the 
plenum to mean equality of the legalists with the illegal 
organisation, and the Menshevik centre in Russia for 
refusing to take part in the work of restoring the Russian 
Bureau of the Central Committee. From this time on Lenin 
resumed the attacks on Martov and Golos sotsial*demokrata 
accusing them of shielding liquidationism, along exactly 
the same lines as before the plenum. He continued to seek 
the support of the Party Mensheviks, referring frequently 
to Plekhanov*s articles in Dnevnik sotsial*demokrata. His 
practical efforts were devoted at this time to finding 
some way of getting the Russian Bureau of the Central 
Committee to work.
The plenum had fixed the number of the Russian 
collegium as seven, made up of two Mensheviks, two 
Bolsheviks and three representatives of the national 
parties. The Mensheviks had left the naming of their 
representatives until the practical leaders in Petersburg 
could be consulted. But very soon reports began to come 
back from the Bolshevik members that the Mensheviks were 
refusing to have anything to do with the Russian Bureau.
The January plenum marked a brief truce secured with 
unwilling concessions from the main contenders in the 
factional war. If we leave aside the precariousness of 
the balance of forces and the unreconciled differences 
among the leaders abroad and turn to the Russian scene, it 
must be said that the proclamation, unreal as it was, of 
the unity of the Party and the end of factional strife
l4o
answered the desires of those left in the underground 
organisation.
In a more fundamental sense the plenum decisions also 
reflected a temporary state of equilibrium, or rather, 
dead point at which the Russian working class movement had 
arrived. By 1910 the militancy of the revolutionary years 
had died down, the workers were silent and the 
organisation which had been the spearhead of the 
revolution was fragmented. A legal labour movement of 
sorts had struggled into existence. The question to be 
answered was whether the working class would move along a 
broad path of legalism or whether there was a leading role 
for the illegal revolutionary party. In 1910 the new 
phase of the class struggle which would determine the 
issue had not begun - hence the balance between legalism 
and the underground, represented in the January plenum.
The position of the Party within Russia at the time 
of the plenum was one of scattered unlinked groups in 
which in general the oblas t * organisation had broken down. 
This was recognised to be the position by the plenum when 
it proposed that where it was impossible to hold oblast * 
conferences to elect delegates to the forthcoming 
conference, delegates should be elected directly by the 
major centres. Instead of, for example, the Central 
Industrial Region sending four delegates from its oblast’ 
conference, it might be decided, depending on the state of 
the organisation in the various cities to designate 
Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kineshma, Tver and Orel as centres to 
send one delegate each. From So tsialr demokrat itself in 
the reports from localities appearing in 1910 and I9H  it 
appeared that the central organisations in Moscow,
Petersburg and the Central Industrial Region frequently 
lost contact with the lower Party bodies. The Central 
Industrial Region was reported in March as having restored 
links with nine centres, but in some of these places the 
organisation was not functioning, and was in desperate 
need of assistance. In December 1909 there were massive 
arrests in the Moscow Committee and the work of leadership 
fell to the Central Raion between December and February.
By this time an Executive Commission had re-established
1links with four raions.
The solution to the organisational collapse as far as 
Party members could see was in restoration of links, 
assistance from professional Party workers and more 
efficient transport of illegal literature. By now the 
great majority of those left in the locality organisations 
were workers and they still needed assistance in the 
conduct of propaganda circles. Workers were described as 
being much less politically experienced, but with more 
interest in general social questions than the worker 
members who had joined before and during the revolutionary 
years.
The news of the plenum which had taken place unknown 
to those in Russia reached the underground organisations 
after some delay. The decisions on unity and the holding 
of the conference were received with great enthusiasm. 
Reports of reactions in the localities began to appear in 
July. In Petersburg Bolsheviks and Mensheviks of the 
Moscow raion were working together in spite of the
SD no. 13, 26 April 1910, p.ll.
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opposition of the Vperedists. In Moscow where, owing to 
the arrests at the end of 1909 the Central raion still 
occupied the leading position, that raion had discussed 
the plenum decisions, supported the calling of the Party 
conference and at the raion committee elections six 
Bolsheviks, one Party Menshevik and one Vperedist were 
elected to office.
From Petersburg in September it was reported that 
unity of action of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had proceeded 
in the preparatory work for the Congress for the Struggle 
against Alcoholism in January 1910, in face of the 
obstruction of the otzovists who wanted to boycott the 
congress. In spite of this a considerable amount of joint 
agitational work had been carried on in trade unions, 
educational associations, schools and clubs. After the 
congress there had been arrests of members of workers* 
delegations, which depleted trade unions and other 
organisations of their best activists. In the reports on 
the congress made to Party groups, raions and legal 
organisations, two tendencies were apparent in the 
discussions, that of the otzovists who urged the 
uselessness of participation for the workers in such 
undertakings, and a tendency which was boycottist from 
opposite premises, namely, that to participate in 
congresses in a political way led only to arrests and 
repression and hence less politics. Rumours of the plenum 
had come to Petersburg at the end of January and the text 
of the resolutions reached them in February in Pravda.
The policy of combination of legal and illegal work and
SD no. 14, 22 June 1910, pp.9-10.
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the turning of factions into tendencies not disruptive of 
the unity activity 'was hailed with joy*, according to the 
report. In the raions where there were few otzovists the 
arrangement of joint activity proceeded smoothly, but 
where they were in control, organisational unity was 
either being prevented or reduced to a formality.
There seems to have been less trouble with the 
otzovists in Moscow, where, it was reported, Bolsheviks 
worked with some Party Mensheviks and Vperedists in the 
same organisations with very little wrangling. Vperedists 
even joined legal organisations. The liquidators gave no 
trouble, since they were so busy with their legal paper 
and so occupied with the struggle against the Party that 
they had no time to think of the existence of the working 
class.^
If in the capitals the resolution devoted to unity 
received much attention, in the smaller centres it was the 
promise of revival of the organisation that was warmly 
greeted. It was here that the question of a functioning 
illegal organisation was critical and that of combined 
legal and illegal work not an immediate one, because there 
were either no legal organisations or they were severely 
circumscribed. A letter What is to be done? from a Party 
Menshevik examined the position of Party organisations in 
the areas outside the capitals. He pointed out how narrow 
and inward-turning Party circles had become. Their
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failure to put out leaflets on local issues was not through 
lack of printing presses but through isolation and 
inactivity. In discussing means by which Social Democrats 
could take a more active part in day to day struggles he 
said that on the one hand Social Democrats working in 
legal organisations tended not to operate as organised 
groups, and hence adopted a narrow and opportunistic 
approach, submitting to the limits imposed on them, while 
on the other, because of the inadequacy of the trade 
unions as organs for the protection of workers* economic 
interests , the real battles were being carried on outside 
the unions. He recommended the setting up of Party cells 
in legal organisations and where legal unions did not 
exist, he proposed, since he was doubtful of the value of 
illegal unions, a reversion to the old pre-revolutionary 
forms of trade union activity - temporary unions of 
struggle, strike funds, fighting funds and regular mass 
meetings. These were forms of organisation not usually 
defined in Party relationships but they had stable
personnel and would be in some sort of liaison with the
1local Party leadership.
Trade unions received considerable attention in the 
Party press at this time. The failure of the unions to 
form any effective organisations for the carrying on of 
the economic struggle was frequently mentioned. In one 
report it was stated that the employers had calculated 
that union membership, estimated at 235>000 in 1907> had 
dropped to 20,000 at the end of 1909- Between 1906 and
SD no. 13j 26 April 1910, pp.7-8.
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1910 the rules of 106 unions had been submitted for
registration through the Moscow factory inspectorate,
resulting in sixteen legally registered unions in that
city in 1910. Other figures equally eloquent of the
decline were cited. Trade unions having no opportunity to
do what they were intended for, that is to carry on
economic struggles, were felt even by the workers to be
useless. The extreme legal constrictions imposed on them
led many activists to seek artificial paths to the masses,
through mutual benefit activity. They might frankly
acknowledge that this was inadequate but asked what was to
be done. On the possible lines of action for the unions
the writer rejected that of legality - the campaigning for
a fully legal existence by permitted methods alone, and
the renunciation of all revolutionary slogans, as a
surrender to the enemy. He urged the organisation of
illegal unions when all legal possibilities had been
exhausted and like the author of the letter What is to be
done? he thought the fluid pre-revolutionary
1organisational forms should be used.
Reports from centres outside Petersburg and Moscow 
consistently indicated that in places and situations where 
there was a need for trade union organisation at a basic 
economic level, it was there and then that trade unions 
were most stringently banned. In Ekaterinoslav gubernia 
it was said that wages had been lowered, there was serious 
unemployment, with employed workers maintaining those out 
of work and there had been outbreaks of cholera and
Ibid., pp.3-5.
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terrible sanitary conditions in the iron foundries in the 
Iuzovka raion, but all attempts to get union rules through 
the gubernia office had been unsuccessful. The police 
were active speculating on the workers1 poverty and it was
said they were offering 70-100 roubles a month for
1collaborators. In a large southern town, unnamed, where
a few mutilated unions had survived, the workers1 attitude
was that only the aristocracy of labour became unionists
because this gave such people their only chance of public
activity, since politics on the job were much too
dangerous. The result of this was that apart from the
careerists, only the very few really advanced and
conscious workers joined the unions, while less advanced
2militants failed to see any value in doing so. In Moscow 
until 1909, it was reported, a number of unions had 
operated actively, but in the autumn there had been such a 
severe clamp down that only minor unions were left, with 
the exception of the Textile Workers with one thousand 
members which had survived on condition that it did not 
hold meetings. The Metal Workers had applied eight times 
for registration and the Bakers three, but had been 
rejected. But bad as the position had now become in Moscow, 
it was worse in the surrounding industrial region where in 
most towns, including such large manufacturing centres as 
Ivanovo-Voznesensk there were no legal unions at all. In 
the whole of Russia, said the report, there were only four3or five points where legal work could be carried on.
1
SD no . 12, 23 March 1910, pp. 9-
2
SD no . 13, 26 April 1910, p . 12.
3
SD no . 18, 16 November 1910, p.
ikj
With the notable exception of Petersburg, and less 
notably Moscow, the trade unions in the first five years 
of their legal existence in Russia had failed to establish 
themselves as independent organisations of the working 
class. The narrow limits allowed them and the constant 
harassment of the police forced them to operate at the 
primitive level of friendly society activity and made it 
almost impossible to lead any movement for better wages 
and conditions. If they observed the restrictions and 
operated legally they were under pressure to bypass the 
vital economic interests of the workers. If they became 
directly involved in these interests, they were thrown 
back into illegal activity where they became an appendage 
of the revolutionary political movement. An example of 
the marginal relevance, even of semi-legal trade union 
activity, to the basic needs of the workers may be seen in 
the list of agitational leaflets published by the 
St Petersburg Central Trade Union Bureau for the year 1909» 
They concerned the Womens1 Congress, cholera, workers* 
insurance, the lockout of Vilno leatherworkers, the 
bristle workers* lockout, the building disaster in the 
South and the strike in Sweden. Ten thousand copies of a
questionnaire on the reasons for the widespread alcoholism
1among Petersburg workers were also published. That there 
was even one leaflet, on workers* insurance, dealing with 
a major economic preoccupation of labour would be 
connected with the fact that workers* insurance was a 
projected government measure and a subject of wide public 
discussion. It was not until 1912 that the eight hour day
SD no. 11, 13 February 1910, p.9*
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slogan was widely raised again for the first time since 
the revolutionary years - and then it was on the 
initiative of the Bolsheviks, not the trade unions.
As has already been said, the overwhelming need in 
Party circles outside the capitals was for restoration of 
the organisation and links with the centre. It was the 
plenum decisions for the holding of an all-Russian 
conference and re-establishment of the Russian centre 
which were welcomed. The tenor of the reports from 
provincial centres in 1910 indicated that a certain 
stability of local groups had been reached. There were no 
longer professional revolutionaries attached to them, the 
old members had disappeared and the new ones were 
inexperienced, but the groups existed. There was a little 
more money available. A laconic report from Tver by a 
functionary (Oblastnik) from the Central Industrial Oblasjt* 
organisation who had managed to make a tour of the area, 
stated that there were none of the old members left, the 
work was entirely in new hands, a recruiting leaflet had 
been issued, there were 120 paying members in the city and 
they wanted someone from the Oblast* Bureau to lead the 
work. He said of Sormovo which had a long history of 
revolutionary activity and which Nogin had described as a 
rare exception among provincial organisations, that the 
Social Democratic collective had existed all along, 
leaflets had been well distributed, particularly those on 
May Day and the reason for inactivity was the need for a 
political line and a lack of confidence in their own 
forces. The summing up of Oblastnik was that there was an 
overriding need to unite the isolated groups and that this
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was the function of the Party centre. In the Central 
Industrial Region, in the absence of links with the Oblast* 
Centre in 1909, it was found that Social Democratic 
workers themselves without outside assistance had been 
trying to restore Party organisations. In some towns, 
Kineshma and Teikhovo, they had been successful. In 
others such as Ivanovo-Voznesensk, where arrests and 
provocation had been particularly severe, the general mood 
of apathy and suspicion had been too much for them.
During 1910 and I9H  there were no reports from the Urals 
until the Russian Organising Commission organiser Semen 
Schwartz made his way there on the autumn of I9H  and 
found Social Democratic groups in Ufa, Perm and 
Ekaterinburg entirely isolated not only from the rest of 
Russia but from each other.
The mingled hope and anxiety of the Party members in 
Russia in respect of happenings abroad became more evident 
by the end of 1910 as news of the violent, renewed faction 
fighting became known, and confusing proposals and counter 
proposals about the Party conference were put forward in 
Sotsial* demokrat and Pravda. Two letters from Stalin, 
coming to the end of a term of exile at this time gave a 
view which was probably widespread among the Bolshevik 
practicals. The first written in December 1910 to Semen 
Schwartz and intended for Lenin*s eyes, supported the 
Lenin-Plekhanov bloc against the liquidators, but insisted 
that the most important thing was the organisation of work 
inside Russia. The liquidators had established a firm
"I
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position in the legal organisations and had their own
Russian centre, while the Bolsheviks were still only
rehearsing. The immediate task was to organise a central
Russian group co-ordinating illegal, semi-legal and legal
1work in the main centres. In another letter written 
shortly afterwards, in January I9H  and not intended for 
Lenin he said
¥e have of course heard from abroad of the 
1 tempest in a teapot* there; the blocs between 
Lenin-Plekhanov, on the one hand, and between 
Trotsky-Martov-Bogdanov, on the other. The 
attitude of the workers towards the first bloc 
is, as far as I know, favourable. But the 
workers are generally beginning to look with 
disdain on what*s going on abroad: let them
climb the walls to their heart's content. So 
far as we ourselves are concerned, whoever 
holds dear the interests of the movement, will 
keep on working, the rest will take care of  ^
itself. This, in my opinion, is for the best.
By the end of 1910 all efforts of the Bolshevik 
organisers to get the Russian Bureau of the Central 
Committee convened and functioning had failed. In 
December the Bolsheviks abroad denounced the plenum 
agreement and applied for the return of funds deposited 
with the German trustees. This action, which had been 
provided for in the 1910 Central Committee plenum 
agreements, should have been followed by a summoning of a 
plenum abroad by the Bureau of the Central Committee 
Abroad. In an article The State of Affairs of the Party
1
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Lenin explained this step as being the only possible way 
of having a plenum summoned. By this time however, he 
must have decided to act unilaterally to the extent of 
setting up parallel bodies to the Bureau of the Central 
Committee Abroad and the Russian Bureau of the Central 
Committee, which would undertake the task of organising a 
Russian conference. From what Piatnitskii in his Zapiski 
b o l 1shevika says, Lenin was contemplating this by the end 
of 1910.1
In the spring of I9H  a private meeting of seven 
Bolshevik and Polish members of the Central Committee 
living abroad took the first steps towards the unilateral 
calling of a Party conference. It was decided that the 
Bolshevik and Polish members of the Bureau of the Central 
Committee Abroad would withdraw from that body, and Rykov 
as a member of the Russian Bureau would summon a Central 
Committee plenum abroad. Both these decisions were 
carried out, the Bolshevik Semashko moved out of the 
B.C.C.A. with its funds and in June the meeting of Central 
Committee members summoned by Rykov took place. It was, 
of course, in no sense a plenum, only eight members were 
present, two of whom a Menshevik and a Bundist, withdrew 
before the resolutions were adopted.
At this meeting two bodies were set up, a Technical 
Commission which was to find the material and technical 
means for the summoning of a conference and an Organising 
Commission Abroad (Z.O.K.) which was to bring into action 
representatives of local organisations in Russia to
0. Piatnitskii, op. cit., p p .154-5.
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establish a new Russian collegium of the Central Committee. 
The other Party groups abroad with the exception of the 
Golosists were invited to join these bodies. All refused, 
although Plekhanov’s group was not in opposition.
Four agents of Z.O.K. were sent to Russia to set up a 
Russian Organising Commission (R.O.K.). Tw o of them, 
Breslav and Rykov, were arrested on reaching Moscow in 
August, Semen Schwartz who went to the Urals and 
Ordzhonikidze to the south, escaped arrest.
In spite of the scandals and indignation which the 
completely unconstitutional actions in setting up Z.O.K. 
and the Technical Commission had aroused in Party circles 
abroad, the appeal of the Z.O.K. agents to local Party 
groups to take active steps for the summoning of a 
conference and the transfer of the initiative to Russian 
organisations, met with considerable support. The feeling 
in favour of practical action was very strong, the widely 
known refusal of the Menshevik practicals to restart the 
Russian Bureau made people inclined to accept the idea of 
a substitute organisation and the furore over the 
unconstitutional actions of Z.O.K. was much muted in 
Russia. There were reports of meetings in St Petersburg 
(4 raions), Kiev, Tiflis and Moscow (2 raions) supporting 
the efforts being made to call the conference.
In September a meeting, gathered by the two remaining 
Z.O.K. agents, was held in Tiflis, of representatives from 
the Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, Baku, Tiflis and Ekaterinburg 
organisations and four others with consultative vote. The
1
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representative from Petersburg failed to arrive. This 
meeting constituted itself the Russian Organising 
Commission (R.O.K.) after discussing whether such a narrow 
gathering could properly so constitute itself, without 
representation from Petersburg, Moscow and the Central 
Industrial Region. It was decided that the matter could 
not be delayed any further.
The relations of R.O.K. with its disreputable parent 
Z.O.K. were considered at its second session. It would 
appear that the local delegates who now constituted R.O.K. 
were anxious to sever connections as soon as possible, to 
the extent of declaring Z.O.K. dissolved. But 
Ordzhonikidze as representative of Z.O.K., with 
consultative vote, protested that this would be a 
premature step if the members of R.O.K. were to be arrested 
and put out of action. A compromise was reached whereby 
Z.O.K. and the Technical Commission were declared to be 
subordinate to R.O.K. and were told not to publish 
anything or spend money without the agreement of R.O.K.
In allotting mandates for the conference the factors
to be taken into consideration were the importance of a
given centre, the numbers of organised members and the
length of its existence. To have a vote a centre must
have had at least 30 members and have been in existence at
2least two months before the beginning of the conference.
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If we look at the Party organisations whose 
representatives took these audacious decisions we see that 
there were only two which had any claim to being stable or 
well established. They were those of Kiev and Baku, in 
both of which Party Mensheviks were prominent. Kiev was 
led by Mensheviks with Bolsheviks participating as junior 
partners, and this organisation had not only 
enthusiastically responded when approached by 
Ordzhonikidze but had undertaken to help him by reviving 
the Ekaterinoslav organisation. In Baku the leadership 
was in the hands of a united Bolshevik-Menshevik committee 
which carried on legal and illegal work.
In spite of the participation of Mensheviks the 
action of the September Tiflis meeting in constituting 
itself Russian Organising Commission and serving an 
ultimatum on Z.O.K. bore all the marks of a Lenin 
organised coup. And indeed this was how the Polish and 
Bolshevik lconcilator members* of Z.O.K. and the Technical 
Commission interpreted it. In thtdi" Open Letter to the 
Russian Organising Commission in November they criticised 
it for its untimely haste and the narrowly Bolshevik 
character of its support. They accused R.O.K. of 
misinterpreting its organisational tasks and allowing 
itself to be manipulated by the Leninist Bolsheviks into 
organising, not a general Party conference but a narrowly 
factional one. Such a factional policy could only 
frighten Party Mensheviks away from work on the conference 
and strengthen the sceptical attitude of their leaders, 
particularly Plekhanov. If such a conference were to be 
called the Poles would not participate, and it would not 
be a conference of unity but of a split.
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It was pointed out that R.O.K. had been constituted 
without representation from Moscow, Petersburg and the 
Central Industrial Region, the Poles had not been invited 
to R.O.K. before its constitution, and although the Z.O.K. 
agents had been sent to Russia with precise instructions 
to safeguard the Party character of the conference, they 
did not inform Z.O.K. of a number of their actions but 
consulted with the Leninists instead. By giving the Urals 
three votes at the conference as against Petersburg's 
three and Moscow and the Central Industrial Region with 
four between them, the impression was created of a biased 
representation against the Menshevik Oblasts in favour of 
Bolshevik ones.
Z.O.K. insisted that R.O.K. should not consider
itself finally constituted but should hold a second
session with wider representation and the time of holding
the conference should be decided to allow for the inclusion
of a considerable majority of the Party if not of all
1Party tendencies.
Ordzhonikidze replied to the Open Letter and other 
criticisms of Z.O.K. in a letter to the editors of 
Sotsial*demokrat with a series of flat denials of the 
charges - R.O.K. did not have an exclusively Bolshevik 
character, it was working in a hurry because it had 
urgently been instructed to do so, it was receiving wide 
support in Russia. The Moscow, Petersburg, Nikolaev, 
Rostov, Saratov, Kazan and Vilno organisations now 
supported it, the Poles had been invited to join but had
0. Bosh, op. cit.,
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not replied and the withholding of funds by Z.O.K. at a
1critical moment had meant the arrest of Semen Schwartz.
By the end of the year it was stated that twenty 
organisations had given their support to R.O.K.
But in fact Z.O.K.ls charges remained unanswered.
The conference that was organised in such haste was 
thoroughly Bolshevik, even though the Kiev and 
Ekaterinoslav Mensheviks stayed to attend it. It was not 
widely representative of Russian organisations. It would 
seem that a much broader conference could have been held 
in spite of the extraordinarily difficult conditions of 
organisation due to the presence of provocateurs in the 
heart of the Bolshevik faction. But by I9H  Lenin had 
decided not only that there was to be a split in the Party 
and how it was to be done, but also that it was essential 
to carry the operation through with the utmost speed.
The question of the kind of Marxist party the Russian 
working class needed, which had been raised in 1908 in the 
context of the defeat of the revolution and the break up 
of the Social Democratic organisation through repression, 
was by I9 H  being discussed in terms of immediate 
perspectives, of what to do next. Political conditions 
had changed to the extent that the Duma had become a 
nuisance that the Government had learnt to live with and 
was approaching the end of its term without further 
curtailment of its rights or arrests of its members, a 
good deal of political argument was permitted in the press, 
and there had been a general widening of the area of
SD no. 25, 8 December I 9 H , P*9*
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public activity and discussion. Reforms of land ownership 
designed to tackle the problem of low agricultural 
productivity and to create a stratum of prosperous peasant 
owners on the surface of the impoverished and turbulent 
villages, together with the resumption, after prolonged 
social disturbance and depression, of rapid industrial 
growth brought to the fore social problems which received 
attention in the press and in public congresses.
As the elections for the 4th Duma came near there was 
much discussion of campaign strategy and political 
programmes, and a general expectation of more active 
participation in political life. Stabilization of the 
regime after the upheavals of 1905-6 had been achieved by 
Stolypin with savage military and police repression and 
the destruction of the political organisations of the 
revolutionary opposition together with the breaking of 
their links with the working class. With the completion 
of the pacification however, decontaminated left wing 
intellectual groups, free from contact with the remnants 
of the proscribed underground parties were able to take 
advantage in 1910 of the greater leniency of the press 
laws and establish legal journals in which they could 
write not only of theoretical questions of Marxism, but 
also, in Aesopian terms, of the state of the working class 
movement and the political tasks of Social Democrats. The 
most important of these journals were Nasha Zaria, the 
organ of legal Mensheviks in Petersburg and Zvezda, the 
journal of the Social Democratic deputies in the Duma, to 
which Lenin frequently contributed.
For Social Democrats discussing the form that the 
working class political organisation should take, the
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immediate question was whether the electoral system of 
June 3, 1907 provided the prerequisites of a slow but
certain advance of new bourgeois forces without need of a 
further bourgeois revolution, or whether as a result of 
1905» the old power had but taken a step along the path of 
transformation into a bourgeois monarchy, preserving the 
real power of the feudal land-owners, so that the 
conditions which gave rise to the revolution would 
continue to operate. If the first assessment was accepted, 
a new type of workers* organisation was called for, which 
would draw in the widest possible membership and, in 
defence of its particular interests, would gather its 
forces and acquire socialist consciousness. In the second 
case the need was for the maintenance of the hegemony of 
the working class to lead a popular revolutionary movement 
to destroy the remnants of feudalism, hence the 
reconstitution of the illegal revolutionary party was also 
required. The line up of forces supporting the differing 
viewpoints was by no means a simple Menshevik-Bolshevik or 
Right-Left division. The most consistent advocates of the 
open, class party were the Petersburg Mensheviks engaged 
in legal work with the trade unions and Duma group but 
they received strong backing from the formerly Bolshevik 
intellectual N. Rozhkov. On the other side, defending the 
necessity of an illegal party were Plekhanov and Kamenev 
who took up positions argued from the theoretical 
propositions of Marxism. The practical workers in the 
localities who wanted a revival of the old party were those 
who were running up against the barriers imposed on any 
but narrowly opportunist legal activity or were struggling 
under conditions which permitted no legal work. The
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Martov Mensheviks who proceeded from an analysis of the 
regime as a contradictory combination of absolutism and 
constitutionalism believed that the building of the open 
workers1 movement was the prime task, together with the 
fight for legality by every means, and within this 
movement would be found the elements for the revival of 
the Party. The difficulty of this case lay in the 
assignment of priorities. While the need for the guiding 
role of the Party was not denied, it was dependent upon 
the creation of a wide mass movement, which left Martov 
open to Lenin*s charges of liquidationism.
Lenin*s polemics in I9H  were greatly enlivened by 
the desertion of Rozhkov to the class party viewpoint. 
Unlike the legalists who argued in fairly general terms 
Rozhkov tried to set out a programme for the immediate 
formation of an open workers* association. His article An 
Essential Beginning sent to Sotsial* demokrat late in 1910 
provoked a strong reaction in the editors. Kamenev with
Zinoviev and Lenin concurring, argued the opposite case in
1a letter begging Rozhkov to withdraw his article, and in 
April 1911 Lenin replied (although Rozhkov*s article had 
not been published) with his Conversation between a 
Legalist and an Opponent of Liquidationism in which he 
countered the arguments for an open association with the 
objection that the Government would not permit any such 
organisation genuinely to defend the interests of the 
working class. In replies later in the year to other 
articles of Rozhkov in Nasha Zaria on open political
Leninskii sbornik (M.-L. 1924-45), V o l . 25, p p .66-70.
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association he elaborated the argument that under existing 
Russian conditions such an organisation could not adopt 
anything more radical than a liberal policy.
As ha been shown earlier there was fair support by 
1911 for the reconstitution of the underground Party.
Since the Central Committee was deadlocked, this could not 
be done within the bounds of strict legality, but a 
general Party conference, provided it was representative 
of as many Party organisations as possible from inside 
Russia and of the factional groups abroad which recognised 
the need for the illegal Party would have been regarded as 
a satisfactory means of beginning the rebuilding. Lenin's 
moves in bypassing the still existing central institutions 
and setting up his own initiating bodies were condemned by 
his opponents abroad, but they were powerless to stop him. 
It was only when it became apparent that the Party 
conference he contemplated was to be confined to the 
supporters of the Leninist line on liquidationism, that 
his allies, the Poles, and the 'conciliator* Bolsheviks 
revolted and protested publicly. In reply to the 
defectors he wrote one of the most interesting of his 
polemics, The New Faction of Conciliators, or the Virtuous 
in which, sweeping away the plea of the conciliators for 
organisational unity of the arty and representation of 
factions, he defended the exclusion of the Vpered, Pravda 
and Golos groups on the ground that they represented non- 
Social Democratic trends. He asserted that it was no 
longer a question of organisation but one of the entire 
programme, tactics and character of the Party, 'or rather 
a question of two parties - the Social Democratic Workers*
Party and the Stolypin Workers Party of Potresov, Smirnov,
l6l
Larin, Levitsky and company*. The question was now
whether the Party was to be Social Democratic or liberal
in character. Summing up, he said,
Certain objective soil already exists (for the 
first time in Russia) for the liberal labour 
policy of Potresov, Levitsky, Larin and 
company. The Stolypin liberalism of the 
Cadets and the Stolypin workers* party are 
already in the process of formation.^
This admission, guarded as it was, was the largest 
Lenin made publicly of the possibility of a successful 
launching of a mass party. His own plans for the calling 
of a factional conference which would speak in the name of 
the whole Party, excluding all who did not accept his 
uncompromising stand against liquidationism were nowwell 
under way, and in January 1912 the conference he had 
planned met in Prague.
The question must be asked why Lenin, in the face of 
support for a conference which would probably have 
repudiated liquidationism but maintained the unity of what 
was left of the Party, decided on a split. It is clear 
that well before the plenum of January 1910 he had felt 
that a formal break between the revolutionary and 
reformist wings of the Russian Social Democratic movement 
would have to be made. At the plenum he had done his best 
not only to have liquidationism declared an anti-Party 
trend, but also to name and outlaw certain groups as 
liquidationist. He was overruled. In common with various 
orthodox Marxists elsewhere he was watching with concern 
the growing influence of reformism in the German Social
Lenin XX, pp.337, 353.
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Democratic movement. Having attended the Copenhagen 
Congress of the International in 1910 , he spoke of the 
crisis in the German Social Democratic Party which was
'due to the growth of an inevitable and decisive break
1with the opportunists1. For Lenin 1iquidationism was the 
manifestation of reformism in Russia. In the conditions 
of 1911? it did look as though there was some chance of a 
wider base of political activity being tolerated and some 
sort of mass workers1 association might be set up. This, 
in Lenin's view, would mean the smothering, instead of the 
revival of the spirit of revolutionary Social Democracy. 
Martov's insistence that the party should not be isolated 
from the mass movement and could not be rebuilt without it, 
was in these circumstances, particularly obnoxious to 
Lenin. It cannot be said, in spite of Lenin's attacks on 
him, that Martov's position was identical with that of the 
legalists. He never denied the necessity of the political 
leadership of the working class by the Social Democratic 
Party, but if the recreated party envisaged by Martov was 
to spring out of a liberal working class movement, its 
centre could only have been pulpy, quite unlike the rock 
hard nucleus that Lenin believed to be necessary.
The resolutions of the gathering at Prague began with 
an account of the calling of the conference and the 
support that had been received from upward of twenty 
organisations in Russia. The conference constituted 
itself a general Party conference, 'the supreme party 
body*.2 It was stated that the three non-Russian national
1
Lenin XIX, p.352.
2
K.P.S.S. v resoliutsiiakh, I, p.270.
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parties had been invited and that non-attendance was their 
own responsibility.
On the tasks of the Party, the policy adopted was an 
endorsement and a continuation of that laid down by the 
3th Conference. The beginning of a political revival in 
the form of strikes and demonstrations was noted. Arising 
from this, the task was the continued work of socialist 
education, organisation and unification of the politically 
conscious masses, and the re-establishment of the illegal 
organisation of the Party, using every legal opportunity, 
extending political agitation and giving support to the 
incipient mass movement.
The Duma elections and the Duma group were treated at 
some length. Participation in the elections was seen as a 
means of carrying on socialist, class propaganda and the 
organisation of the working class. The election slogans 
were to be a democratic republic, the eight hour day, and 
confiscation of all landed estates. The general tactical 
line on the elections was to maintain the independent 
position of the Party, rejecting common platforms with 
other groups and electoral agreements with any other 
parties in the workers* curia, but in other curiae to have 
agreements with the democratic (Trudovik, Populist and 
Socialist Revolutionary) groups, and in certain cases with 
the Cadets against the Government parties.
In the resolution on the character and organisational 
forms of Party work, the conference noted that the new 
upswing of the working class movement made possible further 
development of work through the formation of illegal 
Social Democratic nuclei surrounded by the widest possible
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network of legal workers* associations. Social Democratic 
nuclei in unions organised on an industrial basis should 
function together with nuclei organised territorially.
The importance of extending legal work in unions, libraries, 
reading rooms, workers* entertainment societies, and the 
press was emphasised. Reference was also made to the need 
to revive the forms of illegal mass activity such as the 
birzhi and factory Party meetings.
On liquidationism the conference declared that by its 
conduct, the Nasha Zaria and Delo Zhizni group had placed 
itself outside the Party.
Changes in the Party rules were made which recognised
the extreme difficulty of summoning general conferences
and congresses. Clause 8 of the rules adopted at the
London Congress which provided for the summoning of
conferences every three or four months was replaced by one
to the effect that conferences of representatives of all
Party organisations were to be convened as often as
possible. In regard to representation at Party congresses
the basis was to be decided by the Central Committee. An
addendum to Clause 2 (which stated that all Party
organisations were to be constructed on the principle of
democratic centralism) was made to the effect that
co-option was considered permissible - in accordance with
1the decisions of the December 1908 conference.
The policy and programme of the Prague Conference 
were based on an estimate of the reviving temper and 
political interest of the masses; the illegal Party was to
K.P.S.S. v resoliutsiiakh, I, pp.270-84.
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be reconstructed on the supposition that wide sections of 
the working class were prepared to accept its leadership, 
the opportunities for legal work were recognised to be 
much wider and more varied than in the years of repression, 
and above all, it was now considered timely to raise 
illegal militant slogans as mass political demands.
The conference to split the Party had been organised 
by Lenin to the accompaniment of violent polemics, rifts, 
defection of long time supporters, recriminations, 
scandals in the international socialist movement and the 
hearty disapproval of most Social Democrats in the 
emigration. But having laid down the policy of 
revolutionary Social Democracy, the Leninists turned with 
a remarkably conciliatory mien to the Russian membership.
In the resolution on the reports of the local 
organisations it was noted that everywhere in the 
localities Party work was being conducted jointly and 
harmoniously by the Bolsheviks and the pro-party 
Mensheviks in the main, as well as by Vpered supporters 
wherever there were any, and by all other Social Democrats 
who recognised the need for an illegal R.S.D.W.P. As has 
been said, the only group on which anathema was 
pronounced was that of the St Petersburg legalists. To 
all other Social Democrats in Russia, a cordial invitation 
was extended to join the ranks.
It is not possible to estimate the numbers who 
participated in the elections to the conference, but they 
must have been very small indeed. Eighteen voting 
delegates attended, five from the emigration and the rest 
directly representing local organisations - Petersburg, 
Moscow, Central Industrial Region, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav,
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Nikolaev, Baku, Tiflis, Saratov, Kazan, Vilno and Dvinsk. 
There was not one of the leading Bolshevik practical 
workers present (they had all been arrested). The 
thirteen were members of local organisations, some of whom 
had worked as district or city organisers, three had gone 
through Lenin®s Party school at Longjumeau and two were 
police spies. As well as the centres represented, four 
other centres had supported the conference but were unable 
to send delegates, and the Urals contingent was prevented 
by arrests from attending. A Central Committee of seven 
was elected which included one provocateur, Malinovsky.
Because of the breakdown of Party committees in a 
number of centres, delegates had been directly elected at 
general meetings. In Petersburg 110 members from five 
raions took part in the voting. In Kiev, where Mensheviks 
and Bolsheviks worked together, a city conference of 16 
representatives elected a delegate, and in Ekaterinoslav a 
city conference of 10. Baku and Tiflis delegates were 
elected by the members directly - more than 200 in Baku
iand more than 100 in Tiflis.
Lenin®s conference aroused violent condemnation in 
emigre circles. His opponents, denouncing the 
unconstitutionality of its actions declared that the 
conference represented no more than a fraction of all those 
who called themselves Social Democrats, and they were 
certainly right. On the other hand the Bolsheviks in 
claiming that the twenty and more organisations associated
1
Vserossiiskaia konferentsiia R o s , sots. - 
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with the conference represented the majority of the 
functioning organisations in Russia were probably not 
outrageously wrong either. Certainly, no counter 
conference was ever called of representatives from Russian 
local organisations to denounce the usurpers of the Party 
name, authority and central newspaper. This may well have 
reflected both the weakness of the illegal organisations 
up to 191^ and the chronic tendency of the Russian 
membership to consider itself Social Democratic first and 
factional second.
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CONCLUSION
The Russian Social Democratic Workers* Party at the 
beginning of 1 9 0 7 was an illegal but vigorous and 
ramified organisation numbering upward of 80,000 members, 
harassed by arrests and police spying but in many places 
still enjoying under thin disguise the freedom to meet and 
associate won in 1905* Its agitation and much of its 
propaganda was carried on openly. Its press, after the 
suppression of the short-lived legal journals of 1905 was 
printed under conspiratorial conditions but circulated 
freely. Mass meetings were held, particularly in summer 
as open air gatherings. A great variety of premises in 
union offices, private dwellings and educational 
institutions was still available for Party conferences, 
committee meetings and propaganda classes. Widespread 
agitation and propaganda permitted general discussion of 
Party policy by the rank and file and non-party workers. 
The organisational core, the committees, remained 
underground and professional revolutionaries observed 
elementary rules of conspiracy to avoid arrest.
The years of deep repression that followed Stolypin*s 
coup d*etat of June 1907 saw the flight of the leaders 
into exile, destruction of the central institutions, loss 
of the greater part of the membership and disintegration 
into a number of bitterly hostile factions mutually more 
antagonistic abroad than within Russia. At the end of the 
period occurred the reconstitution from outside of part of 
the Bolshevik faction, the declaration of an open
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organisational break between the Leninists and other 
factions, the assumption of the Party name and central 
institutions by the Leninist group and the rebuilding of 
the organisation within Russia as an underground party 
with a programme of revolutionary socialism.
The severe political persecution of the revolutionary 
opposition on which the June 3 regime was established was 
for the Social Democratic Party a blow which suddenly 
interrupted its organic development, separated leaders 
from members and members from the mass milieu, driving 
those Social Democrats whose work lay in legal spheres to 
sever their connection with the Party, and constraining 
within the proscrustian bed of the underground those who 
remained.
The government took a decision to deal the coup de 
grace to a political organisation whose revolutionary 
actions had already been defeated, an organisation which, 
placed on the defensive by the rapidly declining militancy 
of the workers, was adjusting to a phase of legal 
parliamentary opposition and to work in the emerging legal 
trade unions. In a situation in which it was recognised 
by the Menshevik wing that the revolutionary period of 
armed struggle had passed, and by the Bolsheviks that a 
mass of day to day political activities now stood between 
them and the next armed uprising, the differences between 
the reformist and revolutionary perspectives were not so 
acute that the possibility of an open break was an 
immediate one. The tendency in the formally united Party 
was rather for the rival factions to concentrate their 
forces in certain areas and in certain fields of activity,
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with the Mensheviks entrenched in mass work and the 
Bolsheviks in the central Party apparatus.
Certainly the differences in tactics arising from the 
differing perspectives were considerable. The Mensheviks 
looked to a period of accumulation of the forces of the 
working class, training in political organisation and 
activity and the use of legal opportunities to build a 
broad popular opposition to the autocracy. The Bolsheviks 
with the prospect of the armed revolt moving away into the 
future, were turning to a militant use of legal 
opportunities both to put forward the revolutionary 
viewpoint and to demonstrate the impossibility of using 
bourgeois institutions in radical defence of working class 
interests. These differences however led more often to 
work along separate lines than to headlong confrontation 
except on certain immediate issues such as the Duma 
election campaign which provoked opposing policies on the 
relationship with bourgeois parties.
By 1907 the militancy of the economic movement of the 
working class was declining rapidly. The sweeping mass 
strikes of 1905 which had won important improvements in 
wages and hours had been followed by a lowering of morale 
after the defeat of the Moscow uprising, hastened by some 
unsuccessful strikes and fairly widespread unemployment in 
1906. But at this time the creation had begun of those 
institutions, the trade unions, which would channel and 
direct the economic demands of the class, both those which 
were common to the entire work force and those which made 
up the vast number of bitterly felt sectional grievances.
In addition, right from their inception Russian trade 
unions had undertaken broad cultural-educational activities
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and some social services. A trade union movement was 
coming into being, belated but vigorous and many sided, 
uncluttered by restrictive traditions, directly reflecting 
in its activity the social and economic needs of its 
members and the shortage of voluntary institutions in 
Russian society. Like the political parties, the trade 
unions depended on the educated classes for the conduct of 
their cultural-educational programmes, legal aid and 
medical services and for technical assistance with press 
and management, a state of affairs taken for granted as an 
intermediate stage in the workers* development.
Both factions of the Party took an active interest in 
trade unions. The Mensheviks stood for the utmost 
encouragement of the unions without organisational 
attachment, so-called neutrality. The Bolsheviks had 
recently changed their approach from one of rigid 
neutrality to that of partiinos t * , that i s , the winning of 
ideological influence over the unions and the 
establishment of organisational links between Party and 
unions. The result of the entry of the Bolsheviks into 
the field of trade union work, which they had hitherto 
left to the Mensheviks, would most likely have been a fierce 
struggle for influence in some unions, with the Bolsheviks 
winning commanding positions in associations of unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers and the Mensheviks influence 
remaining predominant amongst skilled workers.
While the immediate prospects of the R.S.D.W.P. in 
the first half of 1907 were those of further retreat and a 
loss of membership in the face of pressing reaction and 
disillusionment of the educated classes with the results 
of the revolution, it had nevertheless established itself
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as the only political party that the great majority of 
urban workers considered in any way as their own and it 
had close links with the growing trade union movement. It 
faced the difficult but not impossible position of being 
illegal but only half underground, persecuted by the 
government but retaining its links with society.
The Party had reached a stage in its development on 
the eve of the coup in which there was increasing 
interaction between the membership and leading committees, 
at least in the most advanced centres. Policy was 
determined by the leadership and constantly assessed by 
the rank and file. The influx of thousands of workers 
into the Party in 1905 had meant the introduction of 
democratic forms of election and in addition, the system 
of standing conferences in Petersburg and Moscow provided 
both an immediate indication as to how policy was received 
by the members, and through the conference delegates 
elected directly from the work places, information on the 
mood of the workers at large.
The Stolypin reaction destroyed all this, with 
momentous consequences both for the Social Democratic 
Party and for the Russian working class.
Although the drastic step taken was not dictated by 
any immediate danger, the government did recognise the 
serious threat to its stability that had been posed by the 
events of the revolutionary years. The political motives 
for the Stolypin land reforms were to lessen the social 
unrest in the villages by the creation of a conservative 
layer of peasant landowners. As Lenin himself recognised, 
the reforms had a fair chance of succeeding, given time. 
The problems facing the government in dealing with the
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numerically small but highly volatile class of industrial 
workers were more formidable. The revolutionary years had 
presented the alarming spectacle of industrial mass 
militancy in alliance with a conscious political element.
Stolypin acted ruthlessly and efficiently to sever 
the connection between the working class and the 
revolutionary intelligentsia. But while the revolutionary 
political party could be reduced to fragments, the problem 
still remained of what form the working class movement 
could be allowed to take. The German path of permitting 
the development of an industrial trade union movement cut 
off from the outlawed political party could hardly be 
followed in Russian conditions. Industrialization was 
still at the stage where a large unskilled labour force of 
low productive capacity endured the severe exploitation of 
long hours, low wages and bad working conditions.
Extensive unionisation of the huge Russian industrial 
enterprises must have led to insistent demands being 
placed on highly resistant employers. But Russia*s heavy 
dependence on foreign capital for industrial investment 
called imperatively for a stable, cheap and docile work 
force. Pressed by the contradictions in which it found 
itself, the government was not prepared to allow the 
development of a viable, legally recognised trade unionism, 
which could have hastened the emergence of a stratum of 
conservative working class leaders and provided a broad 
alternative channel for working class demands to that 
offered by the illegal political Party.
The government *s attack on the Party institutions, 
carried out over a period of time was highly effective. 
First, the entire semi-legal superstructure was swept away,
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the mass contacts broken and serious inroads made into the 
illegal apparatus. Then in 1908-9 the underground 
organisation itself was broken up, mainly through the 
successful use of spying and provocation. The loss of 
members and the danger to the very existence of mass 
organisations presented by any link with the proscribed 
revolutionary Party sharply pointed up the problems of the 
underground organisation divorced from the class it was 
supposed to lead and educate. The Mensheviks pointed out 
the self destroying character of the isolated 
conspiratorial circles, but the alternative they sought in 
the broad path of reformist work with the class likewise 
yielded barren results. The type of persecution to which 
the legal movement and in particular the trade unions were 
subjected, was not of the kind which would allow them to 
come back time after time to fight the employers. They 
were simply headed off by state regulation from any 
effective activity on wages and hours on behalf of their 
members. Specifically bound as they were by the 
Provisional Regulations of 1906 not to defend but to 
elucidate the economic interests of their members, as soon 
as the rules were literally and obstructively applied they 
found themselves deserted by the majority of those who had 
joined with such enthusiasm. In the years of repression, 
in spite of the efforts of Social Democrats working 
legally, no mass class organisation was able to take the 
place of the Party.
Those Social Democrats, the Bolsheviks, who retained 
a revolutionary perspective and clung to the illegal Party 
were faced with a catastrophic situation. The noisy 
outgoing Bolshevik local organisations, left with a
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fraction of their membership and shorn of their leading 
committees found themselves reduced to the hunted life of 
the underground and dependent for funds, literature and 
leadership on the Bolshevik centre in exile. The attack 
on the over-extended Party organisation revealed the 
organic weaknesses that sprang from excessive dependence 
on the services of the intelligentsia. When this 
underpinning was suddenly removed with the mass withdrawal 
of the intelligentsia the structure collapsed and 
propaganda and agitation in many areas ceased altogether.
Considerable numbers of Social Democrats accompanied 
the Party leaders into exile. In the various European 
cities in which they settled they tended to form emigre 
communities and to continue the arguments of the immediate 
past. The Party lived two lives - one in the brawling 
emigration and the other in the shrinking underground. 
Leaders of the factions abroad studied the lessons of the 
revolution, outlined political programmes and diagnosed 
the ills of the Party largely in terms of the misdeeds of 
factional opponents. In addition to the fundamental 
divergence between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, bitter 
differences of opinions developed within the Bolshevik 
faction itself. Tactical disagreements, which when the 
leaders and members were together, could be argued, 
discussed, put to the vote as they arose and the decision 
tested in practice, became when leaders and members were 
separated, prolonged and deadly disputes leading to splits 
and expulsions among the emigres, and in the decimated 
local organisations, confused quarrelling. Although the 
tendencies of the Right to abandon the Party 
(liquidationism) and of the Left to renounce legal action
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(otzovism) arose naturally from the disintegration and 
demoralisation within Russia, the mutual antagonisms of 
the embattled local members were never as fierce as those 
of the emigres. Most legalists were regarded as being 
entirely outside the Party, but amongst the remaining 
members, Leninist Bolsheviks and many otzovists and Party 
Mensheviks, a disposition to forget past disputes was 
evident by the end of 1909. This mood was strongly 
expressed by the practical workers in the Bolshevik 
organisation. These men who had influenced aspects of 
policy in regard to the Party*s relations with mass 
organisations in 1906-7, continued in 1908-10 to urge upon 
the Bolshevik centre views which reflected the state of 
affairs in Russia and from time to time were directly 
opposed to those held by Lenin. The most noteworthy 
instances were the fierce objections to extending the anti- 
otzovist campaign in the form of expulsions to the local 
organisations and the strong support for the unity moves 
leading to the January 1910 plenum.
During the years of severe repression when the local 
illegal press was almost silent the views of the Bolshevik 
membership are to be inferred mainly from their response 
to initiatives from the Bolshevik centre. As the 
energetic representations of the professionals indicated, 
the responses were sometimes negative. Aware of their 
dependence on the centre for the means to carry on Party 
agitation and propaganda, they resented the unending 
brawls of the emigres. Even when they were in firm 
agreement with Lenin*s general line they felt at times 
that their urgent needs were neglected, while time, energy 
and money were spent by the Bolshevik leaders scoring off
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factional opponents. The scandals that enlivened and 
poisoned the atmosphere of the emigration were of much 
less interest to those in Russia. Menshevik charges that 
the Bolshevik leaders had been deeply implicated in major 
expropriations could hardly be expected to arouse echoes 
of indignation in the rank and file otzovists who had 
either done their share of small robberies themselves or 
sympathised with the men who had. While the Bolshevik 
record with Party finances excited horror abroad, the main 
complaints from Bolshevik Party committees concerned the 
meagreness of the subsidies allowed them.
The Central Committee plenum held in January 1910 
represented the last concerted attempt to arrive at a 
working agreement between all factions still in the Party. 
When news of it reached Party Social Democrats in Russia 
they welcomed with enthusiasm the possibility it offered 
of reviving the illegal organisation on as broad a basis 
as was then possible. These hopes were destroyed in the 
internecine war that broke loose again in the emigration 
and the process of disintegration of the Russian 
organisation into unlinked groups continued to the point 
where whatever response the membership could offer, either 
of support or resistance, to moves from abroad, was 
negligible.
Lenin who had been overruled at the plenum in his 
attempts to prevent the reconstitution of the Party in any 
form but that of the centralised illegal organisation, 
resumed his attacks on liquidationism at the first sign of 
obstruction by the Mensheviks. Fearing the possibility, 
in view of the disintegration of the underground 
organisation, of a revival of Social Democracy as a legal
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mass party, he moved with great speed to recreate an 
exclusively Bolshevik organisation. He finally managed, 
having lost all his practical men who had been elected as 
Central Committee members or candidates at the London 
Congress, to put together a flimsy organisational framework 
using new agents. In the face of denunciations abroad and 
the passive abstention of the inert Russian membership, 
the Prague Conference took the Party name and drew up a 
Party building plan along the old lines of the constitution 
of a network of illegal nuclei surrounded by legal 
organisations. The programme adopted - that of 
revolutionary Social Democracy, called for the broadest 
possible struggle against the autocracy.
The Party organisation that was rebuilt in 1912 bore 
the marks of the years of repression. Political conditions 
were still such that neither a large membership nor 
democratic procedures were possible. In comparison with 
the Party of the revolutionary years it was cramped and 
undemocratic. The forms of organisation and activity 
however were well suited to ensure the maximum amount of 
influence among broad masses of workers. The concept of 
stable groups of Social Democrats working in mass 
organisations evolved a few years earlier proved 
particularly useful. The field in which the Bolsheviks 
could operate was now much wider than it had been in the 
post-revolutionary period of reaction. The daily illegal 
newspaper Pravda offered the means of reaching and 
influencing large numbers of workers and strikes and 
demonstrations provided a broad basis for agitational 
activity.
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The programme of revolutionary Social Democracy 
combining political with economic demands, with its 
minimum programme of the democratic republic, the eight 
hour day and confiscation of the landed estates, suited 
the reviving the temper of the industrial workers and won 
their support. Large numbers, certainly, did not flock 
to join the Bolshevik organisation, because it was indeed 
the minimum demands that interested them more than 
socialism at that time. Battered by the repression and 
the years of factional fighting the organisation remained 
fragile. The severely shaken Petersburg Committee did not 
regain its standing among Bolshevik-minded workers of the 
capital until 1917* But for Lenin the essential task was 
to bring about a formal division between the revolutionary 
and reformist wings of Russian Social Democracy and this 
was accomplished in 1912.
He had no doubt that a new revolutionary crisis would 
come and that the maturing revolution would be bourgeois 
and democratic. That the Russian bourgeois revolution 
could be rapidly followed by a socialist revolution he 
believed possible, but the necessary condition of this end 
was leadership of the proletariat by a revolutionary party 
from which all trace of bourgeois influence, that is, 
reformism had been removed.
In 1917 the Bolshevik organisation hacked out by 
Lenin in 1912 was able, after only a brief hesitation to 
accept the new revolutionary perspectives opened up by the 
April Theses of that remarkable man.
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APPENDIX 1
RULES OF THE CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL OBLASTt 
ORGANISATION R.S.D.W.P. 1906
The Central Industrial Oblas t* , or Raion as it was 
often called, was the most important of the Bolshevik led 
oblas t * organisations. These rules were adopted at a 
conference in 1906.
1. The Central Raion embraces all organisations that 
look towards Moscow.
Note. At the present time the Central Raion comprises 
the following organisations: 1. Vologda group,
2. Yaroslavl Committee, 3* Rybinsk group, 4. Kostroma 
Okrug Committee, 5* Nizhni-Novgorod Committee,
6. Vladimir Okrug organisation, 7» Ivanovo-Voznesensk 
Committee, 8. Ivanovo-Voznesensk Okrug Committee,
9* Moscow Committee, 10. Moscow Okrug Committee,
11 Tver Committee, 12. Smolensk Committee, 13* Kaluga 
Committee, 14. Tula Committee, 13* Orel Committee,
16. Briansk Committee, 17» Kursk Committee, 18. Tambov 
Committee, 19*Voronezh Committee.
2. Regular Oblast* conferences are summoned quarterly to 
discuss and resolve general Party and local questions 
and to co-ordinate work in the oblast.
3. Independent organisations with not fewer than 200 
members are entitled to representation with full vote.
Organisations numbering more than 200 are entitled to 
one delegate for each 500 members.
Independent organisations with not fewer than 
100 members are entitled to a consultative vote.
Independent organisations with less than 200 
members may combine to send a delegate with full vote 
on matters of common interest.
Delegates to conference are elected either directly 
by all members of the organisation or by 
democratically organised conferences and congresses.
The Oblast* Bureau puts into effect the decisions of 
the Oblast* conference, assigns the party forces in 
the raion, manages general raion undertakings, 
organises the calling of conference and prepares 
material for it, communicates with the central 
institutions of the Party, informs local 
organisations of the progress of Party affairs, draws 
up drafts of campaign plans, leaflets and so on, and 
restores local organisations which have collapsed. 
Note. Members of the Bureau or its agents are 
entitled to attend meetings of all organisations in 
the Oblas t * with consultative vote.
Organisations of the oblast remit 5 per cent of 
all receipts to the Bureau.
Prole tarii, no. 4,
19 September 1906, p.4.
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APPENDIX 2
DRAFT RULES OF THE PETERSBURG 
ORGANISATION R.S.D.W.P. 1907
The rules under which the conference of the St, 
Petersburg organisation constituted itself a standing body 
were adopted in March 1907»
1. A member of the Petersburg organisation of the 
R.S.D.W.P. is one, who, in accordance with Point 1 of 
the Party rules, accepts the Party programme, pays 
membership dues and belongs to some local Party 
organisation.
2. The members of the Petersburg organisation working in 
a factory or workshop constitute the factory union
(soiuz). Small factories and workshops may combine 
to form one union.
3. All Party work in the factory or workshop is led by 
the factory committee, which is elected by a general 
meeting of the factory union. The number of members 
of the factory committee is determined by the meeting 
of the union.
Note. Members of the Party not working in a 
particular factory but carrying on Party work there 
enjoy the rights of members of the factory union.
4. The Petersburg organisation as a whole is divided 
into territorial raions.
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Note I . The final determination of boundaries 
between raions rests with raions themselves in 
collaboration with the Petersburg Committee.
Note II. Railway workers are grouped into separate 
raions.
5. The leading organ in each raion is the raion 
conference elected by direct vote on a basis of 1 to 
25- Elections to the raion conference are carried 
out at the meeting of the factory union or at the 
meetings of a number of unions.
6. The raion conference directs all raion work in 
accordance with the directives of the city conference 
and under the direct leadership of the Petersburg 
Committee.
7. The raion conference elects the raion committee to 
carry out day to day work in the raion.
8. The military organisation is attached to the 
Petersburg Committee as a special autonomous raion, 
being represented at the city conference by one full 
vote, if it is not possible for all members of the 
organisation to take part in the election.
9. The combat organisation is a technical organisation 
attached to the Petersburg Committee, and is entitled 
to send its own representative to the city conference 
with consultative vote.
10. The city conference is the leading organ of the whole 
of the St Petersburg organisation. Conference is 
elected by direct vote on the basis of 1 to 50.
Note. Two stage elections are permitted only in case 
of insuperable police obstacles, and then only with 
the agreement of the Petersburg Committee.
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11. Conference is a standing body meeting not less than 
twice a month.
12. Elections for the conference are held every six 
months.
Note. Elections for conference may be held upon 
request of half the membership or by decision of the 
conference itself.
13* All Party members are eligible for election by
conference to its executive organ, the Petersburg 
Committee.
Note. Attached to the Petersburg Committee and to 
each raion are special collectives created for work 
among artisans, trade unions and national groups.
14. Executive organs, as elected institutions, are not 
entitled to co-opt, but have the right to invite 
comrades to attend with consultative vote.
Proletarii, no. 13» 23 March 1907» p.8.
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APPENDIX 3
EXTRACT FROM THE LETTER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
ON SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORK IN TRADE UNIONS
FEBRUARY 1908
Once the Bolsheviks had adopted the position that the 
workers* 1 23 mass organisations offered valuable opportunities 
for Social Democratic activity, the Central Committee in 
resolutions and letters explained how the work was to be 
done. The following letter gives an idea of the 
importance attached to work in trade unions, the way in 
which Social Democratic fractions were to be organised, 
and the role of the Party in assisting the economic 
struggle of the trade unions.
*The following tasks in connection with the trade 
unions ... face the R.S.D.W.P.:
1. To give the activity of the trade unions a more 
strikingly militant character and to direct all S.D. 
agitation in the spirit of the London and Stuttgart 
congresses.
2. To strengthen disintegrating, unstable organisations.
3. To create new stable trade unions in place of the 
ones that have disappeared.
All these aims can be realised only when Social 
Democrats in trade unions stop carrying on their work 
entirely without contact with each other, when they form
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compact groups throughout the unions, which will have a 
clear idea of the immediate problems of the trade unions, 
and direct their own activity in the spirit of Social 
Democracy under the leadership of local Party centres.
The absence of such links has already caused great damage 
and, in St Petersburg for example, has led to a whole 
series of undesirable complications. It is enough to 
point out that for this reason many unions did not take 
part in the organisation of the one day strike on November 
22, and even agitated against it while on January 9 the 
typographers struck on their own and have now been 
subjected to severe repression. On the other hand 
numerous examples can be cited of economic action taking 
place without the Party as such participating, although 
individual Social Democrats have taken an active part in 
them. The Central Committee calls upon all Social 
Democrats to start upon the organisation of the above 
mentioned groups in all trade unions, legal and illegal, 
both in the union as a whole and in its separate sections. 
In the local organisation all such groups must be united 
and in close organisational contact with the local Party 
centre. All Party organisations must devote great 
attention to trade union activity and to see to it that 
all members belong to their trade unions, and that having 
joined the union they try to get all union members to join 
the Party.
Co-ordination of the activity of Social Democrats in 
a union may be achieved only through great expenditure of 
energy and will probably cause difficulties at first 
because of the non professional pattern of Party 
organisations, which as a rule answers all needs.
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However the following tasks may be placed on the 
immediate order of the day without difficulty.
1. Meetings of Social Democrats who are members of union 
boards or delegate meetings for preliminary 
discussion of the most important trade union and 
Party questions.
2. Discussion in raion and other (Party) meetings of the 
most important general trade union questions.
3» Meetings - and this will prove more difficult - at
city, raion and podraion level of Social Democrats in 
a particular trade for the purpose of such 
discussions.
4. Owing to the organisation of our trade unions by 
industry and not by occupation, discussion of trade 
union questions are quite feasible in Party meetings 
of Social Democrats.
5. Formation of permanent leading Social Democratic 
commissions in separate unions and city commissions, 
which are democratically elected by S.D. union 
members; or the organisation of Social Democratic 
leadership in another form, depending on local 
conditions.
All this amalgamating of Social Democrats within the 
professional organisations, in the lowest as well as the 
highest bodies, must be effected gradually and to begin 
with, have a fairly loose form depending on local 
c onditions.
Social Democrats must not attend the union with 
resolutions prepared beforehand on each and every question.
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This could have undesirable effects in the unions, where 
the Social Democratic line must be put forward with great 
tact and particular care. All this amalgamation has as 
its aim the consolidating of Social Democrats in the 
unions for the general direction of union work in a Social 
Democratic spirit, for preliminary discussion and working 
out of basic principles for the resolution of the main 
questions arising from the day to day struggle. At the 
same time Social Democrats must certainly raise with 
workers who join the Party all current questions of the 
economic struggle and factory life.
All Party organisations must concern themselves 
closely with these day to day questions. Together with 
Social Democratic groups from the trade unions and with 
their help they must involve themselves in the economic 
life of the working masses; carry on a struggle against 
overtime work, and against worsening conditions of labour, 
take up collections for the strikers in the name of the 
Party, during economic strikes call for solidarity strikes 
organise help for the unemployed and so on.
One of the main tasks in unions at the present moment 
is the organisation of cultural-educational work. Social 
Democrats working in unions here too must be in the front 
rank and place the whole matter on a class basis. By 
means of our national Party apparatus we can and must 
facilitate oblast* and national unification for the unions 
We must help unions to become as well informed as possible 
about their particular branch of industry, we must help to 
raise union literature to the required level.
189
Friendly mutual work of Party and union organisations 
will strengthen both, leading to mutual improvement of 
work and enabling the more rapid unification of the broad 
masses under the banner of socialism.* C .C .R .S .D .W .P
Proletarii, no. 23 > 27 February 1908, p.5
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APPENDIX 4
FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF THE MOSCOW COMMITTEE 
R.S.D.W.P. FOR DECEMBER 1908
The few financial statements of Party committees 
published naturally conceal more than they reveal. The 
main items of interest relate to the expenditure on the 
printery (tekhnika) and on the maintenance of professional 
revolutionaries.
Financial Statement
Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.W.P. for December 1908.
(Owing to circumstances beyond our control the 
Statement for November has not been published and will be 
issued later).
Receipts
Brought forward to December 1 (printery fund) 3 H  rub.; 
from Seraphima 50 r . ; from anon, for Rabochee Znamia 100 r. 
6 k . ; per E.E. 15 r.; received from commercial employees 
12 r . ; from Zamoskvor, raion for Rab. Znamia 6 r . ; from 
Financial Commission 396 r . ; from M.N. for Rab. Znamia 25 
rub.; from G.S. for prisoners 15 r. 75 k . ; from G. as a 
loan 20 r.; from M.N. as a loan 50 r.; from students* 
union for B. (political prisoner) l4 rub.
Total 10l4 rub. 31 kop.
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Expenditure
Printery 3^3 rub.; small printery 11 r.; maintenance of 
professionals 243 r.; subsidy to 3 raions 30 r.; loan to 
M.O.K. 25 r.; to prison from G.S. 15 r. 75 k.; for 
purchase and transport of books 60 r.; organisational 
expenses 20 r. 25 k . ; to Yaroslavets 3 r.; debit to 
commercial and industrial employees 25 r.; S. and G. 125 r. 
secretarial expenses 22 r. 75 k. Total 9^3 rub. 75 kop.
Carried forward to 1st Jan. 1909 51 rub. 6 kop.
Total 1014 rub. 31 kop.
Sotsial*demokrat, no. 4, 21 March 1909j p.8
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APPENDIX 5
MODEL RULES OF A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC 
FRACTION IN A TRADE UNION
MOSCOW
MODEL RULES OF A FRACTION OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC 
MEMBERS OF A TRADE UNION
1. The fraction is organised with the aim of influencing 
the activity of the association in the spirit of the 
programme and tactics of the R.S.D.W.P.
2. With this purpose in view:- (l) all questions 
concerning the activity of the association are 
discussed at general meetings of fraction members,
(2) all questions of Party and political life in 
general are discussed, (3 ) reports are given on the 
activity of the Party collectives.
MEMBERSHIP OF FRACTION
3. All members of the association who accept the 
programme and tactics of the R.S.D.W.P. and abide by 
the organisational rules of the fraction are 
recognised as fraction members.
4. Members of the fraction not paying dues to a Party 
organisation are to assign 1 per cent to the fraction 
funds.
5. All members of the fraction must observe Party 
discipline and the decisions of the general meeting 
and Bureau of the fraction.
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GENERAL MEETINGS
6. General meetings of fraction members are summoned by 
the fraction Bureau.
7. All questions at general meetings of the fraction are 
decided by simple majority vote.
FRACTION BUREAU
8. A fraction Bureau of eight is elected at a general 
meeting.
9 . The fraction Bureau elects from its number one 
representative to the Party-trade union group as a 
link with the Party.
10. The fraction Bureau is the executive organ.
Note. In exceptional circumstances the fraction 
Bureau may itself decide various questions and the 
general meeting may challenge such decisions.
11. All questions at Bureau meetings are decided by 
simple majority vote.
12. The Bureau elects from its number a secretary and 
treasurer.
PROCEDURE WITH REGARD TO 
ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION OF MEMBERS
13. Newly admitted members are confirmed by the fraction 
Bureau.
14. Members of the fraction may be excluded from its 
ranks only by decision of the general meeting.
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The editorial board of Sotsial* demokrat added the 
following comment on the above rules.
*The present draft of model rules was drawn up in 
Moscow. We print it, as an interesting first experiment 
in this field. The Central Committee of our Party with 
its well known (unanimously adopted) resolution on trade 
unions long ago pointed out the necessity of organising 
Social Democratic nuclei in all workers* trade unions. 
The last general Party conference also emphasised the 
necessity of organising these Social Democratic Party 
nuclei in all workers* organisations. Using the 
opportunity once again to remind comrades of this urgent 
task we draw attention to the first attempt at a legal 
formulation of this problem, which must first of all be 
solved practically in those places where for some reason 
or another it has still not been done.*
Sotsial* demokrat, nos. 7-8, 8 August 1909 > p.9*
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APPENDIX 6
EXTRACT FROM THE PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS 
IN RESPECT OF ASSOCIATIONS AND SOCIETIES 
MARCH 1906
The Provisional Regulations in respect of 
Associations and Societies comprise 73 articles.
Reproduced are some which apply specifically to 
associations of employers and employees. These indicate 
the extent to which the economic aims of trade unions were 
circumscribed, the close and constant scrutiny to which 
they were subjected, and give an idea of the opportunities 
for delay in registering the rules presented by the many 
authorities through whose hands they had to pass to secure 
approval.
The following regulations in respect of professional 
associations set up for persons employed in commercial or 
industrial enterprises or for the owners of such 
undertakings are laid down:-
1. Professional associations have as their aim the 
elucidation and co-ordination of their members' 
economic interests and the improvement of working 
conditions, or the raising of the productivity of 
enterprises belonging to them.
2. In particular professional associations may have as
their aim: (a) the investigation of means of removing
by agreement or arbitration misunderstandings arising
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from conditions of contract between employers and 
employees; (b) the ascertaining of wage rates and 
other conditions of work in the various branches of 
industry and commerce; (c) the payment of grants-in- 
aid to their members; (d) the establishment of 
funeral benefit funds, endowments, mutual benefit 
funds and so on; (e) the establishment of libraries, 
trade schools, courses and public readings; (f) the 
provision for their members of opportunities of 
advantageous acquisition of items of necessity and of 
instruments of production; (g) the rendering of 
assistance in the search for employment or for a 
labour force; (h) the provision of legal aid for 
members.
3. Institutions formed by professional associations for 
the realisation of their aims are subject to the 
general regulations governing such institutions.
4. Professional associations may present to the appropriate 
authorities petitions on matters affecting the aims 
and activity of the association and likewise convey 
the considerations moving them in the matters 
aforesaid, upon the demand of these authorities.
5. A professional association may open branches of the 
association for certain districts or certain groups 
of its members on condition only that the above 
mentioned branches do not have managements separate 
from that of the association.
6. The combining of two or more professional associations 
into a union is forbidden. Professional associations 
controlled by institutions or persons abroad are also 
forbidden.
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7. Only those persons of both sexes may join a 
professional association who are engaged in the same, 
similar or linked occupations or trades in commercial 
and industrial undertakings, public and private; 
likewise owners of identical, similar or linked 
industrial or commercial enterprises.
8. Minors may join a professional association if the 
rules of the association do not restrict their 
admission as members.
9« Persons wishing to form a professional association
must, not less than two weeks before the commencement 
of their activities, supply the Chief Factory 
Inspector or District Mining Engineer in the place 
where the association^ management board is located, 
with a written notification accompanied by a notarial 
certification of the legal capacity of applicants and 
the authenticity of their signatures, together with 
two copies of the certified rules of the association, 
and also money for the necessary approval of the 
notification of the formation of the institution.
10. Details of the mode of operation of the association 
and its branches and the form of control of its 
affairs, in so far as this is not laid down in the 
present regulations are to be defined by the rules of 
the association.
11. The rules of an association (Art. 10) must indicate
(a) the name of the association, its aims, area and 
mode of operation and the location of the association;
(b) the full names, rank and addresses of its 
founders; (c) conditions of admission and exclusion
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of members; (d) rights and duties of members; (e) 
membership subscription rates and method of paying 
them; (f) members of the management board and their 
addresses; form of ownership of property of the 
association, method of election and powers of the 
management board and persons entrusted with the 
direction of the affairs and property of the 
association; (g) the term of office of the management 
board and of persons entrusted with the direction of 
the affairs and property of the association, and 
procedure with regard to dismissal from office before 
the appointed time; (h) the method of book keeping;
(i) procedure in regard to the calling of general 
meetings of the association and its branches and the 
length of notice given; (j) matters brought before 
the general meeting; (k) conditions under which 
decisions of the general meeting are deemed valid;
(l) procedure with regard to altering the rules and 
closing the association and the method of liquidation 
of the affairs of the association; (m) the 
establishment of various ancillary institutions of 
the association, mutual benefit funds, funds for 
payment of grants-in-aid, libraries, trade schools 
etc., if such are envisaged; (n) procedure with 
regard to opening branches of the association in 
appropriate cases.
12. Notification of the formation of professional
associations with drafts of their rules are to be 
presented by the Senior Factory Inspector or District 
Mining Engineer to the Governor or the Chief City 
Official (gradonachal1nik) who will pass them on to
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the Provincial or City Office for Matters relating to 
Associations, for consideration and further 
submission on the basis of Articles 23 and 24 of 
Section I of the present regulations.*
13* For the investigation of matters concerning 
professional associations the Senior Factory 
Inspector or District Mining Engineer or persons 
acting in their stead are deemed to be members of the 
Provincial or City Office for Matters relating to 
Associations.
14. The Minister of Trade and Industry in agreement with 
the appropriate ministers is empowered, in respect of 
those places where the positions of Senior Factory 
Inspectors or District Mining Engineers have not been 
approved, to entrust their duties to other local 
officials.
15* The form of the register of professional associations 
is laid down by agreement of the Ministers of the 
Interior and Justice with the Minister of Trade and 
Indus try.
16. The Provincial or City Office for Matters relating to 
Associations informs the Department of Industry in 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry of the 
registration of a professional association and sends 
the articles for approval in the prescribed manner in 
the Senate Announcements and local provincial or 
oblas t * gazettes.
1 7. Every professional association elects at its general 
meeting from the number of its adult members a board 
for the management of the affairs of the association
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on the basis of the rules of the association (Art. 11) 
and special decisions of the general meeting.
18. The management board of the professional association 
immediately upon its election (Art. 17) must supply a 
written notification of the same to the officials 
designated in Article 9 enclosing a list of the 
persons who are members of the board and also other 
persons taking part in the management of the affairs 
of the association with the designation of the 
position and occupation of each of them.
19* The management board of the professional association 
must immediately notify the officials designated in 
Article 9 (a) of every change in the composition of 
the board and generally, in the composition of the 
persons taking part in the management of the affairs 
of the association; (b) of all changes in the rules; 
(c) of the opening or closing of a branch of the 
association (Art. 5) and (d) of the closing of the 
association.
20. Persons and institutions mentioned in Articles 12-14
are obliged, in case of necessity, to give 
information about the notifications filed (Art. 9> 18
and 19) to state and public institutions and also to 
officials and private individuals upon their 
notifications and requests in the matter.
21. The Senior Factory Inspector or the District Mining
Engineer or officials acting in their stead (Art. 14) 
inform the officials in charge of public institutions 
of the notifications received (Arts. 9> 18 and 19)
and of information concerning the approval of 
professional associations for persons working in 
public enterprises.
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Articles 23 and 24 of the regulations in Section I 
provided that the Provincial or City Office for Matters 
relating to Associations had a month in which to 
investigate and accept or reject the draft rules of an 
association; and that registration of association rules 
was to be signified by the affixing of the signature of 
the Governor or Chief City Official.
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